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CONTRIBUTIONS

TO

THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE, DR. AIKIN'S ATHENÆUM,
THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY, AND THE
CHRISTIAN REFORMER.

BY

THE LATE REV. ELIEZER COGAN.

X

In Two Parts.

PART I.—CLASSICAL.

PART II.—THEOLOGICAL, METAPHYSICAL, AND BIBLICAL.

EXTRACTED AND COMPILED BY HIS SON,

RICHARD COGAN.

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TO THE READER.

Soon after the death of my venerated father I looked over the periodicals mentioned in the title-page, to which I knew he had been a contributor, with a view of ascertaining what he had written upon classical and other subjects. I was somewhat surprised to find that he had written so much, and, thinking that many of the articles might be read with interest by, at least, some of his surviving friends, I determined to collect and print them in a small volume. I was not at all aware until after his decease that he had written so much upon classical subjects at so early a period. The articles, it is true, are short; but as he never published any large work, it was these fugitive pieces, and *these alone*, which in the first instance gained for him the reputation of a scholar. And when I find that they were thought worthy of consideration by such men as Carey, Dawes, and Wakefield, I trust I may be pardoned for having made this attempt to rescue them from *entire* oblivion. The reader will see that I have divided the volume into two parts. One or two observations in Part II. might with more propriety (not being Biblical) have been placed in Part I.; but as they were contributions to the Monthly Repository, I did not think it worth while to disturb the order in which they were written. There is, I am well aware, a vast difference of opinion upon the subjects treated of in the second part of the volume. Few, if any, of the denomination of Christians to which he belonged, will be found to agree with him on all points. They were, however, those in which he felt a deep interest, and upon which, especially in early life, he had spent considerable time and thought. In theology as well as metaphysics he was a follower of the celebrated Priestley, of whose character, talent, and writings

he had formed the highest estimate. He did not consider himself by any means a profound theologian. This he has stated in a passage which will be found in pp. 208-9 of this volume. In what estimation he was held as a metaphysician by one of the most acute and able metaphysicians of modern times (the late Dr. Crombie) may be judged by the fact of his having placed in the hands of my father the manuscript of his "Natural Theology" before he sent it to press. I may add with truth, that what he wrote upon these subjects was not for the purpose of displaying either his theological learning or his metaphysical ingenuity, but because he deemed them of great importance, and with the hope, by throwing out a hint or two, of inducing others, who had "more leisure and more ability," to devote their powers to such inquiries. Should the following pages afford gratification to any of his former friends, my object will be gained, and I shall have the satisfaction of knowing that my labour has not been altogether in vain.

R. C.

November, 1855.

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EXTRACTS

FROM

THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE, AND DR. AIKIN'S ATHENÆUM.

PART I.—CLASSICAL.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—The true solution of the question proposed by a correspondent on the passage in Virgil, *Nihil iste nec ausus nec potuit*, is to be found in the following well-known peculiarity of the Latin language; that after a negative a distribution is generally made, not by *aut* or *vel* repeated, but by *nec* or *neque*. Corn. Nep. de Timoleon: *Nihil unquam neque insolens neque gloriosum ex ore ejus exiit*. Plaut. Trin. v. 97. *Neque de illo quicquam neque emeris neque venderes*. Schell. Præcepta Stili bene Latini, vol. i. p. 291. ed. Sec. Prisci τοις *nec* (*neque*)—*nec* (*neque*) præmittunt sæpe vocabulum negans, v. c. *nullus, nihil, non, &c.* Cic. Mil. *Non possum reliqua nec cogitare nec scribere*. This peculiarity seems not to have been present to the mind of the great Bentley, when on the Andria of Terence, Act i. Sc. ii. v. ult. he wrote the following note: *Vera sine dubio et vetusta illa lectio est neque haud, non neque hoc*: Sic Plautus ter quaterque, Noster iii. 3, 31. At ego *non* posse arbitror, *neque* illum hanc perpetuo habere, *neque* me perpeti.

Allow me to remind your correspondent, who proposes an ingenious interpretation of Virg. Ec. i. 54, of a passage in the

Æneid, i. 602, "magnum quæ sparsa per orbem," which will show that the genius of the Latin language is not violated by the ellipsis of the verb *est* after *depasta*.

While I have my pen in my hand, allow me to detain your classical readers another moment, to propose a correction of a passage in Homer: Il. xxii. v. 346, for αἱ γὰρ πῶς read αἱ γὰρ ὥς. See Odyss. xv. 156, and in vindication of the metre, Il. xiv. 521. By the critical scholar the emendation, whether approved or not, will be instantly understood on reading the passage. I am, Sir, yours, &c.

E. COGAN.

Cheshunt, Feb, 23, 1800.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—I have not at hand the observations of Mr. Wakefield referred to by a correspondent in your last number. Without knowing, therefore, whether I have been anticipated, I take the liberty to trouble you with the following remark. The particle *re* in the Latin language has in several compounds the force sought for in the verb *recludo*. Take for examples *repono* and *recondo*.

Scientia condendi ac reponendi fructus.

CICERO.

Quasque recondiderat, Stygiisque admoverat undis,
Effodiuntur opes, irritamenta malorum.

OVID.

Hence the ordinary use of *reconditus*, and the English *recondite*.

E. C.

May 5th, 1800.

P.S. The force of particles in composition has not been sufficiently attended to in studying and teaching the Latin language. That treasure of critical learning, that κτήμα εἰς αἰεὶ, Mr. Wakefield's Lucretius, casts much light on this

subject. Of its importance allow me to give an instance
Virg. An. iv. 230 :—

genus alto a sanguine Teucri
Proderet :

which Ruæus, vir non indoctus, has thus interpreted, *qui probaret originem suam esse e nobili sanguine Teucri!* For an elegant use of the verb *prodo*, see Lucret. vi. 562.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—In consequence of Mr. Robinson's communication on the Greek accents, I take the liberty to acquaint those of your classical readers who may not be at present possessed of the information, that some very curious remarks on the subject are to be found in Hermannus's "Treatise on the Metres of the Greek and Roman Poets," a very ingenious work of a very acute and learned man, which it is to be hoped will speedily find a place in the library of every British scholar. E. C.

June 7th, 1800.

P.S. In reading the Medea of Seneca the other day, I could not help remarking that Gronovius, in his note on verse 335, affirms of the verb *recludo* that it signifies both to *shut* and to *open*. But he produces no examples.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—To the question proposed by N. K., in page 535, vol. ix., it may, perhaps satisfactorily, be replied, that the existence of the article in the writings, and of course in the age, of

Homer is sufficiently proved by the instances which your correspondent has himself produced; and that the unfrequency of its use is to be attributed to a peculiar licence of heroic poetry, as will appear from the consideration that it is very sparingly used by the later heroic poets. Apollonius Rhodius will suffice for an example. Nay, in the iambics of the tragic poets the article is frequently omitted when in a prose writer it would have been inserted.

Allow me another moment to correct a false translation of line 78 of the first book of the Iliad ;

η γαρ οἶμαι ἀνδρα χολωσμεν,

which ought to be rendered, not, with Dr. Clarke, "For I think that a man will be angry," but, "I think that I shall provoke a man." The accusative case of the pronoun is omitted, because *οἶμαι* and *χολωσμεν* respect the same person. This is a simple matter, but the greatest critics have not been sufficiently aware of it. That admirable scholar Mr. Markland, for instance, has several times violated this propriety of the Greek language in his conjectures, v. g. Iph. in Aul. v. 475, where Scaliger and Aldus were mistaken before him ; again, on the Supplices, v. 504, and on verse 1192.

It may be curious to remark, that when the Greek poets use the formula *ιστω γαια*, &c., for *ομνυμι γαιαν* and the like, they still omit the pronoun as though the other form had been adopted. Vide Moschus, Meg. v. 75 et sequent. Homer, Od. v. 184 et sequent. Apoll. Rhod. iv. 95 et sequent.

But in reality it is the nominative which is understood in this construction.* Vide Eur. Med. 751, and following, from *ομνυ* down to *εκουσιω τροπω*. Soph. Antig. 897, 898, Ed. Brunk. 910, 911, of the new edition of Musgrave. This peculiarity was misapprehended by Heath and Henry Stephens on Eur. Cyclops, v. 266, and has been offended against by

* I mean, if a verb and an infinitive mood following respect the same person, a pronoun or adjective appertaining to that person will stand before the infinitive in the nominative case. V. Hoogv. ad Vigurum, p. 207.

Brunk, in a conjecture on Theoc. xxvii. 34. These hints may be of use to young proficient in the Greek language.

E. C.

Cheshunt, July 7, 1800.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—Permit me to propose a correction of a trifling error in a passage of Virgil. *Æneid* vi. 591.

Demens! qui nimbos et non imitabile fulmen
 Ere et cornipedum pulsu *simularat* equorum.

Instead of *simularat*, it should probably be *similarit*. Compare a similar epiphonema in the second book, v. 345.

Infelix! qui non sponsæ præcepta furentis
Audierit.*

It has often occurred to me, in the course of my classical reading, to remark that the elegancies of classical phraseology are not uncommonly preserved in the vulgarisms of the English language. An instance or two may amuse your classical readers.

The redundant pronoun is found in such expressions as the following: "That horse will trot *you* ten miles an hour." This is somewhere observed by Mr. Wakefield, in his very learned and valuable Commentary on Matthew.

Virg. Georg. iii. 434:—

Sævit agris, asperque siti, atque *exterritus* æstu.

In some parts of this kingdom, country people will say, that they have been much *terrified* with gnats, &c.

Lucret. ii. 539:—

Tanta ferarum

Vis est, quarum nos perpauca exempla videmus.

The good woman of whom I bought fruit when a child used often to talk of there being a *power* of apples this season.

* How it is read in other editions I know not; I have only those of Ruæus, Burmann, and Heyne. The manuscripts fluctuate between *simularat*, *simulabat*, and *simularet*.

"I'll comb your locks," "I'll give you a dressing," "I'll trim your jacket for you," are threatenings the full force of which is understood by those who know nothing of their origin. So the Greeks use, in the sense of chastising, *πλυνειν*, *νιπτειν*, *σμηχειν*, &c. Terence, *Heaut.* v. 1. 77: *Adeo exornatum dabo, adeo depexum, ut, dum vivat, meminerit semper mei.* To save trouble, I have borrowed these instances from Koen ad Gregor, p. 127. Vide etiam Harles. ad Theocrit. v. 119.

E. C.

Cheshunt, July 29, 1800.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—Your correspondent E. Cogan, at p. 137 of your last Number, prefers the reading *similarit* in Virg. *Æn.* vi. 590, to that generally received. I venture to differ from this writer on any subject with diffidence and circumspection. In my notes, however, on Lucretius, v. 744, I propose *simularet*, as the genuine reading of the passage; nor do I repent recommending that tense in preference to *similarat* commonly adopted, or even hesitate to undervalue *similarit*, approved by Mr. Cogan, in comparison with this authorised reading, for these reasons:

The *perfect* tense *similarit*, equivalent to *simulavit*, and substituted for it in compliance with the relative, implies a *complete* action; namely, that *Salmoneus* imitated the thunder with *efficiency* and *success*; a supposition wholly incompatible with the language and spirit of the passage: whereas the *imperfect* tense *simularet* conveys a signification of an *inadequate* and *incomplete* performance, and exhibits, with grammatical exactness, in conformity with the obvious purpose of the poet, a bungling attempt of *infatuated* (demens) impiety to represent that criterion of the supreme Deity, which was *inimitable* (non imitabile) by any contrivances of human power.

G. WAKEFIELD.

Dorchester Gaol, Sept. 3, 1800.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—Having read, in p. 137 of your last Number, a conjectural emendation, proposed by Mr. Cogan, of a passage in the sixth book of Virgil's *Æneid*, I send to you, as an accompaniment for it, the following remarks on the same passage, extracted from the "Analysis of the Hexameter," in a recent publication by Mr. Carey, entitled "Latin Prosody made Easy," page 165. In doing this, I neither pretend to prefer Mr. Carey's idea to Mr. Cogan's, nor Mr. Cogan's to Mr. Carey's: my only object is, to give your readers an opportunity of comparing the reasons on both sides, and judging for themselves.

"Demens! qui nimbos, et non imitabile fulmen,
 Ære et cornipedum pulsu *simularet* equorum."

"*Simularet*, which appears to be the reading of some respectable MSS., is here restored to its station, as better agreeing in tense with *Ibat* and *Poscebat*, whether we choose to understand those verbs as implying the *constant habit* of transgression, or as moreover describing the offender *in the very act* of transgressing at the moment when Jupiter checked him in the midst of his triumphant career by suddenly inflicting on him a public and exemplary punishment of his impiety. If Virgil had used the pluperfect at all on this occasion, he would have written *Simulâsset*, not *simulârat*. Every scholar knows that the subjunctive is elegantly combined with the relative to express the *cause, reason, motive*—as here, '*Infatuate wretch! to attempt mimicking,*' &c." E. W.

Piccadilly, Sept. 6, 1800.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

The following is the concluding part of a communication upon another subject:—

As I was reading the following line of Virgil, a few weeks ago, with one of my pupils (*Æn.* vi. 242),

Unde locum Graii dixerunt nomine Aornon,
it occurred to me that it might perhaps be admitted as genuine if a little spirit were given to it by the following alteration:—

Unde locum *Graio* dixerunt nomine Aornon.

Vide *Æn.* vi. 440.

Lugentes campi; sic illos *nomine dicunt*.

And *Æn.* iii. 210.

Strophades *Graio* stant *nomine* dictæ.

E. C.

Cheshunt, Sept. 7, 1800.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

The following is the latter part of an article written on a metaphysical subject:—

SIR,—Allow me to thank your correspondent J. C. (page 311 of your last Number) for his animadversions on my correction of Virgil's *Æneid*, vi. 242. I did not propose the emendation as necessary on the score of phraseology, but to try whether, by a slight alteration, a line might not be vindicated to Virgil which Burman and Heyne reject as *spurious*. Mr. Wakefield, I ought to observe, on the other hand, thinks that Lucretius, in book vi. v. 420, rather countenances its genuineness. In the second remark of your correspondent there is much force, but it applies only to *Aornon*, and not to *Avernum*, which some copies read. Should it be said that *Avernus* is only a *corruption* of a Greek name, and therefore that *Graio nomine* would be improper, I would refer the objector to the following lines of Ovid:—

Sed Veneris mensem *Graio sermone* notatum

Auguror: a spumis est dea dicta maris.

Nec tibi sit mirum *Graio rem nomine* dici,

Italia nam tellus Græcia major erat.

FAST. iv. 61.

Certainly *Aprilis* is no more a genuine Greek word than *Avernus*. Perhaps the following lines of Silius Italicus afford the best commentary on this controverted passage of the Mantuan bard, if indeed the line be his:—

Ille, olim populis dictum Styga, nomine vero
Stagna inter celebrem nunc mitia monstrat Avernum.

Pun. xii. 120.

In further confirmation of the subjunctive mood in Virg. *Æn.* vi. 591, which confirmation can only be needed, because Burman and Heyne, *at qui viri!* have acquiesced in the indicative, let me add *Æn.* ix. 728–9:—

Demens! qui Rutulum in medio non agmine regem
Viderit irrumpentem, ultroque *incluserit* urbi.

I have since observed, that in the Oxford edition (which I did not recollect that I had in my possession), *simularet* is given for *simularat*.
E. C.

Cheshunt, Nov. 1, 1800.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—In your Magazine for August last, p. 33, I made an observation on the use of the nominative case before the infinitive mood in the Greek language. I wish to suggest that the case there specified, namely, when the nominative, the infinitive, and the preceding verb, all respect the *same person*, appears to be the *only* case in which the *ancient* Greek writers used the nominative before the infinitive. Dr. Huntingford, under the following rule of his Greek syntax, “The infinitive mood is elegantly used with a nominative case either before or after it, particularly by the Attics,” gives sixteen examples. The first is rather an instance of the *ανακολουθον*. All the rest, save one from Lucian (of which, not having the connection before me, I can say nothing), come under the predicament of my observation. I will not answer for the fidelity of my memory, but I recollect no indubitable instance in the *poets* which contradicts my remark. I hesitate, however, when I find such critics

as Musgrave and Mr. Wakefield defending the nominative before the infinitive in the following passage of the Trach. of Sophocles, v. 585:—

ὥστε μῆτιν εἰσιδῶν
Στερξάι γυναῖκα κείνος ἀντι σου πλεον.

Musgrave, indeed, refers to a passage which comes under the above description, and upon that passage cites an instance from Philostratus. At any rate, this passage of Sophocles is not decisive, as Brunk's *στερξεί* is supported by manuscript authority.

I do not know whether any writer on the English language has traced the resemblance between our auxiliary verb *have* and the use of the Greek *εχω* with the aorist participle. In a matter known to every Greek scholar I will be sparing of quotations. Vide Eur. Troad. 1150, *ενος μεν ουν μοχθου σ' απαλαξας εχω*, and Aristoph. Eccl. 355, Ed. Brunk. In Eurip. Troad. v. 1121, for *Δαναοι κτεινοντες εχουσιν* read *κτειναντες εχουσιν*, as the sense requires not *interficiunt* but *interfecerunt*.

E. C.

Cheshunt, Dec. 6, 1800.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—Mr. Wakefield, in his *Noctes Carcerariæ*, amidst other very curious matter, has favoured the world with an acute observation on Greek prosody, which he once did me the honour to communicate *vivâ voce*; namely, that an *hiatus* frequently occurs in the third foot of an hexameter, as in the following line of Homer:—

Ἀλλ' ἀκεουσα καθησο, ἐμῷ δ' ἐπιπειθεο μυθῷ.

I was much gratified to find that the solution which Mr. Wakefield gives of this peculiarity coincides with the explanation which had previously suggested itself to my own mind.

This is, the frequency of the pause which the grammarians have called *κατα τρίτον τροχαιον*.

The following line of Virgil is a specimen :—

Ingens : et simulacra modis pallentia miris.

This is what Mr. Carey would ingeniously call the *sesquicæsuræ* in the third foot.

I know not how this pause may affect others; to my ear it is sweet beyond measure or comparison. I could almost say of every line that contains it what Mr. Wakefield says of the following exquisite verse of Lucretius :—

Unum labundi conservans usque tenorem,

that Achilles might have soothed his sorrow by the repetition of them as effectually as by the music of his lyre. Were I to endeavour to account for the ineffable sweetness of this pause, I should attribute it to its immediately succeeding the syllable where the *cæsuræ* is usually found; or to adopt the convenient term of Mr. Carey, I should say, that for the same reason that the *cæsuræ* is peculiarly agreeable in the third foot, the *sesquicæsuræ* is so likewise; which reason appears to be, that, in the words of Hermann, *ita versum dividit, ut nec pulmonibus molestiam creet, et aures numeri varietate delectet*.

Mr. Carey observes, that whenever the *sesquicæsuræ* thus occurs in the third foot, harmony requires that there should be a *cæsuræ* in the fourth, as in the following line :—

Dumque sitim sedare cupit, sitis altera crevit.

Mr. Wakefield remarks, that this pause sometimes makes a line tolerable where the *cæsuræ* is neglected. It will be curious to notice, that in two of the most exquisite lines that ever were penned, this pause is substituted for the ordinary *cæsuræ*.

ΑΥΤΙΣ ΕΠΕΙΤΑ ΠΕΘΟΝΔΕ ΚΥΛΙΝΔΕΤΟ ΛΑΑΣ ΑΝΑΙΔΗΣ,

Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis ævum.

Now I am on the subject of harmony, I am induced to notice a censure of Brunk's on Eur. Phœn. v. 852, in which he

attributes *leaden ears* to all those who prefer *μοι* to *εμοι*, where it is optional to write either. I cannot help pleading for an exception in favour of this pronoun, when used redundantly, as in the following line of Moschus, Meg. 88 :—

νυν δὲ μοι οἰχεται, κ. τ. λ.

The *εμοι* has, to my ear, an *emphasis* which is inconsistent with the sense, or rather the *feeling*, which the redundant pronoun is intended to convey. And my opinion is confirmed by this consideration, that I have met with no passage (except one somewhere in Aristophanes) where, from the measure of the line, it was necessary to write the redundant pronoun *εμοι*.

Another word, and I have done. In Mr. Carey's "Analysis of the Hexameter," p. 174, it is observed, "that words of *two* or *three syllables* require no particular observation; they may be placed anywhere, consistently with the proper attention to *cæsura* and *sesquicæsura*." Whether the following observation be new or not, I cannot tell: it is, that the Latin poets are not fond of using words of this measure ~~~, as *ămāntēs*, except at the end of the hexameter; and when they *do* occur elsewhere, it is perhaps generally in the fourth foot. That they constitute the favourite termination of the hexameter verse, every man's recollection will instantly inform him. And this renders the *sesquicæsura* in the fifth foot—what Mr. Carey observes it to be, highly pleasing and elegant, as—

Me mea paupertas vi | tæ tra | dūcāt inertī.

E. C.

Cheshunt, March 12, 1801.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—To the observations in my last, respecting the use of such words as *ămāntēs* in the Latin poets, I would add, that when they occur so as to form the termination of the fourth foot, which they very rarely do in Virgil—in Ovid pretty fre-

quently—they are generally found preceded by a short monosyllable, as—

Obstrepere sonis *et adunco* tibia cornu.

The Greeks, who close their hexameters with greater variety than the Latins, do not so generally reserve words of the above quantity for the termination of the verse, and use them without scruple after the *sesquicæsuræ* in the third foot, and even close the verse with another word of the same measure, which the Roman poets, I think, avoid. Such lines as the following are not uncommon in Homer:—

Λαωδικὴν Πριαμοῖο θυγατρὸν εἶδος ἀριστήν.

E. C.

April 29, 1801.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—It may amuse those of your readers who are fond of critical learning to see what *has* been said, and *may* be said, upon a hemistich of Virgil, which the ordinary scholar passes over without embarrassment or observation—Æn. lib. ii. v. 619:—

Eripe, nate, fugam.

The sense is clear, but the expression dubious.

Heyne, a man in whom learning, judgment, taste, and candour are united in a very extraordinary degree, considers *eripe* as a poetical substitute for *ræpe*. Scioppius conjectures *fuga*, as did also your humble servant; and this may perhaps be defended by Æn. v. 741:—

Æneas, quo deinde ruis? quo *proripis*? inquit.

Heinsius on Val. Flac. l. ii. 247, defends *eripe fugam* from *iter eripere* in Frontinus. Burmann reads *arripe fugam*, a phrase which, in the judgment of Heyne, requires confirmation as much as that for which it is substituted. This confirmation,

however, is at hand from Claud. Rutil. Itiner. lib. i. v. 165:—

His dictis *iter arripimus* : comitantur amici.

Oudendorp agrees with Burmann. Jo. Schrader, with his usual acuteness and elegance, reads *I rape*. Mr. Wakefield, the last, but not the least, in this honourable group, in one of his lectures on the second book of the *Æneid* which I had the felicity of attending, proposed, with the spirit which characterised everything he did, *En, rape*, appealing to the well-known passage in the *Georgics*, *En, age, segnes rumpe moras*.

Eligat Lector. Equidem cum Wakefieldio sentio.

E. C.

Cheshunt, Nov. 14, 1801.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—The following observations and conjectures are proposed, not as certainly just, but as *lusus ingenii*, which, if they do no good, can do no harm, and may whet the wits of abler critics.

Fungar vice cotis—exsors ipse secandi.

Homer Il. α. v. 597.

Αυταρ ὁ τοις αλλοισι Θεοῖς ἐνδεξία πᾶσιν
Ωνοχοει, γλυκυ νεκταρ απο κρητηρος αφυσσων.

The comma after Ωνοχοει should be removed, as a well-known elegance of the Greek language is thereby lost. To put the matter out of doubt, compare Il. δ. v. 3. νεκταρ εωνοχοει.

Il. γ. v. 100, for Αλεξανδρου ἐνεκ' αρχης, read ατης, as in other places. Vide Il. ω. v. 28.

Il. τ. v. 133,

ὁθ' ἔον φιλον υἷον ὄρωτο
Εργον αεικες εχοντα, ὑπ' Εὐρυσθης αεθλων,

Place a comma after *Ευρυσθης*, that *αθλων* may be governed of *εργον*.

Virgil, *Ecl.* i. v. 74 :—

Insere nunc, Melibœe, pios,

Forte, *I sere nunc*. In this *formula*, the *I* and the *nunc* usually stand together; but this is not universal. Martial *Epigr.* L. x. Ep. 96, *I cole nunc reges*. If any one, however, should defend the common reading from the following hemistich of Virgil, *Insere Daphni, pios, verbum non amplius addam*.

Virgil, *Æn.* v. 372 :—

Victorem Buten immani corpore, qui se
Bebrycia veniens Amyci de gente ferebat,
Perculit, &c.

Immani corpore will be properly connected with *qui se ferebat*, a comma being placed after *Buten* and *gente*, as—

Æn. viii. 199 :—

Illius atros
Ore vomens ignes, *magna se mole ferebat*.

Æn. v. 541 :—

Nec bonus Eurytion prælato invidit honori.

Heyne explains *prælato* by *prærepto*, but this makes the passage ambiguous even to a Roman ear. I have tried *honore*, *honoris*, and *honorem*. *Honore* is good for nothing; *honoris* is also the conjecture of Markland; *honorem* appears the simplest and best. Vide *Hor. Serm.* l. i. vi. v. 49 :—

Quia non, ut forsit honorem
Jure *miki invideat* quivis, ita te quoque amicum.

On the verb *invideo*, see that most judicious grammarian Perizonius, in his notes on *Sanct. Minerva*, lib. iii. cap. 3. n. 80.

Æn. ix. v. 205 :—

Est hic, est animus lucis contemtor.

For *hic* read *huic* *δεικτικως*.

E. C.

Cheshunt, Dec. 24, 1801.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—In my little communication of the 24th of December last, I proposed pointing the following line of Homer, Il. i. v. 133.

Εργον αεικες εχοντα ὑπ' Ευρυσθης αεθλων,

not as it stands in the editions of Barnes and Dr. Clarke, who show that they have mistaken the construction by translating, *sub Eurysthei laboribus*, but after Ευρυσθης as well as εχοντα, that αεθλων may be governed of εργον. This correction is indisputable. In confirmation of the force given to ὑπο, compare Moschus Megara, iv. 4, 5, where speaking of Hercules and Eurystheus he says:—

Η ῥ' ὅτι αλγεα πασχει απειριτα φαιδιμος υἱος
Ανδρος 'ΥΠ' ουτιδανοιο, λεων ὡσει θ' 'ΥΠΟ νεβρου.

See also Professor Porson's note in v. 1011 of the Medea of Euripides.

In defence of εργον αεθλων, see Megara, v. 42, πολεων γαρ οἱ ΕΡΓΟΝ ἐτοιμον ΜΟΧΘΩΝ. E. C.

Walthamstow, Jan. 4, 1802.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—In reply to the inquiries of Mr. Singleton, page 29 of your last Number, it may be briefly observed, that πεφανται in Hom. Il. xvi. v. 207, is the singular number; πεφαμμαι, πεφανσαι, πεφανται. With respect to ειμενος ωμοῖν νεφελην, the fact seems to be this; εω, as a verb of clothing, is construed with two accusatives; but, after the passive voice, it admits the dative of the part, still retaining the accusative of the thing worn or put on. Thus Od. τ. v. 72, κακα δε χρῶι ειματα ειμαι.

Ut vineta egomet cædam mea, I feel disposed to retract the

change of *insere* into *I sere*, in Virgil, *Ec. i. v. 74*, as the irony implied in *I nunc* seems too severe for the occasion.

I was somewhat gratified, a few days ago, in looking into Heyne's *new* edition of Virgil, to find the punctuation, which I proposed in your last, of Virg. *Æn. v. 370*, *Victorem Buten*, &c., confirmed by the judgment of this admirable scholar.

E. C.

Walthamstow, Feb. 3, 1802.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—Justice to the memory of my much-lamented friend, Mr. Wakefield, obliges me to notice, that in his edition of Virgil (which is come into my possession within these ten days), he has anticipated me in reforming the punctuation of Virg. *Æn. v. 372*. To him, therefore, let the whole praise of the correction be given. *Habeat secum servetque sepulcro*. I am not ignorant that Aulus Gellius, lib. v. cap. 8, of his *Noct. Attic.*, explains the passage as it has been generally understood. But whoever reads through the whole chapter will not attribute much to his authority, and will be disposed to allow that, at least *that night*, the Grammarian took a nap.

E. C.

Walthamstow, March 13, 1802.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—I thank Scioppius for his hint. Dr. Hunter's Horace I have, and esteem it. With his Virgil I am altogether unacquainted. Till I have an opportunity of consulting it, I will venture to suppose that he has published—

Bebryciâ veniens, qui se, Amyci de gente ferebat, of the family of Amycus, which would be easy and natural. I could say more in behalf of this conjecture, but let the learned reader judge between the two. *Ego rem in medio relinquo.*

E. C.

Higham Hill, Walthamstow, May 3, 1802.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—I will thank you to correct a rather singular error of the press in page 417 of your last Number. The passage from Virgil should have stood thus :—

qui se,
Bebrycia veniens, Amyci de gente ferebat :

i. e. *Who, coming from Bebrycia, professed to be of the family of Amycus.* And this I have since seen to be Dr. Hunter's emendation. More than enough has been said on the passage; otherwise a still different mode of pointing and interpreting it might be suggested. I cannot conclude without expressing my surprise that the common clumsy method should have satisfied all the editors previous to Mr. Wakefield.

E. C.

Higham Hill, Walthamstow, May 5, 1802.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—In compliance with the request of Dr. Baggs, page 544 of your last Number, I take up my pen once more on a passage of Virgil, of which I thought I had taken leave for ever.

My reasons for rejecting the common punctuation were, that *qui veniens se ferebat* appeared awkward and redundant, and that the words *qui se ferebat* seemed to require something else to be connected with them in order to a good sense, and a *legitimate construction*, both which were supplied by connecting them with *immani corpore*. Vide Wakefield ad locum.

I have now little doubt but that Dr. Hunter has been more perspicacious than either of us, and that *his* is the true punctuation of the passage. In confirmation of *qui se Amyci de gente ferebat*, it will be sufficient to cite a line of Silius Italicus:—

Atque Antenorea sese de stirpe ferebat.

I quote from memory, as I write this in the apartment of a friend.

Dr. Baggs will now perceive that I acquit *Aulus Gellius* of blame in connecting *immani corpore* with *victorem Buten*; but whoever observes the use he makes of the passage, will not hesitate to pronounce whether it was Mr. C. or Aulus Gellius that was *napping*. I must again depend upon my memory, but I think that the reader will find my judgment of the chapter of Aulus Gellius confirmed by Heyne in his Var. Lec. in Virgil, *Æn.* vii. 187. However, no confirmation can be needed.

Your correspondent L., p. 522, will find the following line somewhere in the *Medea* of Euripides:—

λιμνη πεφανται των εμων βουλευματων.

E. C.

Hackney, July 2nd, 1802.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—Your correspondent Mr. Marr (p. 26) will find the following remark in p. 17 of the Preface to the second edition of the *Hecuba*, by Mr. Porson:—"Quod ait Bruckius, quædam

esse verba, quibus solenne sit augmentum abjicere, verba ea, quæ augmentum nunquam habuere, abjicere non possunt. Attici semper dicunt *ανωγα*, nunquam *ηνωγα*, sed augmentum plusquam perfecto tempori reservant." Brunck, who contends for the occasional omission of the augment, had observed on Eurip. *Androm.* v. 955, "Atticorum etiam proprium videtur preteritum medium verbi *ανωγω* absque augmento proferre."

Some ingenious matter in defence of the occasional omission of the augment will be found in the Preface to the *Hecuba*, published by Herman.

That *certain* Ionic peculiarities were tolerated on the Attic Theatre is a point acknowledged. It will be sufficient to refer to Valckenaer, *Commentary on the Hippolitus*, p. 319, or Diatribe on the *Fragments of Euripides*, p. 167. Mr. Porson's *Hecuba* has brought to my mind a question which is agitated with the Professor's usual learning and sagacity, in the note on verse 788, ed. sec., namely, whether *τυγχανω* is ever used *simpliciter* for *ειμι*. One passage seems to have been overlooked, in which the common reading is corroborated by the authority of Eustathius, and which does not appear to admit of correction,—Soph. *Electra*, v. 45:—

Ὅ γὰρ
μεγίστος αὐτοῖς τυγχάνει δορυξένων.

E. C.

Higham Hill, Aug. 3, 1802.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—When I proposed my *simularit* for *simularat* on Virgil *Æn.* vi. 591, I was more anxious about the mood than the tense. A few days after, as I was feasting my fancy on Mr. Wakefield's *Lucretius*, I cast my eyes on his *simularet*, and saw *quasi per nebulam* the reason of his preference of the imperfect tense. I know nothing that can be replied to the re-

mark with which Mr. Wakefield has honoured me, unless it be that perhaps the verb *simulo* implies merely the act of imitation, without any reference to its success; so that the action, with respect to Salmoneus, might be complete, while the imitation itself was awkward and inefficient. Might we not, with propriety, say in English, "Madman! *to have imitated* the inimitable thunder"? However, whatever becomes of the tense, I am glad to have agreed with Mr. Wakefield and Mr. Carey as to the subjunctive mood; in favour of which let me add Stat. Theb. v. 172:—

*Miseri, quos non aut horrida virtus
Marte sub Odrysio, aut medii inclementia ponti
Haurerit!*

Mr. Carey, as I learn from your correspondent E. W., page 230 of your last Number, prefers *simularet*, partly on account of *ibat* and *poscebat* in the description preceding. I, on the contrary, should, I think, prefer the perfect tense, if admissible, as drawing a clearer line of distinction between the epiphonema and the tale; and I should point with a colon at *pōscebat honorem*, which is not done, according to my copies by Burman or Heyne. I shall not wander far from the present subject, if I remark that the first aorist of the Greeks is sometimes used instead of the imperfect *de conatu*. On Eur. Orest., v. 906, ὑπο δ' ετεινε Τυνδαρεως λογους τω σφω κατακτεινοντι τοιουτους λεγειν, Mr. Porson's note is as follows: "*κατακτειναντι Ald et MSS.. quidam. Parum refert.*" This *parum refert* at first startled me, and my pencil spontaneously wrote on the margin, *Immo permultum, ni fallor*. But from a memorandum subjoined, I learn that I have found the aorist of the very verb *τεινω* twice in the Ion alone used of the attempt, not of the effect. One of the passages lies before me in Mr. Wakefield's edition, v. 1310: *εκτεινα δ'οντα πολεμιον δομοις εμοις*.

I wish to suggest a doubt, whether the ablative case in the Latin language be not sometimes used with a double reference. I do not love whims; but if I am whimsical in this, I err in good company. Doering on Catullus, 64, 251—

Multiplices animo volvebat saucia curas,

has this note ; “ *Saucia* percussa dolore, nisi quis *animo* tam ad *volvebat* quam ad *saucia* referre malit. *Exempla enim*, ubi unum nomen ad plura trahendum est, haud rara sunt.

E. C.

Oct. 3, 1802.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—I agree with Mr. Cogan, that the passages of Euripides and Sophocles sufficiently defend one another, and prove, at least in poetry, the legitimate use of the verb τυγχάνειν without the participle ὄν.

My friend, Mr. C. Falconer, jun., pointed out to me another mistake in Mr. Porson's note, which Mr. Cogan has omitted to correct, either through forbearance or oversight. If in Euripides, *Androm.* 1116, we read [Εὐξαιτο φοίξω] ἔτυχε δ' ὦν ἐν ἐμπύροις, there will be an *hiatus valde deflendus*, which Mr. Porson will, I dare say, retract, when it is mentioned to him. I draw this conclusion from two of his own notes, one upon the 571st verse of the *Hecuba*, where he quotes with approbation my namesake's (*Dawes. Misc. Crit.*, pp. 216, 217) censure of a similar mistake of King's; the other on *Orestes*, v. 792, where Mr. Porson proposes a conjecture to remedy the same fault in a comic poet.

While I am on this subject of the *hiatus*, it may not be improper to rescue another passage from the attacks of critics. *Machon* (*Athenaeus* xiii. p. 580, D.) tells us, that *Gnathæna*, seeing a young butcher, said to him, Μειράκιον ὁ καλὸς, φησὶ, πῶς ἴστης, φράσον; “My pretty lad, tell me how you sell (your meat).” Your readers, Sir, who recollect *Shallow's* questions, “How a good yoke of bullocks at *Stamford fair*?” “How a score of ewes now?” will readily agree, that πῶς ἴστης is at least good English. But *Lennepe*, in a note upon *Phalaris*, p. 95, i., will not allow it to be good Greek, so corrects it to πότου ἴστης, and falls into the error I have just exposed. Mr.

Jacobs, in a note upon the Anthology, approves of Lennep's correction. Let us try to defend the vulgar reading by a quotation from Aristophanes, Eq. 478: Πῶς οὖν ὁ τυρὸς ἐν Βοιωτοῖς ὤνιος; but see what a general prejudice has taken place in behalf of πόσου against poor πῶς! Gerard Horreus would read, πόσου δ' ὁ τυρὸς. This conjecture Pierson (on Moeris, p. 424) refutes by producing Acharn. 768: Τί δ' ἄλλο, Μεγαροῖ πῶς ὁ σῖτος ὤνιος; to which, when your readers have added a fragment of Strattis (apud Polluc. iv. 169)—Τὰ δ' ἄλφιθ' ὑμῖν πῶς ἐπῶλουν; τεττάρων Δραχμῶν μάλιστα τὸν κόφινον—they will consent to let Machon and Aristophanes enjoy their old reading.

JOHN NIC. DAWES.

Oct. 11, 1802.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—If any of your classical readers recollect that, in your Magazine of February last, I proposed to alter the punctuation of a line in Homer, Il. i. 133, I owe them and myself the following defence of the common reading. In Iliad, θ. ν. 393, we read—

τεῖρομενον σωεσκον ὑπ' Εὐρυσθης αἰθλων.

Eurip. Her. Fier. v. 832 :—

ἐπει δὲ μοχθους διεπερασ' Εὐρυσθεως.

The correction proposed was strictly classical, and well enough defended by the passage of Moschus; but my usual caution forsook me, when I pronounced it indisputable.

E. C.

Higham Hill, Nov. 8, 1802.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—Heyne's Homer having reached me within these few days, I turned with some impatience to the passage in the 19th

Book, on which I made a remark in your last. This admirable editor has observed that *εργον αεικες* is used, *miro modo*, for *εργα αεικῆ*, but that *εργον* sometimes signifies *labor*, *ærumnosus labor*. He has not noticed the *εργον μοχθων* of Moschus. He allows us to connect *εργον αεθλων*, but proposes that the words should be joined, *αεθλων ὑπ' Ευρυσθης*. But if *αεθλων* is to be joined with *εργον*, I should still prefer my old construction, as *ὑπο*, *προς*, and *εξ*, are frequently construed with neuter and active verbs.

All your classical readers will thank Mr. Dawes for his communication. He handsomely suggests that it might not be from oversight that I did not take notice of the *hiatus* introduced into the line of Euripides by Mr. Porson's correction. I pointed it out in a letter sent to you, Sir, but for which you allowed me to substitute that which you published. To the suggestion of a friend, I am indebted for the knowledge of a fact which I was not aware of, namely, that *τυγχανω* occurs again in the *Electra* of Sophocles, without the participle, v. 313, *νῦν δ' αἰγροισι τυγχανει*. Here, however, it might be read *αἰγροισιν ὧν τυγχανει*, in which order the *formula*, I think, occurs elsewhere. The expression v. 993 is of a different kind.

In Euripid. *Hecuba*, v. 1038—

ἡ γὰρ καθειλες Θρηκα, καὶ κρατεῖς ξένου;

I some years ago conjectured *ξενον*. The correction was at that time approved by Mr. Wakefield, and Herman has since given it in the text. The cause of the depravation, allowing it to be such, is obvious.

As the accusative appears to have been here supplanted by the genitive, I have sometimes suspected that it has been supplanted by the dative in Sophocles *Œdip. Col.* v. 1096 :—

τῷ σκοπῷ μὲν οὐκ εἴεις
ὧς Ψευδομαντὶς;

τὸν σκοπον would exhibit an elegant Græcism. *Vide Eurip. Med.* v. 250, *λεγουσι δ' ἡμᾶς, 'Ὡς ἀκινδυνον βίον ζῶμεν. Inf.* v. 453, Euripides might have written, if he did not write, *λεγουσ'*

Ἰασόν', ὡς κακίστος ἐστ' ἀνὴρ. The elision of the vowel, after a short syllable in the *cæsura*, is liable to no objection. *Vide* p. 24 of Professor Porson's Supplementary Preface to the *Hecuba*. E. C.

Higham Hill, Dec. 6th, 1802.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—The following observations and conjectures on certain passages of the Greek and Roman Classics are very much at your service.

A magno Tragædiæ patre auspicemur: Agam. v. 101, for φαίνουσ', we may not inelegantly read σαινουσ'. *Vide* Piers. Verisim. p. 72. I should not, however, with this most elegant scholar, read προύσηνε for γροσηγε in Eur. Androm. v. 27. I can hardly abandon a conjecture into which Reiske also has fallen, namely, προηγε.—*Nisi me lactasses amantem, et falsa spe produceres.*

The mention of Pierson brings to my mind a conjecture on the *Iôn* of Euripides, v. 617, where, for φαρμακων ανασιμων, he proposes *metri causa*, ανατηφορων. But since the sagacious discovery of Professor Porson, respecting the *anapæst* in the fifth foot of the Iambic line, this alteration will scarcely be admitted. Mr. Wakefield more happily reads φαρμακων τε ανασιμων. *Fortè melius*, ανασιμων τε φαρμακων, ανασιμος occupies this station of the verse, both in Euripides and Sophocles.

I have wavered somewhat with respect to the following passage in the *Hecuba* of Euripides, v. 13, ὁ καὶ με γῆς ὑπέξεπεμψεν, but I am at length inclined, with Brunck and Mr. Wakefield, to consider ὁ as here used for δι' ὁ. Among other reasons, the following has weight with me, that when ὁ has this meaning, καὶ frequently, perhaps generally, follows. *Vide* Phœniss. v. 270. Apollon. Rhod. i. 205, 767.

In this same first book of Apollonius, there is a passage which appears to be slightly corrupted:—

Ἦ, καὶ ὁ μὲν φορμιγγὰ συν ἀμβροσίῃ σχέεν ἀυδῆ·
 τοῦ δ' ἀμοτον ληξάντος ἐτι προυχόντο καρηνὰ
 πάντες ὁ μὴς·

That ὁ μὲν and τοῦ δὲ should be used of the same person is hardly consistent with the genius of the Greek language, and ἀμοτον, which belongs to προυχόντο, stands oddly between τοῦ δὲ ληξάντος. I should propose reading—

Οἱ δ' ἀμοτον, ληξάντος, ἐτι κ.τ.λ.

The passage may have been depraved by some one who did not know the pronoun may be omitted in the genitive absolute. But we need not go further for an example of this peculiarity than back to verse 260 of the very book in hand. If an instance of οἱ δὲ πάντες ὁ μὴς is required, it will be found in verses 474, 475.

In Sophocles Œdip. Tyr. 464—

ξενὴν ἐπὶ
 σκηπτρῷ προδεικνύς ἐμπορευσεται

Villoison (Animadver. in Longus, p. 85,) condemns σκηπτρῷ προδεικνύς, as not Greek, and proposes σκηπτρον. But the common reading may be defended by Theocrit. Idyl. xxii. v. 102, ἐτώσια χερσὶ προδεικνύς.

In Virgil Æn. ii. 615—

Nimbo effulgens, et Gorgone sæva,

it is rather doubtful whether *sæva* is the nominative or ablative. Perhaps the doubt may be resolved by the *Gorgone cruda virago* of Statius.

In the 8th book of the Æneid, v. 222, there is a passage on which the critics have entertained different opinions:—

Tum primum nostri Cacum videre timentem,
 Turbatumque oculis,

Mr. Wakefield reads *oculi*. In Livy we find *oculisque simul et mente turbatum*.

In the 12th book, v. 797, the sense of *mortalis* is considered as ambiguous—

Mortaline decuit violari vulnere divum?

The author of the Epitome of Homer's Iliad, in v. 469, has shown how *he* understood it. Speaking of Diomedes, he says :—

Celestemque manum mortali vulnerat hasta.

Horace Carm. lib. iii. Od. ii. v. 14—

Mors et fugacem persequitur virum.

Bentley reads *consequitur*. Baxter objects *suo more*. Gesher observes, *quem* persequitur: i. e. *cupide et constanter sequitur mors, illum sine dubio consequitur etiam assequiturque*. No one seems to have remembered that *persequi fugientes* is a military phrase, which at once defends the common reading, and gives spirit and beauty to the passage.

E. C.

Higham Hill, Sept. 6, 1803.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—I scarcely know whether it is worth while to notice an error of the press in my last, as no Greek scholar can be perplexed thereby: but the letter *θ* was omitted in the words *θανασιμων, θανατηφορων, and σχεθεν*. While I have my pen in my hand, I will detain you a moment longer. In perusing Huschke's *Analecta Critica*, I have just fallen upon an excellent observation of Bentley's, on the *sublimis anhelitus* of Horace. I wonder that no critic has compared this expression with the following passage in the *Hercules Furens* of Euripides, v. 1095, 1096 :—

και πνοας θερμας πνεω
μεταρσι', ου βεβαια, πνευμονων απο.

E. C.

Higham Hill, Oct. 3, 1803.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—In opening your Magazine of this month, I have just cast my eyes upon an inquiry proposed by Mr. Marr, on v. 270 (or, in Brunck, 262) of the *Œdipus Tyrannus* of Sophocles.

The omission of the augment in *ἐδυστυχησε* is no violation of Mr. Porson's canon, as this word is preceded by a long vowel. In this same play, v. 1504, we read, ὦ *ῥυτευσάμεν*.

Professor Dalzel has fallen into a similar misapprehension of this matter. On v. 1523 of this same *Œdipus*, *Και γὰρ ἂ ῥατῆσας*, he writes thus: ἂ ῥατῆσας, i. e. ἂ *ε*ρατῆσας. *Plane tamen persuasum habet Porsonus, non licuisse in Attico sermone augmentum abjicere*. But here the augment coalesces with the relative. Vide v. 722, *το δεινον ὀφροβειτο*. E. C.

Higham Hill, May 5, 1804.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

SIR,—Your magazine having this month come into my hand later than ordinary, I have now first seen the ingenious observations of J. A. upon Heyne's Commentary on Virgil. How far, upon examination, I should agree with your correspondent, I do not know; but I cannot give my assent to the remark upon the *Pocula Achelœia*, Georg. i. v. 9. The substitution of the water of Achelous, for water in general, was common with the ancients, no doubt for some particular reason, and probably because, according to Didymus—

Αχελῷος παντῶν τῶν ποταμῶν πρεσβυτάτος ἦν.

In the *Andromache* of Euripides, v. 166, we read—

Τευχεον χερί στείρουσαν Αχελῷου δῖοσσον.

But let us further hear Hesychius:—

Αχελωος, ποταμος Αρκαδίας, και παν ὕδωρ ουτος λεγεται.

See Alberti, and the authors cited by him. The Scholiast on Homer, Il. φ. v. 194, remarks—

Κοινως δε παν ὕδωρ Αχελωος καλεται.

With respect to the Achelous, I have nothing more to add, but that Dawes (*vide Miscel. Critica*, p. 176) was precipitate in affirming that the name of this river could not be written Αχελωιος. The evidence of Apollonius Rhodius on this point is satisfactory. L. iv. v. 293:—

—————Εἰ ετεον γε

Γαιης ὑμετερης Αχελωιος ἐξανησιν.

E. C.

Higham Hill, March 11, 1805.

A PECULIARITY IN HERODOTUS.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE ATHENÆUM.

SIR,—Every reader of Herodotus has probably observed in him a peculiarity which has indeed been noticed by the critics, namely, that he frequently separates the preposition from the verb to which it belongs by the insertion of the particle ᾤν, vid. Wesseling ad lib. iii. c. 60, et Schæfer ad Longum, p. 418, who produces from other writers similar instances of the *tmesis* with ᾤν. Vide etiam Koen ad Gregor, p. 209. It has further been remarked, that in this *tmesis*, as employed by Herodotus, the ᾤν has not its ordinary force, but is to a modern nearly redundant. I do not now inquire into the power of the particle in these instances, but proceed to observe that Herodotus inserts it between the preposition and the verb in the use of it now alluded to, I believe, *solely* in the case of an aorist used for the present indefinite, as in the following example:—απ'

ᾶν ἐδόντο, *vendere solent* or *vendunt*; on which use of the aorist vid. Grævii *Lectiones Hesiodæ*, p. 24; Krebsius ad Plutarch; *De audiendis Poetis*, p. 149; Valkenaer's *Diatribæ*, p. 163; Herman "*De emendanda ratione Græcæ Grammaticæ*," p. 187, to which, that I may take an opportunity of recommending an excellent work to the lovers of Plato, I add Heindorf ad *Platonis Phædrum*, p. 275.

The passages in which I have noticed the *tmesis* under consideration will be found in lib. ii. c. 39, 40, 47, in which are two instances, 70, 86, 87, 96, 122, lib. iii. c. 82, lib. iv. c. 60, 196, lib. vii. c. 10. All these instances answer to the description above given; I am not, therefore, disposed to admit the conjecture of Wesseling, ἐς ᾶν ἐλθεῖν, lib. iv. c. 146, which, as I learn from Borhejk's "*Apparatus Criticus ad Herodotum*," is decidedly approved by Larcher. I have only to add that Herodotus, if I am not mistaken, never uses the aorist for the present in the case of a compound verb *without* this *tmesis*; and in one instance he subjoins the ᾶν to the aorist of a simple verb employed in this manner, lib. i. c. 132. If there are any who think such *minutiæ* not worth observing, they may be told from high authority *nihil contemnendum est, neque in bello, neque in re critica*. Mr. Porson ad Eurip. *Medeam*, v. 140, εἰ δὲ γε μὴ πειθόνται, λείπεται δὴ λέγειν αὐτοῖς τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον,

Σοὶ μὲν ταῦτα δοκουντ' ἐστῶ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ταδε.

Coray ad Heliodorum, p. 200.

E. C.

Higham Hill, April 3rd, 1807.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE ATHENÆUM.

SIR,—Some little time ago, in reading the Hymns of Homer in the edition of Herman, I was struck with a circumstance

which may be not altogether uninteresting to your classical readers. On verse 86 of the Hymn to Venus, a poem which Herman pronounces to be *Homeri nomine dignissimum*, the learned editor remarks that this composition is purer with respect to the observance of the digamma than the remaining Hymns of the collection. He then proceeds—*Ac sublatiis vitiis*, v. 148, 182, 195, 204, *hi tantum loci supersunt de quibus dubitari possit, si vera sunt quæ de litera Æolica disputari solent*: v. 44, 54, 85, 86, 134, 170, 233, 257 (to which add v. 6), *nam v. 136 et 279, interpolatoris esse equidem existimo*. What I have to remark in addition to this is, that in almost all these passages the digamma may be restored by an easy remedy, and moreover a remedy which it is also necessary to apply to similar errors in the common text of the Iliad and Odyssey, and that in the remaining instances (one perhaps excepted) the difficulty is no greater than what is found in those writings which are acknowledged to be Homer's. And this, be it noticed, cannot be observed in general of the offences against the digamma in the Hymns to Apollo, Mercury, and Ceres. I shall leave the learned reader to draw what he pleases from these premises when I have examined the several passages above cited in their order.

V. 6. *πασιν δ' ἔργα μεμνηεν*. Here either the conjunction may be omitted, which I should prefer, or the *ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ἔργον ἐτυχθῆ* of Homer's Il. iv. v. 470, with the observation of Bentley, may be compared.

V. 44. *κεδν' εἰδυιαν*, read *κεδνα ἰδυιαν*, and see Il. i. 608, and Heyne ad lib. v. 128.

V. 54. *Πολυπιδάκου Ἰδης*. See Heyne's Excursus on the digamma, v. Ἰδῆ.

V. 85. *εἶδος τε μεγεθος τε καὶ εἴματα σιγαλοεντα*. Here it is easy to read *εἶδος καὶ μεγεθος καὶ*, which correction is also proposed by Matthæi.

V. 86. *Πεπλον μὲν γὰρ ἐστο φαινοτερον πυρος αυγης*. For *ἐστο*, if any emendation is necessary, read *εστο*, a correction which even Ilgen allows to be admissible, though unacquainted with the digamma, who indeed has been hereby betrayed into false

opinions respecting metre. He errs, for example, when, in favour of the reading in question, he observes, *nam γαρ ante spiritum asperum non raro producit etiam extra cæsura*, v. c. Il. ix. 377. But here he might plead a similar mistake of the great Ruhnkenius, who is equally unfortunate in a reference on v. 57 of the Hymn to Ceres, and has drawn Nitscherlich with him into error. See the note of the latter in the verse. With respect, however, to γαρ, lengthened in the cæsura, see Herman on this same verse of the Hymn to Ceres.

It is curious to observe how the opinions and conjectures of the ablest scholars have been sometimes refuted by subsequent *metrical* discoveries. I was forcibly impressed with this fact the other day, upon reading the notes of Markland on the two Iphigenias of Euripides. This admirable scholar has proposed several ingenious corrections which might have passed in his day for just emendations, but which are decisively repelled by Mr. Porson's acute observations on the use of a word forming a *pes Creticus* at the end of an iambic trimeter. See Præf. ad Hecub. pp. 30, 38. Schutz has offended in like manner in a conjecture on the Prometheus of Æschylus, v. 932. But to return to εστο; Bentley proposes to substitute it for εεστο, Il. xii. 464.

V. 134. κενδ' ειδυη. Vide supra, v. 44.

V. 170. βους τε και ιφια μηλα. τε may be omitted.

V. 232. σιτω τ' αμβροση τε και ειματα καλα διδουσα. On this verse I cannot satisfy myself. Perhaps we might read αμβροση τ' ιδε ειματα καλα, as in v. 165, ιδε ειματα σιγαλοεντα. Herman, indeed, in his Orpheia, p. 812, observes: *Apud Homerum et reliquos antiquos ιδε plerumque hiatus facit ita ut non dubitandum videatur quin digamma in hac voce fuerit.* But I suspect that it leaves an hiatus only in the third foot, in which station of the verse I have little doubt but that an hiatus was admissible: v. Wakef. Noctes Carcerariæ and Mr. Northmore's fifth Excursus on Tryphiodorus. The impartial reader will, I think, be disposed to adopt this opinion, when he sees the shifts to which even Bentley is driven to get rid of the hiatus in question.

V. 259. *επην δε πρωτον ιδη φαιος ηελιω*. Read *πρωτα*. In like manner in the *Odyssey*, lib. x. v. 423, for *παμπρωτον* read *παμπρωτα*. *πρωτον* and *πρωτα* are frequently interchanged, as I have particularly observed within these few days, upon comparing the readings of the Ravenna manuscript with Brunck's text of Aristophanes. In verse 275 of the *Equites*, perhaps *πρωτα* ought to be received from that manuscript. E. C.

Higham Hill, Walthamstow, Jan. 5, 1807.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE ATHENÆUM.

SIR,—I wish to acknowledge an oversight in my communication of last month. The conjunction ought not to be omitted in the sixth verse of the Hymn to Venus, but we may, if we please, read *πασι δε εργα*. When observing that *πρωτον* and *πρωτα* are frequently interchanged, I might have added that Markland, in v. 30 of the *Supplices* of Euripides, has published *πρωτα φαινεται* from manuscript for *πρωτοι*, which latter reading the metre will not admit. And though not acquainted with the practice of the tragic poets, as at length ascertained by the sagacity of Mr. Porson, he probably preferred *πρωτα* partly from the judgment of the ear. This may be inferred from his note on v. 665 of the same play.

E. C.

Feb. 3rd, 1807.

METRICAL REMARKS.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE ATHENÆUM.

SIR,—In reading Mr. Pickbourn's "Dissertation on Metrical Pauses," among other just observations I found the following,

—that in the Latin Hexameter the second foot does not consist of a word constituting a *spondee*, except in the instance of the prepositions *inter* and *intra*, followed by their case, as—

Maximus *intra me* Deus est,

upon which Mr. P. properly remarks, that the preposition and its case may be considered as a kind of compound word. The reader will find some curious matter bearing upon this point in Mr. Porson's Preface to the *Hecuba* of Euripides, p. 31, to which he may add Herman's Annotations on the same play, p. 111. On the ground of this metrical law, I was disposed to reject a conjecture (by no means in itself inelegant) which Mr. Burges, in his new edition of the *Troades* of Euripides, has proposed on the following line of the *Andromache*:—

Ω ναυτιλοισι χειματος λιμνην φανεις

where Mr. Burges would read—

Ω ναυτιλοις εκ χειματος,

in which emendation I conceived that *εκ χειματος* would be *metrically* one word, and that the line would therefore be deprived of its *cæsura*. I had afterwards begun to look into the Greek Tragedians for satisfaction on this matter, when recollecting Mr. Porson's remark on the *cæsura* of the Tragic Trochaic Tetrameter Catalectic, which he informs us can never fall upon an article or preposition, I thought I needed to proceed no further. However, fearing that my conclusion might be formed too hastily, I resumed the inquiry, and will now give your classical readers the result. Premising, then, that in such lines as these, which are numerous—

βουλει πεσειν προς ουδας, ελκωσαι τε σου
ιν' ειδοτες το κερδος, ενθεν οιστεον
των πραγμάτων την γλωσσαν ισχυειν πλεον,

the *cæsura* may be considered as lying in the *fourth* foot, I have to remark, that in Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, there are very few lines in which the *cæsura* can be said to fall

on an article or preposition. Of those which I have met with, the following are specimens :—

κἄγω γὰρ ὅς τα δειν' ἐκαρτεροῦν τότε
 εἰ μ' οὗτος ἐκ τῶν σῶν ἀπαξέται βίᾱ
 ὁ δούλος, οὐκ τῆς βαρβαροῦ μητρος γεγώς
 κατεσχόν, ἢ τὸν αὐταδελφόν ἐν ταφῇ.

Of these, however, the first may be classed among the lines which have what Mr. Porson calls a *quasi cæsura*; and the second might be compared with—

Μενελαε, μὴ γνῶμας ὑποστήσας σοφας.

In all the lines that I have yet observed (except one) which present the difficulty that appears in the third and fourth examples, I have found a pause in the second foot, which at least prevents the only incision of the verse from falling on the article or preposition. The exception alluded to is the following, taken from the *Electra* of Sophocles :—

ἐγὼ δ' ὄρωσ' ἢ δυσμορὸς κατὰ στεγας.

The article here no doubt has its force, but it may also be omitted, and we might read ὄρωσα. If, however, this line is not corrupt, Mr. Burges's conjecture can plead a good authority. But the emendation is not *necessary*. See Abresch, on the Supplices of Æschylus, v. 487. I have only to add, that I did not observe in Æschylus any lines like the third and fourth, nor, if I recollect right, like the second of the above examples.

E. C.

Higham Hill, April 5th, 1808.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE ATHENÆUM.

The following is Mr. Cogan's estimate of the abilities of the late Gilbert Wakefield, as a scholar, which appeared in the "Monthly Magazine," Sept. 18, 1801, in a tribute to his memory by J. Aikin :—

As a classical editor he appeared in a selection from the Greek tragedians, in editions of Horace, Virgil, Bion, and Moschus, and, finally, in his "Lucretius," a vast performance, which alone might seem the labour of many industrious years. Of his character, as a man of letters, I have been favoured with the following estimate by an able judge, the Rev. E. Cogan, of Cheshunt:—

"In extent of erudition, particularly if an acquaintance with the Oriental languages be taken into the account, he was perhaps inferior to no man of the present age; and they who have been considered as having had the advantage over him in some of the less important *minutiæ* of Greek literature, have probably limited their attention to fewer objects, and certainly commenced their literary course with a more advantageous preparation. In conjectural criticism he exhibits much of the character of Bentley and Markland: men whom he esteemed according to their high deserts in that species of learning to which his own mind was peculiarly directed. Like these illustrious scholars, he is always learned, sometimes bold, and frequently happy. Like them, he had a mind which disdained to be held in a servile subjection to authority; and in defiance of established readings, which too often substitute the dreams of transcribers for the gems of antiquity, he followed, without fear, wherever reason and probability seemed to lead the way. In his earlier critical works, he exhibited, amidst some errors which his riper judgment discarded, the promise of his future greatness; and even his faults were the infirmities of genius; they flowed from that ardour and enthusiasm which cannot always wait for the slow decisions of cool inquiry. They were faults which, though they afforded a small consolation to dull malignity, did not diminish his praise in the estimation of one solid and impartial judge. His favourite study was poetry, and in an extensive acquaintance with the ancient poets, both Greek and Roman, few men, since the revival of letters, have equalled him, and no one ever surpassed him in the perception of their beauties. When he applies to them the hand of conjecture, he rarely fails to give new spirit and animation by his

touch; and where we are obliged to dissent from his corrections, we are sometimes sorry for the credit of the poet that he does not appear to have written what the critic has suggested. He was peculiarly fond of tracing an elegance of poetical expression through the various modifications which it assumed in the hands of different writers, and in the illustration of ancient phraseology he did not overlook the poets of his own country, with many of which he was very familiar. His great work is undoubtedly his edition of "Lucretius," a work which ignorance may despise, at which malice may carp, and hireling scribblers may rail, but which will rank with the labours of Heinsius, Gronovius, Burman, and Heyne, as long as literature itself shall live. It will share the prediction with which Ovid has graced the memory of the great poet himself:—

*Carmina sublimis tunc sunt peritura Lucreti,
Exitio terras cum dabit una dies.*

Besides its critical merit, it exhibits the richest display of the flowers of poetry that ever was presented to the world, and will amply reward the perusal of every man who has sensibility to relish the finest touches of human genius.

"Mr. Wakefield, even before this immortal specimen of his talents, was deservedly held in the highest estimation by the literati of Germany; and if his honours at home have not equalled his reputation abroad, the candid mind will easily find the explanation of this phenomenon in the violence of political party, and the mean jealousy which has too often disgraced the scholars of Great Britain. The name of Bentley is connected with proof enough of the justice of this insinuation."

EXTRACTS

FROM

THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY AND
CHRISTIAN REFORMER.

PART II.—THEOLOGICAL, METAPHYSICAL,
AND BIBLICAL.

“BEING requested to furnish some account of the late Mr. Dewhurst, as a classical scholar, I readily take up my pen to pay what I conceive to be a just tribute to the memory of my much lamented friend. His virtues, as a man and a Christian, much as it might gratify my feelings to bear my testimony to them, do not fall within my province; and to estimate the vast stores of his information in the various departments of literature and science, were it required from me, would be far beyond my power. I shall therefore confine myself solely to his acquirements in classical knowledge.

“Mr. Dewhurst was truly an excellent scholar, a character which, through partiality or ignorance, is frequently given to those who have no pretensions to scholarship, and the sum of whose attainments consists in the ability to read Latin and Greek with tolerable ease. But Mr. Dewhurst had not only read the ancient authors to a great extent, and by favour of a most retentive memory retained much of them in mind, but was studiously attentive to the minutiae of philology and criticism, and was well versed in the writings of those illustrious scholars, to whose successive labours we are indebted for the

present state of Greek literature in particular. What class of authors were his favourites, it may not now be possible to determine, and indeed literature in every form had such charms for him, as almost to exclude a predilection for any particular object; but from his great acquaintance with ancient history, it may perhaps be safely inferred that he read the historians with peculiar interest. The poets, however, occupied a considerable share of his attention, and these he diligently perused in the best editions which have been published in England, and on the Continent, and with the aid of those critical works which have contributed to the illustration of them. The observations of Valckenær, Ruhnken, Dames, Markland, Porson, Hermann, &c., were familiar to him; nor was he inattentive to the productions of those living scholars in our own country, who have recently employed themselves, with such vigour and effort, in restoring the remains of the Attic Theatre to their primitive purity. But while no one knew better from what sources the most important information was to be derived,—while he well understood the qualifications of an accomplished critic, and viewed a Valckenær, a Ruhnken, and a Porson, with just admiration,—he did not disdain the labours of any scholar from whom useful knowledge was to be gained, nor denied to any man the praise that was his due, because he might sometimes handle matters of which he was ignorant. Upon the temerity of an editor who should attempt to correct depraved passages of a poet, without knowing the principles of the metre in which he wrote, he would pass censure only with a good-humoured smile.

“As our conversation, when I had the good fortune to meet him, frequently turned upon the Greek poets, I am able to state what may, in some measure, show the accuracy of his acquaintance with them. I scarcely recollect a single instance in which I spoke to him of a passage in any respect peculiar, or of a critical remark upon such passage, without finding it as distinctly impressed upon his memory, as if it had been the last thing he had read. It ought not to be omitted that Mr. Porson frequently communicated to him his conjectures, in Mr. Dew-

hurst's estimation, not at all inferior to those which rendered the late Professor the wonder of the age. These he would not have been eager to communicate to the public, lest he should appear forward to enrol himself among the literary friends of so great a man.

"Whether he made much trial of his own strength in conjectural criticism, I am not able to say; but, perhaps, the habit of his mind rendered him more anxious to *know* what was to be *known*, than desirous to *do* what, had he pleased, he might have done. Upon the conjectures of others, however, he decided with great justice, and nothing pleased him more than a happy emendation, which, when he had once read, he never forgot. But not to dwell longer upon particulars, I know no man in whose opinion of a classical work I should have been disposed to place a more implicit confidence. With a great fund of learning, he possessed a most exact judgment, and an eminent share of that candour, which is essential to a just estimate of literary productions.

"In a few words, there were combined in him the most important requisites for the critical scholar; a mind capable of the nicest discrimination, a memory uncommonly retentive, a most patient spirit of investigation, an unwearied assiduity in study, and an anxious curiosity in examining editions and manuscripts; so that, had he devoted himself as exclusively as many have done to classical studies, and had chosen to communicate the result of his researches to the public, he could scarcely have failed to secure himself a place among those names which the lovers of ancient literature will ever revere.

E. C.

Higham Hill, Walthamstow, Dec. 2, 1812. M. R. vol. vii.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—Looking the other day into the "Evangelical Magazine," I was struck with the following passage in the Review of Dr. Williams's "Essay on the Equity of the Divine Government

and the Sovereignty of Divine Grace :”—“ Interminable misery is the natural and spontaneous effect of sin, unless God should interfere by a *sovereign* act to cut off the entail; which he is in no respect whatever bound to do. If in any instance he do so interfere, he acts as a munificent sovereign: if he decline so to interfere, he acts in *equity*, he does no wrong to any.”

On this paragraph I immediately wrote the following observations, which, if you conceive them to be worth inserting in your Repository, are very much at your service:—

“ Interminable misery is the natural and spontaneous effect of sin.” As this is by no means a self-evident truth, I am at liberty to call it in question. I then deny that there are any *data* from which this conclusion can be drawn. It has, however, been said that sin is an infinite evil, because it is committed against an infinite Being, and therefore deserves a punishment infinite in duration. To this I reply, that it is at least as reasonable to measure the evil of sin by the attributes of the being who commits it, as by those of the being against whom it is committed. I will therefore venture to confront this axiom with another. Sin is *not* an infinite evil, because it is committed by a *finite* being, and therefore does *not* deserve interminable punishment. But leaving these axioms to their fate, I proceed to observe that as sin, according to the Calvinistic hypothesis, is the necessary result of a nature totally corrupt, with which corrupt nature we certainly did not endow ourselves, it does *not* deserve interminable misery; and were interminable misery to follow it, it must be by an arbitrary appointment, the injustice and cruelty of which would be commensurate to the suffering inflicted. Nor would the wretch who should be doomed to sustain this eternity of woe be disposed to think his sentence a whit more equitable, when reminded, that he “sinned in Adam and fell with him in his first transgression.” But we are told that “if God in any instance remit the punishment, he acts as a munificent Sovereign: if he decline so to interpose, he acts in *equity*; he does no wrong to any.” No wrong? Does he sustain no wrong who is brought into existence with a nature radically depraved, and then made

eternally miserable for being such? It may not be out of place to state here, that according to Dr. Williams's system, as represented by the reviewer, all the divine dispensations are the results of two great moral faculties in the Supreme Governor, *equity* and *sovereignty*. With what propriety sovereignty can be represented as a *moral faculty*, I am altogether unable to comprehend. *Goodness* I can understand, and, unless my memory fails me, the "Assembly's Catechism" taught me when a child, that God possesses this attribute in an infinite degree. Premising that I mean no reflection either on the understanding or the sincerity of Dr. Williams, I must be permitted to remark, that *infinite goodness* will be wisely kept out of sight by those who contend that the greater part of mankind will suffer eternally for that which they could not help, and over which they possess no control. For it might unfortunately be asked, how comes it to pass that *equity* should so triumph over *benevolence*, how comes it to pass that a Being who is acknowledged to be *infinitely good*, should treat the majority of his human offspring as he would do were he *infinitely malevolent*, and doom them to as much misery as the grand enemy of the human race is supposed to wish them?

When I had read the paragraph on which I have been animadverting, I thought the Doctor had proceeded far enough, but the reviewer wishes that he had proceeded still further, and stated "the scriptural doctrine of the punishment of sin as not merely negative, but as including also *positive infliction* on the score of retributive justice." The reviewer, it seems, is not satisfied with interminable misery as the consequence of sin. What further his imagination has destined for mankind, I am not able to divine, nor anxious to be informed. But that retributive justice should demand the *infliction* alluded to, is a paradox which the human intellect must ever despair of being able to solve. Strange that system should so blind the understanding of men in other respects intelligent, that the very terms which they employ to express their dogmas should carry their refutation with them! It is certainly as impolitic to name *justice* in this matter, as it is wise not to say too much of the attribute of

goodness. What must be the definition of justice by which it can be shown to be just, that a creature, who, born with a corrupt nature, must *inevitably* fall into sin, should be rendered eternally miserable by the Being who made him what he is; or by what definition of justice can it be proved, that God would have been unjust either to *us* or to *himself*, had the *infinite* satisfaction of Jesus Christ been accepted in behalf of all mankind? I know it has been said that the torments of the damned are to be an eternal monument of the immaculate holiness of the Divine Nature. This is changing the ground, but not, to my mind, changing it for the better. The Deity is thus represented as giving birth to a race of *impure* beings, that their eternal sufferings may be a demonstration of his *purity*. And a matchless demonstration it undoubtedly is. Who would have thought that *infinite holiness* should not be distinguishable in its operation from *infinite malevolence*, or that the moral perfection of God should be the grand source of misery to his creatures?

If I have committed an error in wandering from verbal criticism to controversial theology, I will endeavour to make some amends by returning to my proper department. I am not aware that the following passages of Heliodorus have been yet produced in illustration of the well-known text in the epistle to the Philippians, *οὐκ ἄρπαγμον ἡγήσατο το εἶναι ἰσα θεῷ*. Heliodor. Æthiop. Ed. Cor. p. 274, ἡ δὲ Κυβελὴ, τὴν ξυντυχίαν ἄρπαγμα . . . ποιησαμένη. P. 321, ἄρπαγμα το ρηθεν ἐποίησατο ἡ Ἀρσακή. P. 290, νεὸς οὕτω καὶ καλὸς καὶ ἀκμαῖος γυναῖκα ὁμοίαν καὶ προστετηκυῖαν ἀπωθεται, καὶ οὐκ ἄρπαγμα οὐδὲ ἐρμαῖον ἡγείται το πρᾶγμα. On this last passage the learned editor, after observing that some manuscripts, instead of ἡγείται read ποιεῖται, proceeds as follows:—ἐνδεχεται μὲντοι Ἡλιοδώρον, ἐν ἀλλοῖς εἰποντα Ἀρπαγμα ποιεῖσθαι, ἐνταῦθα ἡ ποικίλαι βουλομενον τα της συνθεσεως, ἡ, ὃ καὶ μαλλον εἰκος, εἰς τὴν χριστιανικὴν ἰδεαν το λογου λεληθοτως ὑποφερομενον εἰπειν, Ἀρπαγμα ἡγεῖσθαι, κατὰ το (Φιλιππησ Β, ε) “οὐκ ἄρπαγμον ἡγήσατο το εἶναι ἰσα θεῷ.”

E. C.

Higham Hill, Walthamstow, Feb. 1, 1815. M. R. vol. x.

SIR,—The reason why I addressed you a little while ago [x. 76–78] was, that I wished for once to enter my protest as an individual against a doctrine which is as dishonourable to God as, were it true, it would be fatal to the happiness of man; and I did not think that a better opportunity would offer than that of which, through your indulgence, I availed myself. Nor do I know any evasion by which the force of the observations which I then made can be eluded, except the following, that man is incompetent to pronounce upon the plans of an infinite Being. This, as a general proposition, will be admitted. But let the character of this infinite Being be defined, and let a certain conduct be attributed to him which I can distinctly comprehend, and I shall be able to judge whether there is or is not a consistency between the acknowledged attributes of this great Being, and the conduct ascribed to him. Let this observation be applied to the Calvinistic system of theology. God is represented as a Being infinite in power, wisdom, goodness, holiness, and justice. But it is maintained that his human offspring, in consequence of the transgression of their first parents, are brought into existence with a nature totally corrupt, and that, with the exception of a chosen few, who without any claim to such a distinction will be rendered eternally happy, they will suffer the pains of hell for ever. Unless, then, reason was given me in vain, I can confidently conclude that either the divine character is misrepresented, or that this doctrine must be false. And the justice of this conclusion will be easily established by the following mode of reasoning:—God is infinitely powerful, *therefore* he can do whatever is the object of power. God is infinitely wise, *therefore* he will choose the best ends, and pursue them by the best means. God is infinitely good, *therefore* he must have a satisfaction in the happiness of his creatures, and his measures must be calculated to promote it. Thus far our deductions are clear and certain. But let us proceed. God is infinitely just, *therefore* he has created a race of depraved beings, and will punish them eternally for that, which it was out of their power to avoid. God is infinitely holy, *therefore* he has decreed that his off-

spring should be unholy, that their eternal sufferings may bear testimony to his holiness. Were ever premises and conclusion so at variance! Should it still be said that we know not what justice and holiness may demand in an infinite Being, not to reply that the infinity of an attribute cannot change its nature, this would only be saying that holiness and justice, when predicated of God, may mean something different from what they mean in the common use of language; in other words, that God may have been improperly denominated just and holy. Upon the same principle, goodness in God may mean something very different from the usual import of the term, and for anything that we know to the contrary, it may be the very benevolence of his nature which has doomed the majority of his human offspring to eternal misery!

Before I dismiss the subject from my pen, perhaps for ever, with your permission I should be glad to make one or two observations more:—

God is allowed to be infinitely good. But according to the system which I am opposing, no *ray* or *trace* of goodness appears in the issue of his dispensations towards the majority of mankind. Their condition is the same under the *best* of beings as it would have been under the *worst*!

Much has been said respecting vindictive justice as demanding the eternal punishment of sin. It would be easy to prove that the expression *vindictive justice* is egregiously incorrect. Punishment, when inflicted for some object of utility, is not vindictive, and when it goes beyond this object, it is universally denominated *cruelty*. But, waving this, if any case can be imagined which excludes the exercise of vindictive justice, it is that of Adam's helpless offspring. Born with a nature totally depraved, they are no more the proper subjects of vindictive punishment, than those brute animals whose natural propensities are savage and ferocious.

My last observation respects the infinite satisfaction which Jesus Christ is supposed to have made to vindictive justice for the sins of the elect. To say nothing of the other absurdities with which this notion abounds, if sin is an infinite evil in the

case of the individual, it might be objected that the death of Christ could only do away the guilt of *one* sinner, and the rest must be pardoned gratuitously. Should it, on the other hand, be said that the combined guilt of a multitude cannot add to that which is already infinite, it unquestionably follows that the death of Christ was, *in itself considered*, an equivalent for the sins of the whole world. Why, then, is it not accepted as such? The debt is discharged, and yet the debtor not set free. What nameless attribute of the Divine Nature is it which remains thus inexorable, or how comes it to pass that a man should do more mischief than a God could repair? E. C.

Higham Hill, March 1, 1815. M. R. vol. x.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—Being disengaged a few Sundays ago, I had an opportunity of hearing a very good and useful sermon delivered by an orthodox dissenting minister. I did not indeed agree with the preacher in every point, and my ear was particularly struck with words to the following effect;—that there are two descriptions of men who are hostile to Christianity, they who reject revelation altogether, and they who will admit nothing as an article of revelation which they do not understand, *who rush upon a mystery without any reverence for its awful retirement*. As I have never been accustomed to feel much reverence for the retirement of a *mystery*, I found myself compelled to take my station in this latter class, and there I was led into a train of reflections which I have since committed to paper, and which are now at your service.

My first reflection, if such I may call it, was a feeling of astonishment that Christian divines should be so fond of contending for *mysteries* in religion, after having read the fifth verse of the seventeenth chapter of the book of Revelation. “And on her forehead was a name written, *Mystery, Babylon the Great, the mother of harlots and abominations of the earth.*” But

my astonishment subsided a little when I recollected that theologians, as by a species of infatuation, have not unfrequently sealed the condemnation of their favourite doctrines, by the very terms in which they have expressed them.

I was next led to ask myself what is meant by the term *mystery*, as it has been generally applied to the doctrines of revelation. Is it simply a truth which surpasses the comprehension of the human mind, as the self-existence of the Deity, or is it a proposition which contradicts the most certain conclusions of the understanding, as the doctrine of transubstantiation? Or, is it a term which they who employ it do not wish to have accurately defined, and which, as implying *generally* what is incomprehensible, may denote either what is *above* reason, or what is *contrary* to it? Is it one of those *ambiguous sounds* which controversialists not unfrequently make use of as though to perplex the subject of inquiry, and by which they not only attempt to deceive others, but often impose upon themselves? Certain it is that *mystery* is a word of very convenient application, and which theologians can employ or not, according as they wish to defend or refute a particular article of belief. Thus the Protestant tells the Catholic that his doctrine of transubstantiation involves absurdity and contradiction; but when the same charge is brought against certain dogmas in his own creed, he finds in them nothing absurd or contradictory, but sees only certain sublime *mysteries*, into which, as they are not to be comprehended, it is impious to pry. Thus *mystery*, it seems, is a term which is conceived to afford a retreat from the persecution of argument, and is employed to soften that which ought to go by a different name into something which, with the appearance of falsehood, possesses the reality of truth.

But are we not obliged, in many cases, to admit what is *mysterious*? When I am informed what is meant by *mysterious* in this question, I shall immediately be able to give an answer to it. If by *mysterious* is intended simply that which our understanding cannot grasp, I reply that we are often compelled to admit what is mysterious; for instance, that the great First Cause is self-existent; but if by *mysterious* is meant

what is self-destructive and contradictory, as that a being who is infinitely benevolent should act the part of a cruel, arbitrary tyrant, we *are* not and we *cannot* be compelled to admit it. When, therefore, any proposition is set before us which seems to come under the general denomination of *incomprehensible*, we should carefully distinguish between that which surpasses our reason, and that which contradicts it. Great care should also be taken, lest we receive what is self-contradictory while misled by the vague and ambiguous use of language. Were these simple rules attended to, I conceive we should soon hear no more of what have usually been termed *mysteries* in religion.

But is it not an evidence of becoming diffidence and humility in fallible man to receive on the authority of revelation a truth by which the ordinary conclusions of the human mind are set at nought and confounded? If the authority of revelation were clearly made out on the one side, and on the other a proposition were laid down to be admitted on this authority which should involve a contradiction, this would be a very perplexing case indeed; but until God can contradict himself, this is a perplexity to which we can never be reduced. We may indeed be called, on the authority of revelation, to admit truths which surpass the apprehension of our limited faculties; and that this is perfectly reasonable may be shown by such a case as the following:—A child shall be informed by his father that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. Conceiving his father to be wiser than himself, and that he has no intention to deceive him, he will naturally give credit to this proposition, though he cannot comprehend the evidence on which it rests, and has no reason but authority for believing such to be the fact. But let the child be told that there is no angle, or only one angle in a figure which is affirmed to have three angles, and he would be no very promising child if he did not immediately perceive that there must be some error or equivocation in the use of the terms in which the proposition is conveyed. There is an important and obvious difference between not seeing how a thing *can* be, and seeing why it cannot

be. I do not see how God should have existed from eternity, but I seem compelled to admit this, that I may not be obliged to admit what is more inexplicable. But I do see why God cannot be eternal and not eternal, self-existent and not self-existent, omnipotent and not omnipotent. Had this distinction, which it has sometimes been very convenient to overlook, been always attended to, certain religious controversies might have been brought to a speedier termination. It deserves also to be remembered, that there are certain propositions which, though they cannot perhaps be reduced in form to a contradiction, are so repugnant either to our reason or to our moral feelings, that nothing but the most irresistible evidence would lead the thoughtful inquirer to admit them. And yet propositions of this kind are thrust upon us on the faith of detached texts of scripture, which either imperiously demand or easily admit a more rational interpretation.

I was next going to inquire into the *practical utility* of *mysteries*, but as this appeared clearly a non-entity, I proceeded to ask myself upon what evidence the doctrines which are usually termed *mysteries* are admitted. The evidence in favour of Christianity shall now be allowed to be as strong as it has at any time been represented by its most confident advocates. Is the evidence more satisfactory than those conclusions of the human mind which these mysterious doctrines would set aside? Can I ever be more certain that Christianity is divine than I am that what I taste to be bread is bread and not flesh, and that what my senses inform me to be wine is wine, and not blood? How far the same mode of reasoning will apply to certain Protestant *mysteries*, it will become those who receive them to inquire. But it will be said, Does it not favour scepticism thus to balance the doctrines of revelation with its evidences, and to admit nothing that we do not conceive more likely to be true than that revelation itself should be false? I answer, that the evidences of Christianity are, in my opinion, strong enough to support what I consider as the Christian doctrine, but not strong enough to support any mass of absurdity which the folly of man may choose to erect upon them. Experience indeed

has shown, that that *faith* in Christianity which is the result of education and prejudice is strong enough to bear the most cumbrous load of error that the imagination of man has ever piled together; but the intelligent inquirer who should come to the study of Christianity without any prepossession in its favour, would certainly demand that, when from its external evidence he had seen reason to admit it to be divine, he should not be driven by its internal evidence to a contrary conclusion,—that when he had thought it *morally impossible* that this religion should be false, he should not find it *absolutely impossible* that it should be true. But whoever may charge the above mode of reasoning with being favourable to scepticism, it is to be hoped that this charge will not be brought by the advocate of *mystery*. Not to dwell on the consideration that the *mysteries* which have been annexed to religion have been the fruitful source of scepticism and infidelity, the admission of what has usually been termed a *mystery* shakes the very foundation of all human reasonings, and affords cause to suspect that those conclusions of the understanding which we should deem most clear and certain may nevertheless be false.

E. C.

Higham Hill, Aug. 9, 1815. M. R. vol. x.

P.S. Allow me to thank your correspondent W. D. (p. 358) for his information respecting the passages from Heliodorus. Just before I read his communication, I had found, by looking into a number of the “Classical Journal,” that I had been anticipated again and again.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—Upon reading the extracts from *Mr. Townsend's Armageddon* in your last (pp. 649—652), I could not help conceiving a wish that its merit as a poem might recommend it to an extensive circulation, as it seems under the guise of poetic

imagery to present a just view of the horrors and absurdities of a system, which is infinitely more absurd and horrible than any other extravagance which the human mind has yet conceived. The perusal of such a work may perhaps have the happy effect of terrifying into their senses some of those who have been terrified out of them, and by presenting their creed before them in its true colours, may lead them to seek a refuge from its terrors in a diligent examination of the scriptures, that they may learn "whether these things are so." It requires a mind of a certain temperament, such as that of Jonathan Edwards and Mr. Townsend, to dwell upon the views exhibited in "Armageddon" with a conviction of their truth, and not to sicken into anguish and despair. Hence I suspect that the generality of those who in the main think with Mr. Townsend will wish that, however his own fancy was delighted with such contemplations, he had not endeavoured to fix the fancy of his reader on descriptions at which, I do not say reason stands aghast (for that in theology is a trifle), but at which humanity shudders. How much more to be applauded is the caution of a writer in the "Evangelical Magazine," who observes that though the doctrine of predestination *is beautiful in its place* (in what place, he has omitted to mention), it is not desirable that it should be dwelt upon too frequently. But leaving Mr. T., with whom, in truth, after the excellent remarks of your reviewer, I have very little to do, I proceed once more, with your permission, to make one or two remarks on that system of Theology which is usually termed Calvinistic. It is then a system which, to say the least, is nowhere laid down in form in the New Testament, but is collected by inference from detached passages of scripture, and is *a mere hypothesis* to account for a certain phraseology which is infinitely better accounted for without it. It is a system which no good man can *wish* to be true, and which no man can believe to be true, who suffers his mind to be impressed with the general representation of the divine character and government which are given from Genesis to Revelation. It is a system which gives a hideous picture of the Deity, transforming love into blind partiality, and justice into

insatiable vengeance. It is a system which, were it true, would render it a happiness for the human race, and, by probable inference, for the universe at large, could the theory of the Atheist be realised! It is a system which, by representing human nature as radically depraved, and sin in itself an infinite evil, leaves no room for degrees of criminality in human actions. It is a system which, consistently enough with itself, but in direct defiance of the scripture doctrine of retribution, makes something altogether independent of moral rectitude the ground of salvation, and which can send one man triumphing to glory from the scaffold, and calmly leave another who has endeavoured to exemplify every Christian virtue (unless a change not of character, gentle reader, but of *views and reliance* should take place) to be

“whelm’d in stormy gulphs of rolling fire!”*

E. C.

Higham Hill, Nov. 13, 1815. M. R. vol. x.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—I am aware that when I said in my last, that the Calvinistic system can send a man triumphing to glory from the scaffold, I brought forward a case which the more intelligent and moderate of Calvinistic divines will consider as an enthusiastic abuse, not a just consequence of their doctrine. But the system itself does not positively exclude such a case, as it admits conversion to be wrought at the very close of a vicious life. I think my memory is strictly correct with respect to an instance recorded in the obituary of a work published under the sanction of respectable names, the “Evangelical Maga-

* ‘Αδου τινες ανοιγονται πυλαι βαθειαι, και ποταμοι πυρος ὁμου και στυγος απορρωγες αναπεταννυνται, και σκοτος εφηπλωται πολυφανταστον, και χασματα και μυχοι, κακων μυριων γεμοντες.—*Plutarch de Superstitione.*

zine." The writer visits a prostitute on her death-bed. He awakens her to a sense of her sad condition, goes through the usual process, and concludes his account with expressing a full conviction that *he* shall meet that poor creature in glory.

To the observations of my last perhaps you will allow me to add the following :

It will strike most minds with the force of an axiom, that it must be a general blessing to any species of beings to be under the government of an infinitely wise, just, and benevolent Creator. This axiom, Calvinism, if admitted, proves to be false.

The first and great commandment is, "Thou shalt love thy God with all thy heart;" this commandment Calvinism sets aside by rendering the observance of it impracticable. On the other hand, the command refutes the doctrine.

Calvinists with other Christians admit, on the evidence of Scripture, that God is infinitely good; but Calvinism reduces this infinite goodness to mere theory which fact most woefully contradicts. And, strange to tell, the causes which prevent the exercise of this attribute are found in the Divine Nature itself!

Scripture assures us in various ways that mercy is what God delights to exercise; but Calvinism sets up in its stead an infinite indignation at a supposed infinite evil, which reigns in the divine dispensations, triumphs over wisdom, equity, and goodness, and which nothing can satisfy but the eternal sufferings of myriads of creatures, whose grand crime (as they were born with a nature radically corrupt) has been, that they were destined to exist!

And now, sir, as it is not probable that I shall trouble you again on this subject, I should like to take my leave of it with saying a word on the *tone* in which my observations have been written. Conceiving Calvinism to be a most gross corruption of the best gift of God to man, I have exhibited its inconsistencies and its horrors as they have struck my own mind with unrestrained freedom, but without even an evanescent feeling of ill-will towards those from whom I differ thus widely. Strong as is my conviction of the absurdity and impiety of the system it-

self, I shall ever lose sight of the theoretical Calvinist when found in the person of the practical Christian. E. C.

Higham Hill, Dec. 8th, 1815. M. R. vol. x.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—To some of your younger readers who may be disposed to inquire into the evidences of Christianity, the following remarks on Mr. Hume's objection to miracles may not be useless. I have considered this celebrated objection, and I think impartially, at different times for more than thirty years, and I have had but one opinion concerning it, which is, that it has *no force whatever*.

The objection, indeed, has been ably answered again and again, and by some more elaborately than it required. To meet the conceptions of the multitude it may indeed be desirable that error should be exposed in many words; but it is a maxim with me, that false reasoning always admits a short refutation, when it is once clearly discerned in what the fallacy consists.

Mr. Hume's objection amounts to this, that a miracle being a violation of the order of nature, can never be rendered credible by testimony, as the falsehood of testimony can in no case be deemed miraculous. It would perhaps have been more correct to define a miracle to be a deviation from the order of nature; but let this pass. It is to be observed that Mr. Hume does not object to the evidence which is produced in favour of the Christian miracles as being deficient in *quantity*, but denies *in toto* that this species of evidence can confirm a miracle. This makes it necessary to inquire a little into the force of this evidence. It will suit Mr. Hume's purpose that we should consider testimony in the gross, in which view of it, it must be confessed that it not unfrequently deceives. But testimony differs from testimony as much as error does from truth, and it

may be so circumstanced and so accumulated in force that its falsehood will be deemed *impossible*. Let the actions and the fate of the late Emperor of France be for a moment called to mind. These are admitted by thousands, upon the evidence of testimony alone, and admitted with as *full conviction* as can be produced by mathematical or *ocular* demonstration. And will any one presume to say that this evidence may be false? Is it not to suppose *a violation of the order of nature* to suppose it false? * It has just been intimated that testimony of a certain kind produces a conviction equal to what is produced by ocular demonstration. And whence does this arise? It is the spontaneous and necessary result of experience. That kind and degree of testimony which we have never known to deceive us, we rest assured cannot deceive us; and such is the confidence which we place in it, that the supposed improbability of the fact to which it bears witness, usually detracts nothing from the strength of the conviction which is effected by it. It is true enough that, according to Mr. Hume's observation, we cannot rationally admit any fact till we conceive it to be more improbable that the evidence should be false than that the fact should be true. But in order to a just judgment, it is necessary that we consider on what ground we pronounce any fact to be antecedently improbable; and it is certain that when our notions of its improbability arise, as they often do, from a mere defect of knowledge, they instantly yield to certain testimony.

Such being the force of testimony, and such the nature of the faith which we place in it, I ask what fact cannot be supported by testimony, the falsehood of which would be deemed

* How far the evidence which is produced in favour of the Christian miracles falls short of the strongest possible testimony, is a question with which I have nothing to do. Mr. Hume's is an abstract position, that no testimony can prove the reality of a miracle. When this has been shown to be false, it remains with every one to consider for himself whether the antecedent improbability of the Christian miracles appear to him to be surmounted by the testimony which is brought forward in their behalf.

impossible, except that which should itself appear to involve an *impossibility*? But the Christian miracles do not come under this predicament, nor does Mr. Hume's argument proceed upon such a supposition. What, then, is it which renders them incapable of being supported by testimony? Their *antecedent improbability*. And of this improbability how are we to judge? Were they not referred to a superior power? Were they supposed to be effected by some hidden law of nature which was never in action before nor since; were it necessary to maintain that they took place without any assignable cause, and to acknowledge that they produced no important effect, their antecedent improbability would certainly be great. But from what data are we to conclude that God would never interfere miraculously in the government of the world, or, in other words, would never *communicate to mankind such a revelation as the Christian*? And this improbability is the *precise improbability* which, if Mr. Hume is to be believed, no testimony can overcome. But such an interposition is *contrary to experience*. It has been observed that this expression is not quite accurate; but waving this, I ask, may it not with equal truth be affirmed that the falsehood of testimony in certain circumstances is contrary to experience? But to *what* experience is the interposition in question contrary? To say that it is contrary to *universal* experience is to beg the question. When, therefore, it is said that such an interposition is contrary to experience, the meaning must be that it is contrary either to *our* experience or to *general* experience. To urge that it is contrary to *our* experience would be to lay it down as an axiom, that if God should ever interfere miraculously in the affairs of men, he must interfere also in our age and for our particular satisfaction. To press the objection that such an interposition is contrary to *general* experience, would subject the objector to a very perplexing question. What reason is there to suppose that if God should interfere miraculously in the administration of the world, such interpositions would be so frequent as to be matters of general experience? In the case of events which must take place, if they take place at all, by

the operation of the laws of nature, general experience will reasonably influence our belief, and the want of similar instances will render us slow in admitting facts which seem to set the ordinary course of nature at defiance. But to bring a miraculous interposition of Providence, which is recorded to have taken place at a certain time and for a certain purpose, to the test of general experience, is palpably absurd, unless it could be proved that if miracles were ever wrought they must be wrought frequently, which is a proposition that no one would choose to defend. But to show how little experience has to do with the credibility of a Divine revelation, let us suppose that God had never interposed miraculously in the government of the world to the present hour, and that the question were now put, whether he ever would so interpose. The only rational reply would be, Who can tell but he who sees the end from the beginning? Allowing the improbability of such an interposition from the want of past experience, would this improbability amount to anything like a *proof* that the future would in this respect correspond to the past? And shall that become *incredible*, when attested, which it was by no means certain would not take place? In a word, that anything short of the absolute *incredibility* of a fact *in itself considered* should render it incapable of being proved by testimony, is a paradox which it may require some ingenuity to defend, but which it is truly wonderful that any human being should be found seriously to believe. I affirm, then, without fear of refutation, that the evidence of testimony may be so circumstanced as to render a miracle wrought for a certain purpose the object of rational belief. And I have no hesitation to affirm, also, that whoever would not believe such miracle upon the strongest possible testimony, would not believe it on the evidence of ocular demonstration. But in fact, a being so incredulous does not exist. I once, indeed, heard an unbeliever say, that he would not believe a miracle if he saw it. I approved his consistency, though I did not give credit to his declaration. Man, however reluctant, may be compelled to believe his eyes, and he may also be compelled to put faith

in testimony, in spite of all the refined and subtle reasonings in the world. In many cases, he cannot wait to calculate between the strength of the evidence and the improbability of the fact; and in some cases, could he wait for ever, he would not know how to manage the calculation. And conscious of his infirmity, he chooses in such cases rather to examine the validity of the testimony, of which he can judge with tolerable exactness, than to fatigue his faculties with endeavouring to balance the evidence which is laid before him against improbabilities, the force of which he cannot estimate. And in the case of Christianity, if he conceives himself to be an incompetent judge of the antecedent credibility of a Divine Revelation, his business is to inquire into the evidence with as much impartiality as he can, and to abide by the result of such inquiry. If any Christian has precisely calculated the preponderance of this evidence above the *à priori* improbability of the facts, I should be glad to be acquainted with the balance. And if any disciple of Mr. Hume will point out the measure in which the antecedent improbability of the facts surmounts the strength of the testimony, added to the *improbability* of the prevalence of Christianity, had the miracles been false, he may call upon me to abjure the Christian faith.

One word more on the subject of miracles, and I have done. Though we could not judge *à priori* whether God would interfere miraculously in the government of the world, yet when such an interposition has taken place, its credibility may be heightened by the end which was proposed by it, and the consequences by which it has been followed. Thus the Christian dispensation, among other objects, was avowedly intended to overthrow the idolatry of the heathen world, and to establish the worship of the One living and true God. And this purpose it has most fully and gloriously accomplished. The miracles, then, recorded in the Christian Scriptures, are not events which have left no trace behind them, but are events of which the effects have been experienced from the season of their occurrence to the present hour, and which will continue to be experienced till time shall be no more.

It has, I think, been made to appear that Mr. Hume, while he threatens destruction to Christianity at a blow, has in fact effected nothing, and that the Christian does not set aside every principle of rational belief, when he acknowledges Jesus of Nazareth to have been a man approved of God by MIRACLES and signs which God did by him. E. C.

Higham Hill, Nov. 11th, 1816. M. R. vol. xi.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—When a man has been handsomely invited to speak, it might appear disrespectful to be silent. This is my apology for saying a few words more on the subject of miracles, while I am not conscious that I have anything to advance which is worthy the notice of your readers. I am happy that your ingenious Correspondent, A. B. C., agrees with me in the main point, that Mr. Hume's reasoning is inconclusive. The only remaining question, then, is, whether the testimony in favour of the miracles recorded in the New Testament is sufficient to establish facts confessedly so extraordinary: and of this question every man must judge for himself. There is no scale of improbability on the one hand, or of the strength of testimony on the other, to which such an appeal can be made as to force conviction on every mind. I agree with your Correspondent, that no event which has taken place according to the laws of nature, could in reality have been antecedently improbable. But I at the same time conceive that we can form no judgment of the improbability of a miracle, by a miracle being understood an evidence of a Divine interposition for a certain object. Your Correspondent observes that I should require stronger testimony to prove that a man had risen from the dead, than that a man had died. Undoubtedly. And if this supposed resurrection of a dead man were not referred to a Divine Power, and were

not intended to answer some useful purpose, though I might perhaps be *compelled* to admit it (as no violation of the laws of nature can be more wanton and inexplicable than the falsehood of the strongest testimony), I should scarcely know how to defend the belief of it on the ground of reason. But the credibility of this fact is altogether changed when I see that it is calculated to answer an important end, and moreover see this end effected by it. The event now supposed is not, properly speaking, a violation of the laws of nature, which, I take for granted, will continue to operate as before. It is necessary for the benefit of man that the laws of nature should be steady in their operation; but it may, however, also be necessary that God should for a certain purpose interpose and act without them. Your Correspondent observes, that we are not much disposed to admit the miracles of the second and third centuries, and asks, if we make thus free with testimony removed from us by the lapse of time, where are we to stop? I reply, when we arrive at miracles which were calculated to answer an important object, and which are supported by testimony which appears unexceptionable and satisfactory. And I cannot help remarking here, that the progress and present existence of Christianity, afford such a proof of the credit which was given to the miracles of the New Testament history in the earliest ages, as compensates for the distance to which the testimony is thrown by the intervention of time, and which, though it does not actually diminish the force of the testimony in itself considered, causes it to press with less force upon our minds, and leaves us at liberty to neglect it if we please. E. C.

Higham Hill, Jan. 15th, 1817. M. R. vol. xii.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—In p. 56 of your “Repository” for January, I find this alarming declaration, sealed by the authority of Mr. Stodhart,

of Pell Street, Ratcliff Highway, that "they who deny the co-equal and co-essential godhead of Jesus Christ, will, with Unitarians, be damned to all eternity." I read this denunciation with a mingled feeling of astonishment, contempt, and pity. My astonishment, indeed, was not called forth by any novelty in the thing, as the temper which dictates these anathemas is, unhappily, prevalent enough. But were the sentence rung in my ears every hour of every day, I should never cease to be astonished at the presumption of a poor fallible mortal, who should dare to seat himself on the throne of God, and shut the gates of mercy on all who do not think as he does.—Unitarians are to be damned to all eternity!—Not surely because they differ in their religious creed from Mr. Stodhart. And yet I defy him, in conjunction with all who hold the same opinion, to assign a better reason why they should be damned than this would be. Theologians are not always with caution bold, but he must be a bold man indeed, who should have the hardihood to deny that Unitarianism has ranked amongst its professors, men who have been eminently adorned with every Christian virtue. Nor would he be less audacious, who should venture to affirm, that Unitarianism does not embrace *every practical principle* of Christianity. Virtue, indeed, is to a Unitarian the acknowledged end of his faith, and every article in his creed enforces the practice of virtue. But he does not believe the co-equal and co-essential Godhead of Jesus Christ; and, therefore, he is to be damned to all eternity. Mr. Stodhart, I am afraid, would not hear him, or he might plead, if not in arrest of judgment, at least in extenuation of his crime, that amidst the various and contradictory explanations which have been given of the Trinitarian doctrine, he was altogether at a loss to understand what it was that he was called upon to believe. Mr. Stodhart, however, (whose knowledge, no doubt, is equal to his zeal,) may perhaps be able to throw some new light on this perplexing subject, and may condescend to inform us how three *false** deities

* The Father alone, saith Mr. Stodhart, is a *false* Deity. "To us there is but one God even the Father," says the Apostle Paul. And in in-

make one *true* God ; unless, indeed, he should determine, in his anger, to leave us to find out the secret for ourselves. But Mr. Stodhart would say, mine is the doctrine of Scripture, and if the Unitarians would read the New Testament with impartiality, they would find it there expressed in every page. No doubt if they would take Mr. Stodhart for their guide, and obligingly accept his interpretation of Scripture phraseology, they would find not only this doctrine, but every other article of his delectable system. But with Mr. Stodhart's good leave, they would rather see with their own eyes than with his ; especially as, were they to borrow his optics, they might perchance, imbibe his spirit ; from which, at present, every feeling of their heart revolts. But Mr. S. would add, or if he did not, somebody would for him, the Unitarians *perversely* and *wilfully* shut their eyes against the truth. It is no wonder that they who usurp one prerogative of the Almighty, should, upon occasion, exercise another. And, in truth, many of our orthodox brethren have a marvellous faculty of diving into the hearts of their opponents. In the twinkling of an eye they can unlock the breast of a poor Unitarian, and there, amidst other dire and dreadful things, they can clearly behold original depravity, in the shape of carnal reason, arming itself in proud rebellion against the truth of God. Some of this perspicacious fraternity have ascertained that Unitarians are neither more nor less than unbelievers in disguise. Others, I

interpreting this declaration according to its literal meaning, I am supported by a good authority. A recent convert to Orthodoxy, in order to guard against the dire effects of interpreting Scripture upon the principles of rational criticism, has laid down a rule of interpretation, in terms to the following effect : that Scripture language is always to be explained according to the natural and obvious meaning of the words. Were this canon applied to the greater part of the New Testament, what woeful work would it make with the popular theology ! It was kind, however, to endeavour to furnish a principle, which would at once clear up every difficulty. Mr. Stodhart, it is to be feared, would not have been thus indulgent ; he would have contented himself with proclaiming, This is the truth, and if you will not believe it, you will be damned to all eternity !

am told, have discovered that, in the heart of a Unitarian, piety at best never rises above the level of *infidel devotion*. As we have been accustomed to pay some respect to the injunction of our Master, "Judge not, that ye be not judged," we confess ourselves not qualified to carry on our theological warfare by this method of attack. We, therefore, leave it in the exclusive possession of our opponents; and much good may it do them.—But enough and more than enough on this ungracious topic. I will therefore, only add, that it is high time that this damning spirit of bigotry should hide its head and blush. Blush, indeed, it cannot, for bigotry, as it has no feeling, knows no shame. Let it, then, if it must be so, pour forth its fury while it may. The time cannot fail to come, when the wretched system which ministers fuel to this unholy flame, shall have been swept from the face of the earth by the progressive operation of that spirit of inquiry, which weak men may lament and bigots may execrate, but which no threats of damnation can intimidate, nor any mortal power repress.

E. C.

Higham Hill, March 4th, 1819. M. R. vol. xiv.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—My attention having been lately directed to the subject of natural religion, I send you a few reflections upon it, to make such use of as you shall please.

By natural religion, as distinguished from revealed, might seem to be meant that system of *faith* and *worship* which has prevailed in the world where revelation has been unknown. But this appellation is rather given to certain principles which, while they have been admitted by some, have been rejected by others, and which have been very indistinctly apprehended by the majority of mankind. But whatever may be the principles of natural religion, and however clear may be their evidence, I ask, what has this religion effected? Has it ever saved man-

kind from the grossest idolatry and the most debasing superstition? Has it at any period led the great mass of the human race to the worship or the knowledge of One all-wise, all-powerful, all-benevolent Creator?

The fundamental principle of religion is the being of a God; and it is generally admitted, that there is no truth in the whole circle of moral inquiry, which rests upon such satisfactory and conclusive evidence. We also, as Christians, believe that this God is infinite in wisdom, power, and goodness; and this glorious truth we pronounce to be not more the doctrine of revelation than the dictate of sound philosophy. But let us hear the voice of an enlightened Heathen. Cicero begins his work on the "Nature of the Gods" with this memorable declaration, that the question respecting the nature of the gods is *very difficult* and *very obscure*. And whoever reads the Treatise through, may see reason to congratulate himself that he did not live in an age when such a disputation could be held on such a subject. I pass over the providential government of God, to the doctrine of a future life; and on this important doctrine I shall quote a few observations from a work recently published, and entitled "Apeleutherus," premising that though I differ from the Author most materially, this difference does not diminish my respect for his talents, or my admiration of his sincerity. But I shall first make a remark on a position of our Author's, respecting the evidence of what he terms supernatural revelation.

"The *history* of a miracle cannot, without absurdity, be admitted as evidence of the truth of any doctrine, since it cannot communicate that *certainty* which it does not itself possess." What it does not possess it undoubtedly cannot communicate. But suppose it to possess some degree of *probability*, which indeed the Author virtually admits, there will certainly be no *absurdity* in taking its evidence as far as it will go; but there would be a *great absurdity* in rejecting this evidence altogether, because it does not amount to certainty; unless, indeed, the doctrine for which it pleads "is already supported by more than sufficient evidence of an indisputable kind." "In all

cases in which human nature can feel an interest, would it not be much more easy to learn the truth, independently of the miracle, than to arrive at *absolute certainty* concerning the miracle, in order to prove the doctrine? I say absolute certainty, because nothing short of this can be of any use in the case we are considering." Do the principles of natural religion, then, rest upon *absolute certainty*? * If not, they can be of no use whatever, and we shall be in danger, for want of certainty, of having no religion at all. But why is this *absolute certainty* required? Human belief and human conduct in general are governed by probability, and by probability alone. The *conviction*, however, which is produced by historical testimony, and that with respect to facts of great antiquity, is scarcely to be distinguished from the confidence of *certain knowledge*. And though "human testimony," according to our Author, "however credible, *may or may not be true*," when upon sufficient inquiry we have satisfied ourselves that it *is* true, we feel persuaded that in this particular case it *cannot* be false. "But if any man could persuade me that my eternal salvation were depending upon its truth, he would, at the same moment, fill my mind with doubt and anxiety." Let me feel the same conviction of the reality of any fact, as I do of the reality of many facts, even of ancient date, and my mind would be filled with no doubt or anxiety, whatever were depending upon its truth.

But to proceed to the subject of a future life; "what I principally rely on," says our Author, "is the obvious suitability and propriety of a sequel to our present existence, and the manifest absurdity of supposing the wise and benevolent Creator to have produced so noble a work as man, for the mere purpose of destroying him; and I rely principally on this, because, from its simplicity and force, it appears emi-

* That they do not, our Author himself acknowledges when he says, with respect to a future life, p. 234, that "certainty is entirely out of the question." This concession, indeed, I did not expect, after having read in p. 219, that it is *impossible* that human life should terminate in the silence and darkness of the grave.

nently calculated to affect, and is, in fact, that consideration which has always affected, the mass of mankind, and produced that universal expectation of a future life which we find to prevail in the world ;” * and which he tells us elsewhere has prevailed among the generality of the human race, “ with scarcely the intervention of a doubt.” What has been thus confidently received by the generality of the human race, I am not able to say ; but there are many passages in the ancient authors which satisfactorily demonstrate that the wisest philosophers of Greece and Rome could not advance beyond this alternative—that death would either prove the extinction of being, or be an introduction to a better state of existence than the present. And much as this argument has always affected the mass of mankind, Plato seems to have felt its force but feebly, when he wrote his *Phædon*, or he would not have taken so much pains to establish the natural immortality of the soul ; which he conceived, and, I think, justly in his circumstances, to be essential to the proof of a life to come. As it is not, I presume, an article of natural religion that a time will come when the whole human

* But our Author proceeds :—“ Not indeed that this argument necessarily presents itself to the unassisted understanding of every individual of mankind ; or even that a majority of the human race has in any age possessed powers and information to reason correctly in this way ; but that in every age it has pleased the sovereign Creator and Governor of the universe to raise up men of superior discernment and penetration, who, after having explored the paths of science for themselves, have delighted in communicating their discoveries to others.” This does not appear very consistent with what we read in p. 128, that “ the religion of reason and nature is *intelligible to every human being*, who is willing to open his eyes, and to fix them attentively upon its luminous and instructive lessons.” But if, as we are informed, there is a *manifest* absurdity in supposing the wise and benevolent Creator to have produced so noble a work as man for the mere purpose of destroying him, I cannot help inquiring how it came to pass that *superior discernment and penetration* should be necessary for discovering this absurdity ? Did the difficulty lie in ascertaining the premises, or in drawing the conclusion ? As for the multitude who were too dull to discern this absurdity themselves, there is reason to suspect that they took the matter upon trust, and never distinctly apprehended the force of the argument by which they were so much affected.

race will at once be raised from their graves, and restored to life and action, he who shall attempt, without the light of revelation, to establish the future existence of the human species, will fail in a material point if he omits to show that there is something in man which *must* or *may* survive the stroke of death. It would not have satisfied Plato, nor would it satisfy me to say, "It is in vain for me to inquire *how* I am to exist *hereafter*, since I am utterly unable to comprehend *how* I exist *at present*."

But to return to the argument under consideration. It rests upon the position that the phenomena of human life, without a future being, imply a defect of wisdom and goodness in the Creator. Thus far, then, the perfection of the Divine character is an hypothesis unsupported by *fact*. And unless it can be established by certain abstract reasonings (and these, while they may appear satisfactory to some, will seem nugatory to others), it will be precipitate to draw from it an inference *so contrary to present appearances*, as the future existence of the human race. But, says our Author, admit a future state, "and we at once obtain a view of the scheme of Divine Providence, comprehensive, luminous, and delightful." This I am by no means disposed to deny. But unless this view of it be confirmed by the authority of that God who alone knows his own counsels, it is only an hypothesis, and an hypothesis which, in many minds, would not prevail against that universal analogy, which seems to forbid the hope that life, when once extinct, will ever be restored. Setting revelation entirely out of the question, we might say, that, *as a matter of fact*, God seems to consult not so much for the individuals of mankind as for the species, and that it would be difficult to *prove* that the continuation and progressive improvement of the species would not answer all the ends which the Creator had in view in their formation. Man, it might be said, is a *noble work*, but not so noble, perhaps, in the eyes of the Creator as in his own; and as for the waste of intellectual and moral attainment, which is implied in the destruction of the individuals of the species, it may be no great object amidst the immensity of creation, and

in the estimation of a Being whose power, no doubt, is perpetually employed in producing life, intellect, and happiness throughout his vast dominions. And were the whole human race what the great majority have thus far been, their extinction might not seem to form a much stronger objection to the plan of Providence than that of the beasts that perish.

But our Author's argument, as stated above, seems to resolve itself into this simple proposition, that a perfectly wise and good Being could not form a rational agent without making him immortal. The fact, however, that man dies and is heard of no more, *seems* to negative the proposition; and that reasoning must be powerful which shall overcome this stubborn objection.* I am by no means prepared to prove that the pro-

* Even granting the perfections of the Deity, it would be difficult to show that such a being as man, even though the individuals of the species should perish, would not be a desirable link in the chain of animated existence; and it has always appeared to me something like presumption to affirm that God cannot be wise and good, unless A., B., and C., should be *immortal*. My view of the subject is well expressed in p. 18 of Mr. J. Kenrick's admirable Sermon "On the Necessity of Revelation to teach the Doctrine of a Future Life." In a word, the constitution of the world differs, in various respects, from what our limited understandings would have led us to expect from the combination of infinite power, wisdom, and benevolence; and being thus, as it should seem, convicted of ignorance (if these are in truth the attributes of the Deity), we go beyond our province, when we confidently pronounce that the future existence of the human race is necessary to make the scheme of Providence complete.

Our Author's error (for if I had not thought him in an error I should not have troubled myself to write what I have written) consists in magnifying presumptions into proofs, and attributing an undue force to certain considerations which render revelation *credible*, in order to show that it was not *necessary*. But as long as man should *appear* to be *lost for ever* in the grave, it would be at least a thing *ardently to be desired*, that we could be distinctly informed by Him who made us, what he has yet in view respecting us. Setting aside the history of revelation, nothing like the restoration of a man once dead, that is, nothing which, as a *matter of fact*, could give any assurance of a life to come, has ever been heard of since the world began. As Mr. Belsham somewhere

position is false, but were my hope of a future life to rest solely or principally upon it, I should wish to see it confirmed by something like logical demonstration.

In pp. 218, 219, of "Apeleutherus," there is a fine passage on the painful moral discipline to which man is rendered subject, and which gives a more persuasive force to the argument. But I am afraid that the sufferings of which our Author treats so eloquently, would more generally excite a doubt of the perfection of the Divine attributes, than suggest a confident expectation of a life to come. Our Author rejects with disdain the argument for a future life, which has been drawn from the inequality of the Divine dispensations, asking, with the poet, What can we reason but from what we *know*? and quoting the well-known observation of Mr. Hume, "that you have no ground to ascribe to the author of Nature any qualities but what you see he has actually exerted and displayed in his productions." I am surprised that he did not perceive that there is opportunity to apply this reasoning against himself. I take human life as I find it, checkered with suffering, deformed by moral evil, and terminating in *death*; and I ask, whether the plan of Providence, *as far as we have any certain knowledge of it*, corresponds to the character of an infinitely wise, powerful, and benevolent Creator? The ground on which our author's argument is founded will oblige him to answer, no. How, then, am I to be assured that God is infinite in wisdom, power, and goodness? The hypothesis of a future life, indeed, will settle everything; but on what certain foundation is the hypothesis to rest, until the perfection of the Divine character shall have been established? It will not satisfy to say, that there must be a future state, and therefore that God may be infinitely powerful, wise, and good; nor, on the other hand, that

eloquently expresses himself, on the natural probability of a resurrection, "Experience is silent; philosophy is confounded; revelation alone darts a beam of light through the solid gloom; the messenger of heavenly truth announces, that all who are in their graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth."

God is all perfection, and therefore there must be a life to come. Here Christianity comes admirably to our assistance, and declares what otherwise, however plausible, would be assumption only, that "this mortal will put on immortality." But, it is said, the grand miracle on which Christians have usually laid so great a stress, namely, the resurrection of Christ, neither proves the *immortality of the soul* nor the *general resurrection of human bodies*. Granting the reality of the fact, and, what I think will not be denied, that the apostles understood its meaning, it is a divine attestation to the future existence of the human race; and an attestation which I would not exchange for all the arguments which have been advanced in favour of the doctrine, from the days of Plato to the present hour.

Upon the whole, I feel a decided conviction, that, without revelation, the question respecting a future life is involved in deep obscurity. And I think it worthy of remark, that, with the exception of one or two individuals of a sanguine cast of mind, I have met with no one who doubted of the truth of Christianity, who did not doubt in an equal degree of a life to come. At the same time, the uncertainty in which nature leaves the subject is no objection to the reality of a future being, when it is confirmed by the voice of revelation. We are told, indeed, that "if Christianity be not built upon the solid rock of natural religion, it can have no foundation at all." If by this observation were meant that revelation cannot contradict the clear and certain deductions of reason, I should subscribe to the proposition with all my heart and soul. But if thereby be intended that revelation cannot disclose what reason might never have discovered, I cannot help regarding it as manifestly false; since it is only saying, in other words, that God must reveal all that he chooses to make known of his purposes by *one* medium, which is what few men would choose to affirm. Or if it is to be understood as intimating, that no historical and external evidence can confirm the truth of revelation, I should reply, that this is a proposition which

cannot be maintained without setting aside our faith in testimony, and undermining the principal foundation of human knowledge. E. C.

April, 1819. M. R. vol. xiv.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—I am sorry that your correspondent Homo (p. 293), who attributes to me a great deal more than I dare take to myself, should look to me for that satisfaction which he has not, it seems, been able to obtain from the liberal divines of the present day. He must, however, I think, have been convinced that the doctrine of the eternity of hell torments is not the doctrine of Scripture; and when this is set aside, I do not know what compels us to affix an interpretation to the expressions in which the future punishment of sin is denounced, which would be inconsistent with that infinite goodness which we ascribe to the Creator.

I take this opportunity to suggest, that I have long doubted whether the description in the twenty-fifth chapter of Matthew, from the 31st verse to the end, has any reference to a future life. Certainly the reason which is assigned for the acceptance of those on the King's right hand, and the rejection of those on his left, is altogether inapplicable to myriads of the human race, and therefore does not naturally direct the mind to what is called the day of judgment. I propose this doubt with diffidence, and should be glad to see the question discussed by some abler person who should think that there is ground for my suspicion. E. C.

June, 1819. M. R. vol. xiv.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—Upon perusing Mr. Hutton's excellent sermon lately delivered at Bradford (*see* "Mon. Repos." p. 400), I was led to

ask myself upon what principle our Calvinistic brethren can refuse to yield to the force of his reasonings; and the answer was, that it can only be by persisting to view *moral*ity through a medium of their own; a medium which, it may be observed, annihilates the moral agency of man. Their system is founded on the position that the human heart is altogether depraved, and that man, in an unregenerate state, can do nothing which will be of any avail towards acceptance with God. If this be so, man is not a *moral agent* according to any imaginable definition by which the notion of moral agency can be conveyed. Not only the knowledge of what is good, but the power to do what is good enters into the very essence of moral action; and this power is by the Calvinistic hypothesis excluded.

But the freedom of the will may constitute man a moral agent. Let the will be as free as freedom can make it, as long as the human heart remains totally corrupt, it can only choose between different forms of evil; and since every sin is an *infinite evil*, it can signify nothing, as to the moral quality of the action, in what form the offence is committed. But does not the moral evil which abounds in the world countenance the doctrine of the original depravity of man? Does not this hypothesis well explain the wickedness which deforms the moral creation, and afford the solution of a phenomenon which no one, whatever be his views of theology, can refuse to admit? No doubt, the hypothesis that the human heart is totally and radically corrupt, will account for all the sin (if sin it ought to be called) which man does or can commit; but there is another phenomenon for which it does not account, and with which it can never be reconciled, and that is, the quantum of good which is found in the actions of men together with the evil, and which, whatever this quantum may be, completely sets aside the hypothesis. Will the Calvinists say that there is nothing morally good in those acts which mankind have denominated virtuous, when performed by the unregenerate man? Would the chastity of a Joseph and the benevolence of the good Samaritan have no quality of moral excellence in an Unitarian Christian? Then will I in my turn deny that there is

any *moral turpitude* in the deeds which are ascribed to an Heliogabalus and a Nero. To what sad extremities are men driven in reasoning, when they oppose hypothesis to fact!

But let us pass from the unregenerate to the regenerate man. Were anything surprising in the business of theology, it would be surprising that intelligent Calvinists should not see that the effects which they ascribe to the operation of the Holy Spirit, may easily be accounted for without having recourse to supernatural interposition. Let a man who sincerely admits the principles of Calvinism be also disposed to reflect much upon these principles (and this he surely may be, without a divine influence), and his *conversion* seems to follow of course. When he is once convinced that, without flying to the righteousness of Christ he is undone for ever, nothing is more natural than that he should ardently embrace what he is taught to consider as the gospel method of salvation; and in the contemplation of what he regards as the scheme of redemption, his religious feelings will be wrought up to a tone which the undiscerning mind may easily be led to ascribe to the agency of the Spirit of God, especially when possessed of an opinion that the human heart is naturally incapable of raising its affections to things above. And hence it is not to be wondered at, that men of a sanguine temperament should at length attain an undoubting conviction that they have experienced that operation of divine grace, which alone can save them from the wrath to come.

But what is it, after all, that is effected by regeneration? Does it purify the heart altogether from the corruption of sin? This will hardly be affirmed. There is then an *infinite evil* still lurking within, and which must occasionally burst forth into actual transgression; so that it would be difficult to prove that the regenerated soul is better fitted for heaven after regeneration than before. And though the moral disposition and conduct may be in the main consistent with the pure precepts of Christianity, this is no more than what is found in many whom Calvinism dooms to everlasting perdition. So that, judging from *fact*, the human heart, which is by hypothesis

radically and totally corrupt, is capable of as much moral excellence in its natural and depraved state, as when it has been wrought upon and purified by the Spirit of God !

E. C.

Higham Hill, June 25, 1819. M. R. vol. xiv.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—Allow me to join Mr. Howe (p. 661), in recommending to the attention of our Unitarian friends the Society for the Relief of Aged and Infirm Dissenting Ministers. For what reasons they have hitherto been backward upon this occasion, I have no right to inquire. But if there are any who think that it will wound the feelings of ministers in distress to be relieved by this Society, I can only say, that to me this apprehension appears altogether groundless. It will not, I conceive, wound any man's feelings to receive assistance from a fund which was not raised in consideration of his individual case, but with a prospective view to the case of all who should be circumstanced as he is ; nor will any man be ashamed to acknowledge himself poor, whose profession has been known to exclude the means of rising above poverty. The situation of Dissenting Ministers, who are solely or chiefly dependent upon the emoluments of their profession, does not appear to me to have been sufficiently considered. Their sensibilities are commonly somewhat refined by education ; their office introduces them to the intimacy of men comparatively rich, and thus they contract a familiarity with the comforts and accommodations of what are called easy circumstances ; the whole of their active life is not unfrequently one continued struggle with difficulties ; and, at length, when overtaken by age and infirmity, they may, without any fault of their own, be thrown upon the support of precarious charity. Surely to men thus circumstanced it will be cheering and consolatory to find that, while they are labouring to promote the best interests of mankind, the peculiarities

of their condition are not overlooked, but that the more wealthy part of the Dissenting community are cheerfully contributing to a society, which has for its object the support and comfort of their declining years. It will be to them a delightful argument that they have not laboured in vain in inculcating the lessons of that Master, who left it as his last injunction to his followers, that they should love one another. What objections of any weight can be urged against the institution in question, I am unable to conceive. But I shall, I trust, be excused if I remark, that those reasonings ought to be founded on clear and certain principles, which are allowed to stop the hand of charity. Benevolence may, indeed, be exercised indiscreetly; but it is better for a man's self that it should be indiscreetly exercised, than that it should be checked by scrupulous and, perhaps, mistaken calculations of the good or evil by which its exercise might be followed. But no imaginable evil, that I can see, can possibly result from any support which is likely to be given to the Society for which Mr. Howe is pleading, and for which I sincerely hope that he may not plead in vain.

E. C.

Higham Hill, Dec. 4, 1819. M. R. vol. xiv.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—Having repeatedly heard intelligent persons express an opinion, that the question concerning Liberty and Necessity involves difficulties from which the human mind cannot easily extricate itself, I conceived that it might not be useless to show, that as a philosophical question it is as simple as need be, and admits a most clear and certain solution. The controversy has been embarrassed by the use of the term *motive*, which is not *essential* to it, and which, being capable of different interpretations, has left room for misapprehension and subterfuge.

The proposition of the Necessitarian is precisely this, that every volition or determination of the mind is the necessary

result of the state of the mind at the time when the determination is formed.* Of the truth of this proposition, in regard to myself, I am conscious; and presuming that the general constitution of all human minds is the same, I suspect that, were the question closely urged, the consciousness of every other man would coincide in this respect with my own. And were it not for certain consequences, which are supposed to follow the admission of this doctrine, I am persuaded that no human being would have been found to doubt its truth.

But in opposition to this statement the advocate of Liberty maintains, that there is in the human mind a self-determining power, to which, as their proper cause, all the volitions or determinations of the mind are to be referred.

What, then, is the operation of this self-determining power? By the very definition, it is not governed in its exercise by the state or disposition of the mind. Does it, then, itself determine the state of mind in which a certain volition shall be formed? Then, as no mental act can be performed except in some certain state of mind, it may be asked, How came the mind to be in that state in which the self-determining power was called upon to act? Did this power of its sovereign pleasure decree this state of the mind also, and before this a former state, and so on to the *first moment of conscious existence*, always acting in a certain state of mind, and always determining that state? But in reality, the determining the state of the mind, in which a given volition shall take place, would not differ from determining the volition itself. In a given state of mind, then, does

* Though I have avoided the use of the term *motive*, I do not mean to intimate, that motives have nothing to do with volition. By motive, indeed, the Necessitarian means not only the inducement which is presented to the mind, but the mental disposition in which a given volition is formed. But to use the term in its ordinary acceptation, it may be remarked, that every state of mind in which a volition takes place, results partly from a former state, and partly from the influence of certain motives or considerations which are suggested to the mind. And no truth in the whole circle of intellectual inquiry seems more self-evident than this, that from a definite state of mind, nothing but a definite volition can proceed.

it determine the volition? If so, can it determine in opposition to the state of the mind *at the time* when the volition is formed? If not, it can do nothing that is worth contending for. If it can, whenever this case is realised the *will* inclines one way, and the *mind* another. But as the will in its exercise cannot, even in imagination, be distinguished from *the mind in the act of willing*, the mind wills against itself, or wills and does not will the same thing, at the same time. That this reasoning may not be confronted by *classical* authority, I just remark, that Homer's well-known *oxymoron* ἐκὼν ἀέκοντι γέ θυμῷ, stands at an immeasurable distance from the case which is here supposed.

But let this self-determining power be examined a little more closely. And as it is stated to be the faculty of the mind which determines the volitions, and, therefore, the actions of men, it is reasonable to ask, whether it possesses the properties of judgment, reflection, and other qualities which have always been supposed to have some influence upon the determinations of the will? If so, it is no longer a faculty of the mind, but the mind itself; and when we are told that it is the efficient cause of volition, all that is meant is, that our volitions are the volitions of the mind. If it does not possess these properties, it is nothing but the simple power of volition, which, as it will not submit to be governed by the state or habit of the mind, but insists upon the privilege of determining itself, is not distinguishable from blind caprice, or what we usually term *chance*.

Shall it be said that the *mind* determines its volitions *by means* of a self-determining power, which is inherent in it, and essential to it? Can the mind, then, form either of two opposite volitions at the same time, and in the same frame and disposition? If not, it does not possess a self-determining power, and everything is conceded which the Necessitarian contends for. If, when the mind is said to possess a self-determining power, it were meant that the volitions of the mind originate in itself, and are not forced upon it by extraneous compulsion, nothing would be said but what is true, and nothing but what

the Necessitarian admits and maintains. But this will not serve the cause for which this power has been devised. In order to set aside the position of the Necessitarian, this faculty must be supposed to be altogether independent of the feelings and dispositions of the mind, and must, in the strictest sense, determine itself, and govern its own decisions. The advocate of Liberty may say, that this is not what he means, but he will hear in reply, that if he does not mean this, he means nothing. But if the mind can form either of two opposite volitions at the same time, then the true and proper cause of definite volitions is the abstract *power of willing*; a fit principle, in good truth, to which the government of life should be committed.

Will the advocate of Liberty lay down his proposition in terms to the following effect: that though the state of the mind has a certain influence upon the self-determining power, yet that it does not, strictly speaking, *cause* the volition, which is the *free* act of the power for which he contends? What, then, is the nature of the influence supposed? Does it in any way effect that the volition should be what it is? If so, all that the Necessitarian will be solicitous to maintain is granted. If not, we must look somewhere else, that is, to the self-determining power, for the reason why one volition takes place rather than another: that is, a power which bears the same relation to all imaginable volitions, contains in itself the sole cause of every definite and specific volition. And on this faculty depends the moral agency of man! But does the self-determining power, in fact, obey the influence which the mind exerts upon it? Why, then, does it obey it? Because it chooses. Does it, then, reflect and judge, and thus determine on the propriety of yielding this obedience? No such thing. Reflection and judgment are properties not of a self-determining power, but of intellect and reason. They are not attributes of the will, but of the mind.

But what, after all, can we understand by a *self-determining* power, considered as the efficient cause of volition? It is an incontrovertible truth, that the act of volition implies a certain

inclination or disposition of the mind. Does, then, the self-determining power cause this disposition, or is it acted upon and governed by it? If the latter, it is not a *self-determining* power, and the controversy is at an end. If it be said to determine this disposition, the question arises, whether it must be considered as acting independently of *every mental feeling*? If so, it is a manifest nonentity, since a volition cannot take place except in *some* state and disposition of the mind. If it does not act independently of mental feeling, it will again be asked, does it determine that state of feeling in which it acts? To what conclusion this question would lead, it must be needless to remark.

But let the advocate of Liberty plead for himself in the language of that able metaphysician, Dr. Clarke: "The true, proper, immediate, *physical efficient cause* of action," says he, "is the power of self-motion in men, which exerts itself *freely*, in consequence of the last judgment of the understanding." If this power *always* obeys the last judgment of the understanding, the Necessitarian will ask no more. But can this power, at the very time when it exerts itself *freely*, in consequence of the last judgment of the understanding, determine without any inducement whatever to set this last judgment at defiance, and to act in direct opposition to it? This Dr. Clarke would not have affirmed. If it cannot, what is gained by maintaining, with an appearance at least of contradiction, that it exerts itself *freely, in consequence* of this judgment? If it can, then it is in very deed a power of *self-motion*, a power which, without *any reason*, can act against the very reason *in consequence* of which it acts.*

* Dr. Clarke is disposed to consider the last judgment of the understanding as the same with the *act of volition*. Then, as in this case the power of self-motion has nothing to do with volition, but only acts in consequence of the determination of the *will* or the *understanding*, it may be dismissed from the controversy, as having no relation to the matter in dispute. "But," says he, "if the *act of volition* be distinguished from the *last judgment of the understanding*, then the *act of volition*, or rather *the beginning of action*, consequent upon the last

In a word, if definite volitions have not their causes in definite states of mind, they can be attributed to no cause distinct from the mere power of willing. But to say that the mere faculty of the will, or what would here be the same thing, the self-determining power, is the sole cause of specific volitions, does not in reality differ from saying that a definite volition is the cause of itself. The self-determining power, in itself considered, is equally indifferent to all volitions; but by a determinate *act*, it is supposed to cause a specific volition; but this *act* is the volition itself, nor can even for a moment be conceived of as distinct from it. The self-determining power, in other words, wills *this* or *that*, *because* it wills it; that is, the only reason for the volition is the volition itself.

Were it necessary to reason any further against this same self-determining power, this independent faculty, which will submit to no control, and acknowledge no principle of action but the imperious maxim *sit pro ratione voluntas*, it might be objected in the first place, that its existence is a mere assumption; secondly, that the assumption is unnecessary, as the phenomena of volition are satisfactorily accounted for without it; thirdly, that the assumption is unwarrantable, as we are acquainted with nothing in the whole compass of nature which bears any analogy to such a faculty; and fourthly, that the supposed operation of this faculty contradicts *the only notions which mankind have ever formed of the connection between cause and effect*. We are, indeed, ignorant of the operation of what we term causes, but this ignorance does not diminish the force of the objection. For a definite effect, we, in fact, look for a definite cause; and every variation in the effect is *always* supposed to imply a proportionable variation

judgment of the understanding, is not *determined* or *caused* by that last judgment as the *physical efficient*, but only as the *moral motive*." If the last judgment of the understanding *causes* the volition, that is sufficient. By what name its operation shall be called, the Necessitarian will not be very anxious to determine. For what avails the distinction between the *physical efficient*, and the *moral motive*, if the volition in given circumstances could not be different from what it is?

in the cause. Let it, then, be remembered, that the subject of controversy is not the cause of volition in general, but of definite and specific volitions. Now a self-determining power, if it means anything, must mean a power which, at the same time and in the same circumstances, can form either of two different or opposite volitions. But to refer a definite volition to the act of such a faculty, is, *according to the only idea which we have of causation*, to say that a specific volition can be formed without a cause. The *sic volo* of the self-determining power will not be a satisfactory answer to the question, how it came to be the *pleasure* of the will to determine as it did. The prevalence of one inclination at the very moment when it was possible by the hypothesis that another inclination should have prevailed, requires a definite cause as much as any effect in nature; or rather the supposition involves an impossibility, unless mankind have been thus far mistaken in requiring a definite cause for a definite effect. And if they have been herein mistaken, they may also have been mistaken in requiring *any cause at all* for that which they have denominated an effect; since the same reasoning which has led them to the notion of a cause, has led them to conceive of it as a *definite energy*, from which a *definite result* proceeds. To deny, then, that a definite cause is necessary to a definite effect, or what is the same thing, to deny that a difference in the effect implies a difference in the cause, is to call in question the very existence of a cause. The term, indeed, may be retained, but the only idea which we have of the thing is gone. And when the advocate of Liberty imagines a power which can at the same time cause either of two different volitions, he deceives himself by a mere abuse of language. A self-determining power, then, is not only gratuitously assumed, but involves another assumption, which sets at defiance what have hitherto been thought the most certain conclusions of the human mind.

I will now say one word respecting the moral consequences which are supposed to follow from the doctrine of Necessity.

The most formidable of these is, that it annihilates the accountability of man, and renders him an unfit subject of reward and punishment. I shall consider the difficulty as pressing entirely on the side of punishment, and shall observe, that as, according to the Necessitarian system, punishment can operate on the *state of the mind*, it may with the greatest propriety be applied. But if man had within him such a *capricious principle* as a self-determining power, the application of punishment would be improper, *because it would be useless*. What, indeed, has been called *vindictive punishment*, the doctrine of Necessity does exclude; but this, instead of being an objection to the doctrine, is one of its recommendations. Vindictive punishment, it is true, cannot be defended upon any system; but upon the principles of the Necessitarian it is *manifestly and palpably* absurd.

It will easily be perceived that I have not written for those who are altogether strangers to the controversy, nor for those who thoroughly understand the subject; but, as I intimated above, for those who have conceived that it cannot be thoroughly understood. And if the light in which it has now been placed shall render it more intelligible to any who have hitherto thought it obscure and intricate, my end will be answered.

E. C.

P. S. I am aware that I have written much more than was necessary; but the supposed difficulty of the subject seemed to require that it should be treated somewhat at length. Otherwise the argument (like most other arguments) lies in a small compass. The Necessitarian maintains, that every volition necessarily results from the state of mind in which the volition takes place. His opponent, to set aside this proposition, contends for a self-determining power as the efficient cause of volition. Here a simple question presents itself. Can the mind *will* this or that *without* a certain feeling or disposition that prompts the volition? Fact, to which even a self-determining power must bow, will answer, Certainly not. *Consequently* it

cannot will *against* the state or disposition in which it is at any given time. And here, were impartial reason to decide, the controversy must end.

Jan. 1820. M. R. vol. xv.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—By way of an *addendum* to my paper on the doctrine of Necessity, (pp. 7—11,) I should wish briefly to state the objections which are brought against this doctrine, and briefly to reply to them.

Objection. The doctrine of Necessity annihilates the distinction between virtue and vice.

Answer. The objection is not true. A benevolent deed will retain its character, though the doctrine of Necessity be admitted. But if the actions of men proceeded from a self-determining power of the will, then, indeed, as they would indicate no disposition of the heart, they would have no moral quality, and the distinctions of morality would be set aside.

Objection. The doctrine of Necessity subverts the foundation of praise and blame.

Answer. Then praise and blame, according to the observation just now made, can have no foundation at all. The truth is, we view moral beauty with complacency, and moral deformity with disgust; and praise and blame are the expressions of these sentiments. Hence may be explained the origin of what is termed remorse.

Objection. The doctrine of Necessity, if true, renders man an unfit subject of reward and punishment.

Answer. The objection is false, unless it can be shown that, upon Necessitarian principles, reward and punishment cannot operate to the formation of virtuous affections, which, were man really constituted upon the principles of Philosophical Liberty, they certainly could not. But as the objection chiefly respects *future* punishment, it may be observed that, if this punishment is considered as corrective, the difficulty

vanishes. The case of the wicked, indeed, compared with that of the righteous, may seem to reflect upon the goodness of the Universal Parent. But that there should be gradations of happiness seems to be the favourite law of Providence; nor is it more incumbent upon the Necessitarian than upon any other man to vindicate this appointment. But let it be supposed that future punishment will *not* be corrective.* Let the Libertarian reconcile this supposition to the Divine benevolence, and the same solution of the difficulty which will serve for him will do for his opponent.

Objection. The doctrine of Necessity makes God the author of sin.

Answer. If the moral evil which exists in the creation is conducive to good, no difficulty arises from its introduction; if it is not, when the advocate of Liberty shall have vindicated the Divine perfections, the Necessitarian may avail himself of his vindication.

Objection. The doctrine of Necessity leads to moral inactivity.

Answer. There is nothing which human folly cannot abuse. But he would deserve the palm for folly who should refuse to exert himself for the promotion of his own happiness because the series of human actions is predetermined, while experience and observation concur to convince him that what a man soweth that he also reaps. Suppose a man to be afflicted with a disorder for which he believed that a particular medicine was a certain cure. What should we think of him if he refused to apply the remedy from a persuasion that it was predetermined whether he should or should not recover?

* Dr. Paley speaking of human punishments properly considers them as founded on utility, and observes that *the retribution of so much pain for so much guilt*, which we expect at the hand of God, does not obtain here. Query. Do we see any reason why pain should follow guilt if it could be of no advantage either to the sufferer or to others? The experience of life has caused guilt and suffering to be associated in our minds; but do we not deceive ourselves if we fancy that we perceive a connection between them which, independent of *all considerations of utility*, rests on the abstract principle of justice?

Objection. According to the doctrine of Necessity, our actions are not properly our own, and there is but one will in the universe.

Answer. Our actions are in a sufficiently proper sense our own, as they are the result of human powers. With respect to the latter part of the objection, that there is but one will in the universe, this in a sense is true, and to the Christian Necessitarian a glorious truth it is. Believing in the infinite wisdom, power, and goodness of the Great First Cause, he will see reason to consider all events, whether pleasurable or painful, and all actions, whether morally good or morally evil, as equally essential to the harmony of the creation, and equally conducive to the ultimate happiness of mankind. Thus, in his view, as in that of his Maker, all *real* evil is exterminated from the universe. Hence, if he properly reflects upon his principles, he will find in them the most powerful aids to devotion and benevolence.

As I have not trespassed long on the time of your readers, I will, with your permission, detain them a few moments by turning to another subject. The other day, upon reading Plutarch's *Consolatio ad Apollonium*, I was led to reflect a little upon a favourite maxim of the ancient philosophers, that, in grief occasioned by afflictive bereavements, it is the part of a wise man *temporis medicinam ratione præcipere*. I will not bring forward quotations in evidence that such was their maxim, but will simply state to the English reader that, according to the opinion of these philosophers, it is the part of wisdom to remedy grief by reason, and not to wait for the alleviation which time would otherwise bring with it. This sentiment affords a striking, but not the only proof, that the ancients attributed to reason much more than it can justly claim. It seems also to show that they were but little acquainted with the constitution of the human mind. A little just reflection would have taught them that the effect of time in mitigating sorrow is not to be anticipated by any act of the understanding. It is almost needless to remark that time diminishes

grief, by causing new impressions to succeed to old ones, and that, by engaging the mind in interests which arise out of new occurrences, it gradually weakens the recollections by which the painful events of a former period had been succeeded. But by what effort of reason is this progressive operation of time to be superseded? Experience, indeed, sufficiently proves that no mental energy can effect, without the aid of time, what time, without the aid of reason, seldom fails to accomplish. But what topics of consolation had reason to offer which could render the lenient hand of time unnecessary to the mitigation of human sorrow? That it is wise to bear with patience what it is impossible to avoid; that whatever sufferings visit the individual, he is not the *only* sufferer; that if we lose our friends by death, they escape the evils which might have awaited them in a longer life, and at the worst are only as though they had never been.* Such, and no better than such, were the considerations which philosophy could suggest to soothe the anguish of an afflicted heart. How inferior to the assurances of Christianity, that “this mortal must put on immortality,” and that suffering is a part of a wise and benevolent discipline which may assist to prepare us for everlasting happiness in the life to come! Not, indeed, that these assurances will immediately calm the agitated spirit, or produce the effect for which philosophy in vain invoked the aid of reason. Time still supplies the only certain cure for the agony of poignant grief. And if affliction has a beneficial influence on the human heart, it is right that the remedy should not be instantly at our command. But while the philosophers of old demanded of reason to perform the work of time, they not only demanded what the law of nature forbids, but showed that, while they felt grief to be an evil, they were strangers to the considerations which are best calculated to soften its severity, and had no proper conception of the present state as a scene of moral

* When the ancient philosophers speak of a future life in circumstances which put their faith to the proof, they generally state the hypothesis of annihilation, together with that of a future being, and in such a manner as to render it dubious to which their minds inclined.

discipline. Whence, indeed, should they have had this conception, when, as Cicero expressly informs us, there was nothing on which both the learned and the unlearned differed so much as on this, whether the gods pay any regard to the concerns of men?

I shall be believed when I say that I am not disposed to despise or undervalue the ancients; but truth compels me to confess that their philosophy falls lamentably below the discoveries of revelation; discoveries which he will value most who endeavours to ascertain what unassisted reason can do by carefully examining what it has done.

E. C.

Jan. 1820. M. R. vol. xv.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—It was not my intention to say anything more on the doctrine of Necessity, but I seem called upon to add a few words upon the subject: and they shall be as few as possible. Your ingenious correspondent Homo (p. 93) is of opinion that the question is to be resolved into consciousness. But I conceive that, without an appeal to consciousness, we may pronounce upon the truth of the following proposition, that a definite effect must have a definite cause. But your Correspondent further observes, that the doctrine of Necessity seems to exclude accountability altogether. To this I reply, that the doctrine of Necessity appears to me demonstrably true; and *fact* proves that man is an accountable being. In his journey through life he takes the consequences of his own conduct, and is in an important sense the author of his own happiness or misery. And what more than this need be understood by accountableness? The following observation of Dr. Jebb seems to be rational, and, if just, is much to the purpose here: "Punishment (the Doctor means in the common sense of the term) is the annexing of something over and above the natural consequence of an action. But this addition, let divines say what they please, obtains not in a future state." But granting

that this observation is not just, does accountableness, in any sense of the term, imply that the actions of men proceed from a *self-determining power* of the will?

With respect to the objection of my friend Dr. Morell, (p. 86,) for the convenience of replying to it, I shall state it in the following terms: The moral feelings of mankind teach them that it is just that punishment should follow guilt, and therefore that man cannot be what the Necessitarian represents him. But do the moral feelings of mankind teach them that justice would demand the punishment of guilt, if the punishment could produce no beneficial effect? Then their feelings, I conceive, reason faster than their understanding. See note in p. 70 of your last number. But do their feelings teach them that punishment would be more justly inflicted on a being constituted upon the principles of philosophical liberty, than on what is termed a necessary agent? Then their feelings teach them what is not true. The fact seems to be, that observation and experience have caused the ideas of guilt and punishment to be so closely associated in our minds that we may imagine that we see or feel a connection between them which does not rest on the basis of utility, and which cannot be proved to exist.—Is the moral consciousness of which Dr. Morell speaks an innate feeling? Is there reason to think that, if man had never seen punishment follow guilt, he would have inferred from his moral constitution that it ought to follow it? If so, we need not, I think, object altogether to the doctrine of *innate principles*. But is this feeling the result of experience? Then it cannot teach us what experience does not teach; and if we feel convinced that justice calls for the punishment of sin, though the punishment *would be in every sense useless*, it must be reason and not feeling which has taught us this lesson. Where, then, is the evidence of this proposition to be found? But after all, is this feeling, if carefully considered, anything more than an acquiescence in a law of nature which is presumed to be wise and right? Perhaps, indeed, there may be blended with this feeling a secret conviction that the suffering which is the consequence of guilt is,

in a general view of it, beneficial; a conviction which experience can scarcely have failed to generate. At all events, it may be observed, that feelings are sometimes difficult things to analyse, and cannot be successfully opposed to what appear to be the clear and certain deductions of reason. I submit these hasty remarks to the consideration of my friend, and if they should appear satisfactory to his reflecting mind, I shall *feel* persuaded that they are just. E. C.

P. S. Does our moral consciousness teach us that there is a connection between guilt and punishment which is not founded on utility, but on the *immutable fitness of things*? This, I think, my friend will hardly allow.

Is there not reason to think that we sometimes lose sight of the origin of our moral notions, and overlook the medium by which ideas have been associated in our minds? Is not this the case with those who imagine that they perceive virtue to be intrinsically excellent, and vice intrinsically odious, *all regard to their respective tendencies and effects being set aside*?

March, 1820. M. R. vol. xv.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—It has sometimes been objected to Unitarianism that it is a cold and philosophical system, which by no means lays the same hold on the feelings with those views of religion which are denominated Calvinistic. This objection I wish briefly to consider. And in reply to it, I should say, that the true test of religious feeling, I mean that feeling which alone is valuable, is a good and holy life. Now, if Unitarians, as a body, fall below their fellow-professors in the practice of Christian virtue, some presumption may be derived hence against their doctrine. But this, I trust, is not the fact; nor is this, I believe, alleged against them. Having premised thus much, I do not wish to deny, that the Calvinistic system is calculated to make a stronger impression on the feelings than

the simpler doctrine of the Unitarian. And fiction, in like manner, often has the advantage over truth in the power of impressing the imagination and the heart. But what are the feelings which this system addresses, and which it so powerfully affects? Chiefly and peculiarly the feelings of apprehension and terror. And certainly it is not less calculated to overwhelm the soul with horror than to confound and *prostrate* the understanding. But it will be said, that by the economy of Redemption it calls forth in the sincere believer the liveliest emotions of gratitude and joy. Be it so. But does it follow hence that the views on which these affections are founded are correct? Then we must establish a new test of truth; and those opinions must be considered as most likely to be theoretically just by which the feelings are most deeply interested. But is there, then, nothing in the Unitarian doctrine upon which the human heart can fix with a warmth of religious affection? I trust that the experience of many of its professors can bear witness, that, by the views which it gives of the Divine Being, it lays a foundation for that sacred admiration of his character which cannot be long cherished without terminating in love to him; and that, by the representations which it exhibits of the Divine government, it encourages the most cheerful trust in Providence, and an unqualified submission to the will of God. And though it directs every sentiment that can properly be termed devotional to the Universal Parent alone, it leaves room for that affectionate regard to Jesus Christ which will constrain the sincere believer to keep his commandments.

I now propose to inquire, whether the mere ardent feelings which are inspired by the Calvinistic doctrine can justly be considered as a moral benefit? And in this inquiry I would first ask, Are the feelings in question excited by practical principles? If not, it is fair to conclude, that they are practically useless. Calvinism, indeed, by the instrumentality of terror, may sometimes secure a *greater degree of attention to religion* than the milder doctrine of the Unitarian will usually direct to it. And this appears to be the only imaginable ad-

vantage to which the system can lay claim. But it may bear a question, whether what is gained in point of strong impression will make any compensation for what is lost by encumbering a system of plain practical truths with dark and inexplicable mysteries. But in relation to the present inquiry it is worthy of remark, that feelings which elevate the mind much above its ordinary tone cannot be long sustained, and consequently that the *sum* of devotional feeling in the serious-minded Unitarian may not be less than in the serious Calvinist, though the former may not experience the occasional fervours of the latter. And it may also be observed, *without any imputation on the sincerity of our Calvinistic brethren*, that the appearance of religious feeling, which is exhibited in their religious exercises, may sometimes go beyond what is actually experienced. A certain language founded on their system may be, and probably often is, employed, when the feelings of which it seems to be the natural expression are not in fact excited. But granting that these feelings are awakened whenever the language which is appropriate to them issues from the lips, yet when they have subsided, the mind may be left less sensible to the influence of those practical considerations which address themselves chiefly to the understanding. In connection with this remark I would observe, and the observation is by no means unimportant, that when strong religious feelings are excited by mysterious doctrines that have no necessary relation to practice, there is danger lest the concerns of morality should be regarded as uninteresting and of small comparative value. And that this is not an imaginary danger seems sufficiently proved by fact. To the great majority of Calvinistic professors the moral part of religion does not appear to present a subject of interesting reflection. And the preacher, who should make it his primary business to illustrate and enforce that bright assemblage of virtues which constitutes the Christian character, would be soon suspected of not being sound in the faith, and would probably be left in a short time to deliver his lectures on *dry morality* to empty pews. A Calvinist, I cheerfully confess, may love virtue, as a man, and may practise it, as a

Christian; but *as a Calvinist*, he cannot regard it with the interest with which it will be regarded by the consistent Unitarian. He holds it, indeed, to be essential to the favour of God; but his notions of original depravity and the regenerating influence of the Spirit place it out of the sphere of human exertion; not to say that the atoning sacrifice and imputed righteousness of Christ seem to do away the necessity of *labouring to attain* that for the want of which so extraordinary a compensation has been made. In the estimation of the Unitarian, on the other hand, virtue is, strictly speaking, a human attainment, resulting naturally and necessarily from the proper exercise of the human powers, and, in itself considered, the object of Divine approbation and complacency.

But to return from this digression, I observe, once more, that where great stress is laid upon fervours of religious affection, there is no small danger lest the character should be estimated by them; than which no error can be more prejudicial to the interests of Christian virtue. In the opinion of the Calvinist, the most upright and holy life is but an equivocal evidence that the work of grace has been carried on in the heart. Certain feelings must be experienced before this evidence can be pronounced to possess any value. But it is easy to see that a man who is not enamoured of moral rectitude may not unnaturally fall into the error of laying more stress on the requisite feelings than on the practice which ought to accompany them; and I am greatly mistaken if it is not much easier to obtain the one than to observe the other. But after all, it will be said that Calvinism, by means of the powerful impression which it makes on the imagination and feelings, has a great effect upon the lower orders of society, and has been the happy means of reclaiming many from vicious irregularities to sobriety and decency of conduct. This I believe to be true; and it seems to furnish something like an explanation of a phenomenon, which to the Unitarian might appear extraordinary and perplexing; namely, that what he regards as a gross corruption of Christianity should have spread so widely and prevailed so long. To this system, however, he

believes that the progress of mental improvement must one day be fatal; and he is at liberty to believe, that by that time the Christian world in general may have attained sufficient refinement to allow its full efficacy to the simple doctrine of the gospel, when stripped of the awful mysteries and adventitious terrors with which it has been encompassed by the misapprehension of man.

E. C.

Walthamstow, May 20, 1820. M. R. vol. xv.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—The Calvinist has sometimes urged against the Unitarian, that he thinks and speaks too lightly of the evil of sin. Does not the fundamental error of Calvinism lie in attributing to sin a degree of malignity which does not appertain to it?*

Sin, says the Calvinist, is an infinite evil, because it is committed against an infinite Being. Hence he infers that it deserves an infinite punishment, and that this punishment must be suffered unless an infinite satisfaction be made to the justice of God, which satisfaction can only be made by an infinite Being.

Now, as there is not one word of all this in Scripture, but the doctrine which is here presented is a merely human explanation of what Scripture is supposed to teach, if upon inquiry it should appear altogether destitute of reason, no impartial man will doubt what is the just and necessary inference. I mean to examine these propositions in their order, and I sincerely wish that our Calvinistic brethren would fairly and candidly discuss the subject with us. If I am wrong, it does not indeed follow that their interpretation of the language of Scripture must be accepted; but if I am right, the whole of their system necessarily falls to the ground.

* On the malignity of sin, see Dr. Cogan's "Theological Disquisition on the Characteristic Excellencies of Christianity," pp. 543-549.

Sin is an infinite evil, because it is committed against an infinite Being. But by whom is it committed? The proposition, to be fairly stated, ought to stand thus: sin, which is committed by a finite against an infinite Being, is an infinite evil. It would then be just as reasonable to say that sin is a finite evil because it is committed by a finite being, as to say that it is an infinite evil because the Being against whom it is committed is infinite. In fact, the only intelligible rule by which the evil of sin can be estimated, is the mischief which it does, or the misery which it produces. Does it then, necessarily, and from its own nature, produce infinite misery,* or is infinite misery judicially annexed to it by the Creator? The former will not be maintained, and to assume the latter, is to beg the question. But the criminality of an offence, in relation to the offender, is *universally* estimated by the powers of his understanding, and the means of knowledge and improvement which he has enjoyed. And if it is deemed impossible for him to have had any just conception of the moral turpitude of the offence, his guilt is justly considered as proportionably extenuated. But is it possible for the finite mind of man to comprehend the enormity of an infinite offence? If not, the guilt of such an offence can never be charged upon him. But what is sin in itself considered? A deviation from rectitude and virtue. And if the slightest neglect of the perfect law of God (whether intentional or otherwise) is an infinite offence, and that it must be according to the axiom, what shall we say to the bold and daring act of iniquity? Is this more than an

* The Calvinistic argument is, not that sin is an infinite evil because it produces infinite misery, but that infinite misery will follow it because it is an infinite evil. Should it be said that sin, considered *in the abstract*, is an infinite evil as it is committed against an infinite Being, I should reply, that it will be time enough to consider this position when sin shall be committed *in the abstract*. Sin is necessarily relative, and, to be justly considered, must be considered in connection with the offending party as well as with the Being against whom the offence is committed. On the question whether sin is an infinite evil, see Reasons for rejecting the Calvinistic Theology, in the Monthly Repository, vol. x., pp. 23, 24.

infinite offence, or are we, with the Stoics of old, to maintain that all sins are equal ?

“Sensus moresque repugnant ;
Atque ipsa utilitas, justi prope mater et æqui.”

But I would further ask, whether it be possible for man to avoid sin in every form ? If not, sin is so far the inevitable result of his imperfect nature ; which nature, according to the Calvinistic reasoning, must itself be infinitely evil. But shall this be predicated of anything of which God is the author ? I have not, indeed, forgotten what is said concerning Adam as the federal head of his offspring. But did Adam proceed from the hands of his Creator a being morally perfect ? If so, how came he to fall ? If not, and he had in his constitution the seeds and stamina of sin, he had in him an infinite evil. With regard to what is said respecting the abuse of free-will, in the first parent of our race, I must be excused discussing that question here.

But sin, because it is an infinite evil, deserves an infinite punishment. That is, an infinite punishment is due to even the slightest transgression of the perfect law of God in a frail and imperfect creature, and this punishment is to be awarded by the Creator ! I shall only observe on this proposition, that if the premises are false, the conclusion cannot stand.

But let us proceed to consider the next proposition, that the sinner must suffer an infinite punishment unless an infinite satisfaction be made to the justice of God.—In this proposition, it is intimated that something distinct from the punishment of the offender may satisfy the claims of justice. But does justice demand, or does it not demand, that sin, being an infinite evil, should be followed by an infinite suffering ; and does it demand, or does it not, that where the guilt has been incurred, there the punishment should fall ? And if it does demand this, and such demand is consistent with the justice of God, which, in common with his other attributes, must be infinite, the demand itself must be infinitely just. And to what principle can such a demand give place ? If it be said that justice

sometimes yields to mercy, I answer, that were justice what the present argument supposes it to be, it never would yield to it, and that when it does so yield, it does not demand an equivalent satisfaction. But what is the nature of the satisfaction required? It is even that the suffering due to sin should be transferred to one by whom the guilt could not be contracted, in order that by this exchange the guilty should escape. Thus this stern and unrelenting principle, which will have nothing short of an infinite punishment for the offences of a finite being, and which infinite benevolence cannot prevail upon to relinquish one iota of its claims, can suffer its demands to be altogether set aside *as far as concerns the offender*, and, provided the sin be punished, can permit the sinner to go free! The present proposition may be dismissed when two questions have been asked: What is justice but a modification of benevolence? What are the only intelligible ends of punishment?

But the required satisfaction can only be made by an infinite Being. Then we might have pronounced the case to be hopeless, since, except the Deity, an infinite being does not exist. Against this objection, however, the Calvinistic system provides by a wonderful expedient. The second person* of that mysterious Trinity into which the Divine nature is distributed, undertakes to make the demanded satisfaction. And to whom does he make this satisfaction? Doubtless to the other two and to himself. And how is this satisfaction made? By his union with a mortal man who expired upon a cross. Did the divine nature of Christ, then, suffer in the stead of sinners, or of the elect, all that they would have suffered to all eternity?

* What is the meaning of the term *person* in this use of it? Is there not reason to think that this term, *used confessedly without a definite signification*, is retained as convenient, because when the Father and the Son are represented as doing what nothing but *intelligent agents* could do, the term *person* allows them to be considered as such; but when, on the other hand, the doctrine itself is the subject of inquiry, it is conceived that the charge of Tritheism may be eluded by pleading that the term *person* is not intended to denote an intelligent *being* or *agent*?

If not, the full demands of justice have not been satisfied, and sin consequently cannot be forgiven. Did the Divinity suffer at all? If not, where is the value of the sacrifice which has been offered? Could the death of a human, finite being, make a satisfaction for that which is pronounced to be an infinite offence, and for which it is affirmed that none but an infinite being could atone?

If the primary proposition that sin is an infinite evil is shown to be false, every conclusion which is drawn from it necessarily falls to the ground. In like manner, if it appears that an infinite satisfaction has not been made for the sins of mankind, those reasonings which are advanced to prove such a satisfaction necessary, must be fallacious. Now, unless the Deity himself suffered (which few, I trust, in the present day will choose to affirm), such a satisfaction has not been and could not be made. Whatever was the nature of the union between the second person of the Trinity and the man Christ Jesus, it did not extend to the grand object for which human nature was assumed, and while the man suffered, the divinity remained untouched.—But the man was ennobled by being the residence of the Deity. Was his nature thereby changed from finite to infinite? If not, his death was the death of a *finite* being, and could no more make an *infinite* satisfaction for sin than the death of any other man. And to say that it was *accepted* as a sacrifice of *infinite value*, would only be to say that it was accepted for that which it was not.—But it teaches in a striking manner the evil of sin, and the abhorrence in which it is held by an infinitely holy God. These do not appear to be natural inferences from the sufferings of one who *knew no sin*, and I confess that my mind would be directed to some very different conclusion.—But it vindicated the honour of the Divine government, and rendered it compatible with justice, that sin should be forgiven. In the first place, it has never been proved to be inconsistent with justice, that the punishment of sin should upon repentance be remitted. In the next place, it can never be shown that the honour of the Divine government would not be sufficiently maintained by

withholding pardon from the impenitent ; and, finally, there is no intelligible connection between the expedient which is supposed to have been employed, and the end which is said to have been effected. But in order to show more clearly that the sufferings of Christ were not a satisfaction to Divine justice for the sins of mankind, I observe, that in order that justice should be satisfied, the end answered by the death of Christ must be the same, as far as justice is concerned, as would have been answered if justice had taken its natural course, and the supposed satisfaction had not been made. Thus, if the object of justice had been to promote the moral improvement and happiness of mankind, and the same end was answered equally well by the death of Christ, it might with some propriety have been said, that justice was satisfied by his sufferings. But justice, in the case supposed, demanded that the sinner should be consigned to everlasting punishment, and the end proposed by the sufferings of Christ was, that he should not suffer at all. If justice can accept such a satisfaction as this, it is not the inexorable principle which at first it appeared to be.—But as Christ suffered in his own person what was due to sinners, justice has no further demand upon them. Is it, then, indifferent to justice *who* suffers, provided the due quantum of suffering be endured, and also indifferent with what view the suffering be inflicted, whether to punish the guilty or to exempt them from punishment ?—But justice may so far yield to mercy as to accept the sufferings of the innocent for the punishment of the guilty. Suppose the contrary were affirmed, who could refute the affirmation ? But if justice is not a branch of benevolence, and its demand of an infinite punishment for an infinite offence is founded, as the Calvinistic argument supposes, on the immutable fitness of things, mercy, if by mercy be meant a disposition to pardon the guilty, cannot exist in a Being infinitely wise and infinitely *just*. And if it did exist, what would it have to plead against the demands of eternal and unchangeable rectitude ?—But the death of Christ displayed the evil of sin in a manner not less awful than if the sinner had suffered in his own person. But the demand of justice was, not that

the sinner should witness the evil of sin, but that he should suffer the evil of it in everlasting punishment. But why was the evil of sin thus awfully displayed? The answer must be to promote the moral improvement and happiness of mankind. Justice, then, has a view to utility, and the ground of the argument is withdrawn. But is not the evil of sin sufficiently displayed in the everlasting sufferings of myriads of the human race? And as these remain under the curse, justice has obtained an everlasting triumph over mercy. Justice has had its satisfaction for the salvation of the redeemed, and mercy has gratuitously consented that the great majority of mankind should be doomed to perdition. And are we called upon to believe that both these attributes are infinite? In a word, according to the Calvinistic reasoning, an attribute which is denominated justice, is *the grand moral perfection of the Deity*, to which the essential benevolence of his nature is compelled to yield. What could be intended when it was said that "God is Love"? E. C.

October, 1820. M. R. vol. xv.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—In the year 1796, I printed a *small* pamphlet on the "Evidences of Christianity." It was thought of favourably at the time by persons of whose judgment I had a good opinion. I have since been asked, whether it would not be desirable that I should reprint it. To this I should for several reasons object. The *substance* of it, however, will be found in the following observations, which, if they appear to you to be useful, you will not, perhaps, think out of place in your Repository.

The Christian religion has existed for about 1800 years; and previous to this period it did *not* exist. It derives its origin from a person called Jesus Christ, who lived in Judea, and was crucified by Pontius Pilate, the Roman governor. A short time after the death of its founder, it was preached in

the Roman Empire by a few of his followers, and gained increasing credit and establishment, till at length it attained a decided pre-eminence above the Pagan religion and worship which had prevailed there for many ages, and which it finally overthrew. This conversion of the Pagans to Christianity must be considered as one of the most signal revolutions which ever took place upon earth, and is an event of which every philosophical mind must wish to know the real and proper causes. The only history which appears to account for this singular phenomenon is that of the New Testament; and this history consists of a clear and distinct narrative of facts, which, if admitted, will readily explain this extraordinary revolution. Hence arises a claim which this history lays to our attention, and likewise a strong presumption in its favour; as it must be allowed to stand in a very different predicament from a narrative of facts which will account for no existing phenomenon, and of which no monument, except the historical testimony, is extant. This presumption is corroborated by the consideration, that, as far as appears from the evidence of history, it was the credit that was actually given to the facts in question which caused the gradually-increasing diffusion and establishment of Christianity.*

Dr. Priestley, in his "Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever" (a work truly inestimable), has the following paragraph: "With respect to *hypotheses*, to explain appearances of any kind, the philosophical Christian considers himself as bound to admit that which (according to the received rules of philosophising or reasoning) is the most probable; so that the

* Let us suppose that we knew nothing of the early history of Christianity, but merely understood that it commenced at the time at which its origin is dated, that it gradually subverted the idolatry of the Heathen world, and that wherever it came it carried with it a pure system of morality, and inspired a *confident assurance of a life to come*. Let the Christian Scriptures be put into our hands with proper evidence of their authenticity. Should we not think that we had found the true cause of an extraordinary phenomenon? Or should we think that the volume ought to be rejected because it professed to give the narrative of a divine interposition?

question between him and other philosophers is, whether his hypothesis or theirs will best explain the *known facts*, such as are the present belief of Judaism and Christianity, and also the belief of them in the earliest ages to which they can be traced." With deference to an authority which I so highly respect, I should rather say, that until the New Testament history has been shown to be unworthy of credit, every hypothesis to explain the origin and progress of Christianity is *unnecessary*, and consequently undeserving of attention.

Let it then be considered by what methods, and by what alone, the credit of this history can be subverted. First, by proving the testimony in favour of the facts to be defective and equivocal. Secondly, by showing the facts themselves to be incredible. Thirdly, by demonstrating, that, if the facts had taken place, different consequences must have followed. Fourthly, by proving that the existence and progress of Christianity are to be attributed to causes altogether independent of the truth of the facts recorded in the history under consideration.

In order to prove the testimony to be false or deficient, it must be shown, that there is not the same reason to believe the genuineness of the books of the New Testament as of other books of equal antiquity; or that the facts which are recorded in them are of such a nature as to exclude certainty of information; or that the historians had no proper opportunity of ascertaining their reality; or that, from certain rules of decision admitted in other cases, there is reason to conclude that the veracity of these historians may justly be called in question. But if it appear that the gospel-history will abide the test of this inquiry, it must be concluded that no objection can be urged against the testimony, *in itself considered*. And let it be remarked, that this testimony, which is now supposed to have borne a fair and strict examination, is strongly corroborated by the original presumption in favour of the facts which has already been stated. And that there should be this concurrence of presumption and testimony in favour of a mere imposture, must be considered as very extraordinary and im-

probable. Thus allowing, what has never been disproved, that the testimony, in itself considered, is not objectionable, the general evidence in favour of Christianity may be stated as follows :—The New-Testament history possesses all the requisite marks of credibility. It contains the narrative of facts, the belief of which prevailed and extended itself in defiance of prejudice and opposition, and finally produced the most signal and important consequences; consequences which are experienced at the present hour.

But in opposition to this historical and presumptive evidence, it may be alleged, that the facts recorded in the history under consideration are in themselves so incredible, as to be inadmissible upon testimony which in itself considered appears to be clear and unequivocal. It will be urged, that miracles are in their nature so very extraordinary, as to carry in themselves a refutation of any evidence by which they may appear to be attended. In reply to this objection, it is to be remarked, that a revelation is in itself a deviation from the order of nature, or, in other words, a miracle, and that it must be confirmed by other miracles in order to establish its truth. The question, then, respecting the credibility of the facts recorded in the gospel-history, resolves itself into the previous question, Is it credible that God should communicate his will to mankind in an extraordinary and supernatural manner? Now, let it be considered on what grounds (I mean on the principles of Theism) it is possible to affirm the *incredibility* of such an interposition; and these must be the three that follow :—that such an interposition is contrary to experience; to the Divine perfections as discoverable by the light of nature; or to the conduct of the Divine Government, which acts not by special interposition, but by general laws. To say that a divine revelation is contrary to experience, unless *general* experience be intended, is evidently to beg the question; and to maintain that it contradicts the attributes of the Deity, is to affirm much more than it would be possible to prove. And though God has appointed general laws for the government of his creatures, it by no means admits of demonstration that he will never interfere in an extraordinary

manner to effect purposes which could not be so well accomplished by the operation of general appointments. Thus, instead of its being affirmed that miracles, or a divine revelation, are *incredible*, it ought rather to be said, that, judging from general experience and what we know of the Divine conduct, they are attended with that kind of improbability which it requires clear and unequivocal testimony to counterbalance. To pronounce them *incredible* is simply to affirm, what can never be proved, that the Author of nature had from the first determined never to effect a deviation from the general course of nature. With respect, then, to the *improbability* of miracles, it may be observed, that it is an improbability of which we are incompetent judges, and which may, therefore, be surmounted by a certain force of testimony. And we find, in fact, that the highest degree of supposed improbability, arising merely from a want of experience, is perpetually overcome by such evidence as is supposed to possess the proper recommendations to enforce belief. And it is further to be observed, that an improbability arising from the want of analogy, may be more or less credible according to the magnitude of the phenomena which are to be explained by the admission of it. A miracle which, if believed, accounts for no existing phenomenon, and a miracle, or set of miracles, which will explain a great and important effect for which a sufficient cause is wanting, must be allowed to be very differently circumstanced in point of credibility; and it might be added, that a less degree of positive testimony will suffice to confirm the latter than what would be necessary to establish the former. Let me now ask, whether what appears to be an authentic record of miracles may not be admitted as containing the cause of a most extraordinary phenomenon, of which history offers no other explanation? As a further presumption in favour of miracles, it may be observed, that there are only two religions existing upon earth which profess to be established on miracles that were public and notorious; namely, the Jewish and the Christian; and there appertain to both these religions circumstances which are best explained upon the supposition that they are really divine. The Jews, it is acknowledged,

were inferior to other nations in every species of polite literature and in general science. And yet, though surrounded by idolaters, they maintained, as a community, the Unity of God, and entertained more exalted views of the Divine perfections than even the wisest philosophers of the most polished nations. The Christian religion is confessedly the most pure and philosophical that ever appeared upon earth; containing principles most highly beneficial to the general interests of mankind, and presenting a standard of morality to which no objection can be made. And it may safely be observed, that these extraordinary facts are best accounted for by admitting the miracles of the Old and New Testament, and that they are striking confirmations of their truth. But before I quit the subject of miracles, I ought to notice the objection of Mr. Hume, that *no* testimony can justify the belief of a miracle, since the falsehood of human testimony can never be more miraculous than the truth of the fact which it professes to establish. But the fallacy of this objection will be apparent if we consider that the falsehood of testimony in certain circumstances would be *impossible, without a violation of the order of nature*. But such a violation of this order, a violation which could be referred to no cause, and could answer no beneficial end, would be far more inexplicable, and therefore far more incredible than a set of miracles which are expressly attributed to God as their author, and from which a great and important effect has followed.

But it may be objected, that, allowing the validity of the testimony, and admitting likewise the credibility of the facts, the New-Testament history cannot be received by the philosophical inquirer, since, if the facts there recorded had really taken place, different consequences must have followed, and all Judea and the Roman Empire must have been immediately converted to the Christian faith. This objection it seems, does not deny that the truth of the gospel-history is a sufficient cause of the revolution which was effected by Christianity, but simply affirms, that the progress of this revolution must have been more rapid had the facts been real. But as the sufficiency of the cause to which the Christian ascribes the origin and diffu-

sion of Christianity is by the very objection acknowledged, those reasonings must be very clear and forcible which will oblige him to reject it. But that the objection is by no means decisive will appear from the following observations. Few *comparatively* could have been eye-witnesses of the miracles in question. Prejudices *of the strongest kind* against Christianity existed among both Jews and Gentiles. Now that these prejudices will not account for the slow and partial progress of Christianity, allowing it to have been as slow and as partial as any unbeliever will maintain it to have been, can never be proved, unless it can be demonstrated that *no* prejudice can resist the credible report of miracles. But on what *data* this demonstration is to proceed, it will be difficult to say. The mind is certainly indisposed to receive any fact in proportion as it is averse to the conclusion which is to be admitted upon the belief of the fact; and with *certain* prejudices, and in certain circumstances, it is probable that no evidence of testimony would be attended to. Paine, I think, somewhere says, that he would not have believed the resurrection of Jesus without ocular and manual demonstration; and yet he too urges the unbelief of the Jews, as a proof that the event never took place. It may here be further observed, that they who were not converted to Christianity in the earlier ages of the Christian history, must have remained unbelievers, either because their prejudices did not allow them to pay any proper attention to the subject, or because they knew the falsehood of the pretended miracles on which Christianity depends. If the latter alternative be adopted, how comes it to pass that it should not appear upon the *slightest evidence*, that the truth of these miracles had ever been disproved? If these observations do not remove the objection, it may be asked, How can the belief of those who did receive Christianity be accounted for, upon supposition that the facts on which it professes to depend, are false? It may perhaps be replied, that this fact may be explained by the natural credulity of the human mind, and that love of the marvellous, which has shown itself in every age and nation. But will not the force of prejudice, equally natural to the human

mind, just as well account for the non-conversion of the remainder who were not converted?

I now proceed to the consideration of the fourth method by which the evidences of the Christian religion may be opposed; by proving that the truth of the facts contained in the gospel-history, was not the real cause of the existence and progress of Christianity. And here it must be observed, that if the evidence in favour of this history had not been already invalidated, the contrary evidence must be very clear and convincing before it can with justice be rejected. Nothing, in fact, will avail but evidence, which shall be clearer and more authentic than can be produced in favour of the history, the credit of which is to be subverted. When the Christian is asked, how the great revolution which was effected by Christianity is to be accounted for, he immediately replies, by the evidence of the facts on which it professes to rest; and he produces a history of these facts, which he maintains to be attended with all the requisite marks of genuineness and truth; and if the unbeliever, without *previously* subverting the credit of this history, attempts to prove its falsehood, by unfolding the origin and explaining the progress of Christianity, it is obvious that this attempt must be made on the evidence of the clearest and most decisive testimony; and that the causes to which the rise and establishment of Christianity shall be thus ascribed, must have no connection, even of the remotest kind, with the truth of the controverted facts. But it may now be proper to consider the causes to which the unbeliever, in the absence of historical testimony which might set aside the Christian records, must ascribe the origin and progress of Christianity; and these must be the following, imposture and credulity. On this *hypothesis* it may be observed, that it is gratuitous, and erected in opposition to historical testimony; and that the exigence of the case does not require it. Moreover, the operation which is assigned to imposture and credulity by the unbeliever, can never be proved to be conformable to analogy; though it might reasonably be expected that an hypothesis which should be assumed for no other purpose than to avoid admitting what contradicts analogy,

should possess the advantage of being itself analogous to the ordinary course of events, and free from the difficulty which it was invented to avoid. But was it ever heard of since the world began, that an imposture, *appealing to public facts*, produced a total change in the religious associations of a large community? And with respect to what imposture *can* effect, we must be allowed to judge by what it *has* effected. Upon the whole, the difference between the argument of the Christian and the hypothesis of the Unbeliever stands as follows: The Christian attributes the rise, progress and establishment of Christianity, to a cause which indeed contradicts analogy, but which is affirmed upon proper evidence to have existed. The Unbeliever erects, in opposition, an hypothesis *not* supported by testimony, and which can never be proved to be more conformable to analogy than the very facts which it is invented to overthrow. Upon a review of the whole it must surely be concluded, that if Christianity is an imposture, it was the most happy in its contrivance, the most dexterous in its management, and the most magnificent in its effects that ever wrought upon the credulity of mankind.

But before I quit the subject, it will be right to notice one or two objections to Christianity drawn not from a defect of testimony, or the incredibility of the facts, but from circumstances connected with this religion, and conclusions to be admitted by those who receive it. Of this kind are the following: The partial diffusion of this religion supposed to be divine; the incapacity of mankind in general to judge of its evidence; and the little good which has followed its promulgation.

Before I consider these objections separately, I shall premise an observation which will apply to them all, and which does not appear to have been sufficiently attended to; which is this: that as the legitimate and proper method of attack is now relinquished, and objections urged against Christianity which do not, strictly speaking, apply to it as a question of history, those principles must be clear and certain from which these objections are derived. For *in no case* can this method of opposing historical evidence be properly employed, except the axioms

which are thus brought in opposition to the testimony, are of such a nature that to reject them would be to bid defiance to the plainest conclusions of the human mind. Let the objections above-mentioned be now separately considered. It is then said, that a religion which really proceeded from God, could never have been limited to a small number of the human race, but must, like the benevolence of its Author, have been extended to them all. To this it may be replied, that a gradation of privilege is the favourite law of nature, and that moral advantages are, *in fact*, allotted to mankind in very different degrees: so that the objection, if it has any force, must be urged not against Christianity, but against the whole economy of the Divine government.

But it is further affirmed, that the generality of mankind are not qualified to determine upon the evidences of the Christian religion, and that it cannot be supposed that a religion should proceed from God, of which the proof should not be equally clear and intelligible to all. This objection, like the preceding, has the misfortune to contradict a general principle of the Divine administration. It is a fact, that the lower classes of mankind, who have not leisure and ability to inquire into the evidence of important truth, depend for information upon those superior classes who possess the opportunities which are denied to them. And whatever had been the evidence of the Christian religion, multitudes in the lowest station of society, must have still remained incompetent judges of its truth, unless a perpetual miracle had been wrought to remedy the inconvenience. But it may be further observed, that the most ignorant, as well as the best-informed of men, are capable of feeling the practical influence of Christianity, which is far more important than deciding upon its evidence.

But we are now to encounter an objection apparently more formidable and alarming, that Christianity has been the cause of great and public evils, and that it is altogether problematical whether it has done more good or harm to the cause which it professes to promote—that of virtue and happiness. Admitting the objection for a moment in all its force, it may be

replied, that the evil which has resulted from Christianity has been purely adventitious, and that it is some argument of its excellence if it has done any good at all, amidst the general perversion of its principles, and the enormous load of absurdity with which it has been encumbered. And it will be allowed by judicious inquirers, that Christianity is now better understood than it has been for many ages, and that by the aid of learning and criticism its genuine principles have been unfolded, and their unadulterated excellence displayed; so that it must be admitted to be probable, that the evil complained of will be gradually diminished; and should the time arrive when Christianity shall be professed in its primitive purity, consisting simply of the doctrines of a perfect Deity, an overruling Providence, a future retribution, and the immortality of man,* it is

* On the doctrine of a future life, which is the great discovery of the gospel, I have one or two queries to propose: Does the evidence of nature disprove the doctrine? This will not, I think, be pretended. Does nature clearly reveal this doctrine? This has been affirmed (but I must be excused if I add that it has been *only* affirmed) by men whose talents and character demand respect. Did nature fully disclose this doctrine to the wise men of antiquity? Let the learned Valckenaer answer the question: "*Quidquid optimi philosophorum, Socrates et Cicero, de immortalitate animæ loquuntur, meræ tantum sunt fluctuationes. Christiani demum de hoc dogmate certo fuerunt persuasi. Hinc æstimari poterit,*" adds this great man, "*quam exiguam vim habuerint eximia Gentilium præcepta ethica, quippe hanc ferme vitam tantum spectantia.*" Does nature by the constitution of the human mind, and the phenomena of the moral world, suggest the hope of a life to come? This hope Christianity is designed and admirably calculated to confirm. And, after having reflected upon the subject much and seriously through the greater part of my life, I venture to give my decided opinion, that, unless the doctrine of future existence can be proved to be *false* or *incredible*, the Christian religion, supported as it is by the strongest direct and presumptive evidence, cannot rationally be rejected. That the subject is not without its difficulties, I do not wish to dissemble. It seems, indeed, to be the general fate of moral truths, that when they appear to be satisfactorily established, some difficulty should remain which may form the ground of objection. This observation applies (as, I think, Bishop Watson has also remarked) even to that truth which of all truths seems to rest on the surest foundation, the being of a God. And it will sometimes happen, that

difficult to see what evil could arise, directly or indirectly, from such a religion. Indeed, if this is not religion, there is no such thing. And if these doctrines are admitted at all, it is difficult to conceive that their influence should be more injurious in consequence of their being received upon the evidence of fact. It may further be remarked in reply to the objection before us, that before it can be urged with effect against Christianity, two difficult questions must be decided. First, as evil must be supposed to attend everything which passes through the hands of such an imperfect creature as man, what balance of good may reasonably be expected from a divine revelation? Secondly, What is the precise balance between the good which has resulted from Christianity and the evil to which it has incidentally given rise?

I submit these reflections to your readers, trusting that they are just in the main, and that they may be of some service to the impartial inquirer in enabling him to decide upon the evidences of a religion which has been justly characterized as the best gift of God to man.

E. C.

Jan., Feb., 1821. M. R. vol. xvi.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—In addition to the remarks on the *External Evidences* of Christianity, which you did me the favour to publish (pp. 1-3 and 84-87), I am induced to transmit to you a few observations on certain circumstances appertaining to this religion which may be regarded as *presumptions* of its truth. But I would first remark, that if God should think fit to an objection which has but little weight when contrasted with the evidence to which it is opposed, will be more intelligible to general apprehension than the answer, and will supply a topic of plausible declamation to those who find it easier to declaim than to reason. But in all cases the preponderance of evidence ought to be allowed to turn the scale. Have unbelievers, in general, appeared solicitous to hold the balance with an impartial hand?

interfere in an extraordinary manner in the government of the world, it is reasonable to believe that such interference would be directed to some great and important object. Whether any such object has been proposed or effected by the Christian revelation, will speedily appear.

I observe, then, that one grand and *avowed* object of Christianity was to deliver mankind from the idolatry that prevailed in the world at the time of its promulgation, and to establish in its stead the knowledge and worship of the one living and true God. And this object has been gloriously accomplished. That this was one of the great purposes which Christianity was intended to answer, is explicitly stated by the Apostle Paul, in his manly address to his auditors at Athens, an address which may almost be considered as prophetic of the extensive diffusion of Christianity, and of the effects by which its propagation would be followed. It may, perhaps, be said, that nature so clearly teaches the being, unity, and perfections of God, that, without the aid of revelation, mankind must in time have emancipated themselves from idolatry and superstition, and have attained to all necessary and useful knowledge of the Creator. What they could have done for themselves is by no means certain; what has been done for them is manifest and unquestionable. And it is also indisputable, that, where the light of revelation was withheld, they had made but very small advances towards the attainment of the knowledge in question. On such a point it would be folly to speak with confidence; but I doubt exceedingly, whether, without the assistance of revelation, the bulk of mankind would at any period have arrived at the conception that there is one God only, and that God a being of infinite perfection. This conception seems to us easy and simple, and the evidence on which it rests to be irresistible. But the arguments by which it is supported, exclusive of revelation, are not adapted to the level of every mind. The fundamental proposition that contrivance implies a contriver, is indeed a proposition of which every man can perceive the force; but much more than this must have been apprehended before we could have reached the

sublime view of the Deity which is conveyed in the volume of revelation. Perhaps it will be objected, that the great majority of Christians do not, properly speaking, believe the unity of God, and that their views of his character are far from being consistent and honourable. This is unhappily too true. But the Christian Scriptures contain the remedy for the evil; and the time cannot fail to come when the evil will be remedied. Nor can it reasonably be doubted but that the time will also come when idolatry in every form will be banished from the face of the earth, and that by the sole influence of the Christian revelation.

But another *avowed object* of Christianity was to teach the doctrine of future life and retribution; and this object it has most fully accomplished. Wherever its light has been diffused, it has shed its beams over the darkness of the grave, and has inspired not only the hope, but the assurance of immortality. And this may be regarded as some presumption of its truth, if we reflect, that were we now, for the first time, informed that God had given a revelation of his will to men, our first inquiry would probably be, whether this revelation professed to solve the grand problem, Is man intended to survive the grave? And if he is in truth born for immortality, it surely were not unworthy of the Deity to interfere in an extraordinary manner to acquaint him with his high destination. It is indeed sometimes said, that a revelation was not wanted to teach the doctrine of a future life, since this is taught with sufficient clearness in the volume of nature, and was confidently maintained by the philosophers of old. On this subject I have given my opinion very explicitly on several occasions, and shall, therefore, not enlarge upon it now. I shall only remark, in relation to the ancient philosophers, that we have their arguments in our hands, and can therefore judge for ourselves of the conviction which they were likely to produce. I cannot, however, help adding an observation, in which I am confirmed by that great master of reasoning, Dr. Priestley, that the ancients did not employ the hope of immortality either as a motive to duty, or as a *topic of consolation* in those cases

where its influence would have been most seasonable and useful.* The inference from this fact (and a fact it is) is obvious and certain.

But again, Christianity has established a pure and perfect system of morality. This, I trust, I may consider as granted. And it deserves observation, that the moral precepts which are laid down in the Christian Scriptures are delivered with a tone of authority which admirably accords with the supposition, that they who taught them were inspired. No premises are laid down from which certain conclusions are drawn; there is no trace of an intellectual process by which the truth of certain principles had been ascertained, but every precept is left to rest either on its own evidence, or on the acknowledged claims of the teacher by whom it is inculcated. And little as Christians in general have been disposed to practise the morality of their religion, that man must have been very unfortunate in his social intercourse, who has not seen many instances in which the principles of Christianity have trained the sincere believer *to as high a degree of moral excellence as human nature could be expected to attain*. Some will object, that were Christianity divine, its efficacy would be more generally felt, and that its celestial origin would clearly manifest itself in the lives of the great majority of its professors. Not now to inquire into the causes why its moral influence is not greater than it is, it will be sufficient to observe, that had it been the Divine intention that the human race at large should rapidly attain to the perfection of moral excellence, they would have been differently constituted to what they are. Forgetting the manifest plan of Providence, we demand more from Revelation than we had any just reason to expect from

* I do not mean that, in the cases alluded to, they never make mention of a future existence. But when they make mention of it, it is merely as one branch of an alternative by which they endeavour to prove that death is not to be regarded as an evil. And how little they were themselves impressed with it, may be inferred with sufficient certainty from the stress which they lay on *other considerations* which they conceived were calculated to mitigate the poignancy of grief.

it, and then are apt to conclude that Christianity cannot be divine, because our demands have not been satisfied. But what I wished principally to remark in relation to the present subject was, the advantage of having a perfect standard of morality *which is acknowledged to be divine*. To say nothing of its influence upon individuals, it must have a happy effect in modifying the public opinion on all subjects connected with morality; and he who knows the mighty influence which public opinion has upon human conduct will not think lightly of anything by which this powerful engine can be controlled and regulated. Will it be said that this high standard of morals has not governed public opinion in the degree which might have been expected from its divine authority? I have virtually replied to this objection already. Suffice it then to say, that it has been the means of effecting a happy change in the manners and condition of mankind, and that it has a certain operation even upon those who know little of its nature, and who feel no solicitude to conform their lives to its requisitions. But if the perfection of this standard be granted, the question may be put with irresistible force in relation to our Lord, Whence had this man this knowledge?

My last observation respects the spirituality of the religious worship which is prescribed by Christianity. How prone mankind have ever been to attach forms and ceremonies to religion, or rather to place religion in them, their history most fully shows. Even Christians, with the Scriptures in their hands, and in direct defiance of the genius of their religion, have appended numerous frivolities to the simple worship which alone can plead the authority of their great Master. He merely taught that God, as a Spirit, should be worshipped in spirit and in truth. Beyond this he enjoined nothing. But who was Jesus Christ as far as he was not a teacher sent from God? A Jew, nursed in the bosom of a religion abounding with ceremonies, ceremonies to which he might have been expected to feel the same attachment with the rest of his countrymen. Yet, without questioning the divinity of the Mosaic ritual, without casting any reflection on the formalities which

he dismissed from his more pure and exalted system, he simply enjoins that God should be worshipped, and prescribes no formalities with which his worship should be accompanied. With what hypothesis, but that of divine illumination, such a conduct can accord, I am altogether at a loss to conceive. *Imposture* is, I think, confessedly out of the question; and that would be a very singular *enthusiasm* which should reject everything that could kindle the imagination, and which in its operation should surpass the ordinary effects of the most sober and enlightened reason. Upon the whole, the simplicity of the Christian worship is as strong a presumption of the divine origin of the religion as can well be imagined, and must surely have its weight with every mind to which all presumptive reasoning is not addressed in vain.

E. C.

March, 1821. M. R. vol. xvi.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—The perusal of certain papers in your Repository, on the subject of Miracles, has led me to transmit to you one or two remarks, which, though not directly applicable to the observations of your correspondents, may not be altogether useless.

In inquiring into the truth of the miracles recorded in the New Testament, we ought to consider them as they are there represented, not as events without an author and without an object, but as events which are expressly referred to a Divine agency, and which were intended to answer a certain purpose. The resurrection of a man from the dead, regarded as an insulated event from which no conclusion could be drawn, and by which no object was effected, would require strong evidence indeed to render it credible. But the resurrection of a man as a pledge of the future existence of mankind, and as an event which was to lay the foundation of a theology which should change (and which has changed) the religion of the world, is

very differently circumstanced. It is also to be considered, that if God should please to interfere in a supernatural manner in the government of the world, such interference would be miraculous, and must be supported by miracles as its proof. The question, then, respecting the probability or improbability of the Christian miracles resolves itself into the question, whether it be probable or improbable that God should step aside from the usual plan of his administration in such a manner and for such an object as is stated in the Christian Scriptures; and he who feels assured that such an interposition can be confirmed by *no* testimony, may of course save himself the trouble of inquiring into the evidence of the facts by which it is supported. But he who has not arrived at this assurance has nothing to do but to examine as impartially as he can the evidence which is laid before him, and to consider whether it is *in itself* worthy of credit. He will act unphilosophically if, at every step, he recurs to the antecedent improbability of miracles, (of which we are very incompetent judges,) in order to throw a suspicion upon evidence which appears to be convincing and satisfactory. He should consider the testimony not so much *relatively* as *absolutely*; and for this plain reason, because he has no balance in which he can weigh the evidence of testimony against an antecedent improbability, so as to ascertain precisely when the latter is surmounted by the former.* In the case of a fact which we deem to be improbable, we are

* I will here take the liberty to refer to an observation which I formerly made on this subject. "In many cases man cannot wait to calculate between the strength of the evidence and the improbability of the fact; and, in some cases, could he wait for ever, he would not know how to manage the calculation. And, conscious of his infirmity, he chooses, in such cases, rather to examine the validity of the testimony, of which he can judge with tolerable exactness, than to fatigue his faculties with endeavouring to balance the evidence which is laid before him against improbabilities, the force of which he cannot estimate. And in the case of Christianity, if he conceives himself to be an incompetent judge of the antecedent credibility of a divine revelation, his business is to inquire into the evidence with as much impartiality as he can, and to abide by the result of such inquiry."

scrupulous, and ought to be scrupulous, as to the validity of the testimony on which it rests; but we never pretend to apply a scale by which we can estimate improbability on the one hand, and the force of testimony on the other, in order to decide whether the fact is to be received. And in innumerable cases a high degree of supposed improbability is so completely overcome by the power of testimony, that it forms no deduction whatever from the confidence with which a fact is believed. Nothing is more common than to hear that such or such thing might have been thought *impossible*, but that, nevertheless, it is *true*. And the miracles of the New Testament ought to be inquired into in the same manner in which we inquire into the truth of any fact which we demand should be supported by clear and solid evidence. If the notion of such a divine interposition as is recorded in the Christian Scriptures, carries its own refutation along with it, we need inquire no further. But if not, we ought to examine its evidence with strictness and impartiality, and rest in the result of such examination. When I say that we *ought* to do this, I do not now mean morally, but philosophically. It is in this way that we judge of other facts, and if we refuse to judge of miracles on the same principle, we shall be in danger of rejecting what, to say the least, *may* be true, and what, if true, must be most interesting and important.

E. C.

Nov., 1821. M. R. vol. xvi.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—One of the most plausible objections to the arguments for the being of a God is that which is suggested by Mr. Hume, namely, that we have no experience in the origin of worlds, and therefore cannot safely conclude, because ships, cities, &c., are made by human art, that the universe must have had an intelligent Author. This objection I propose to consider.

The universe exhibits in innumerable instances an adaptation of means to ends, or what, for the sake of brevity, I shall sometimes call contrivance, not meaning thereby to assume the matter in dispute. And this adaptation of means to ends seems to be as truly prospective as anything which we call contrivance in the works of art. The eye appears to have been as manifestly formed for seeing, as the telescope for assisting the vision of the eye. The universe, then, is justly comprehended in the general description of works which indicate a fitness of means to ends: and if I may not, in the case of the universe, call this fitness intentional, I must maintain that it is strictly *analogous* to the effects of intention in the works of art. As far as relates to the *appearance* of design, the works of art have no advantage over the works of nature. The question, then, is, why I should not apply to the latter the reasoning which I apply without hesitation, and, as it seems, without error, to the former. Is it not reasonable to maintain, as a universal truth, that such an adaptation of means to ends as was never known to be fortuitous must be referred to an intelligent Author? But I have had no experience in the origin of worlds. This is true; nor is this experience needed. I have seen, in cases innumerable, the connection between intellect in a designing cause, and the marks of contrivance in the works which intellect has effected; and unless the human mind must be denied the privilege of reasoning from the clearest analogies, I may safely infer that this connection must be universal. Contrivance is contrivance, wherever it be found; and the connection between cause and effect is not more certain than the connection between an effect which indicates contrivance, and an intelligent or designing cause. We gain our knowledge of both these connections in precisely the same manner, or rather they are virtually the same, the latter being only a specific modification of the former. But Mr. Hume says, that all that we can pretend to know concerning the connection of cause and effect is constant *conjunction*. That conjunction is all that we *perceive* is true; and a more harmless truth was never made known to the world. For until some

disciple of Mr. Hume shall assign a better reason for constant *conjunction* than that the things thus *conjoined* are necessarily *connected*, the human mind will go on to reason from effect to cause, as it did before Mr. Hume's discovery saw the light. Could Mr. Hume's observation *disjoin* what we see to be *conjoined*, it would do something; but the fact remains exactly as it was, and where we see that an effect is, there we cannot help concluding that a cause has been. And this is sufficient for all purposes of reasoning. And if any one shall choose to believe that cause and effect are always conjoined but never connected; for example, that, though a ball, when struck by a cricket-bat, is invariably put in motion, yet, for any necessity that operates, it might invariably remain at rest: he may, indeed, enjoy the satisfaction of not thinking with the vulgar, but assuredly he will not have the credit of thinking with the wise. But Mr. Hume further observes, that "all reasoning from the relation of causes and effects is founded on a certain instinct of our nature, and may be fallacious and deceitful." If this proposition is intended merely to intimate *a possibility* that the reasoning in question may be fallacious, it amounts to no more than this, that this reasoning does not rise to absolute or mathematical demonstration. But if it is intended to imply that all reasoning from the relation of causes and effects probably *is* fallacious, it may be satisfactorily replied, that it does not follow because a thing possibly *may be*, that, therefore, it probably *is*. Moreover, if the observation were to be thus interpreted, it would imply, that the contrary conclusions to those which mankind have hitherto drawn from the relation of cause and effect would be more likely to be just; an extravagance to which no soberminded man can assent for a moment. In innumerable instances we rest with as much confidence upon reasonings drawn from this source as upon the evidence of the senses or upon mathematical proof. And this, however it comes to pass, we cannot help doing. But to spend another moment upon Mr. Hume's proposition: were the reasoning from the relation of causes and effects founded upon instinct, this, I conceive, would be a presumption that it would *not* be

fallacious. It is, however, founded on no such thing. It is founded on experience, on which Mr. Hume can place sufficient dependence when it suits his purpose. And the same experience which has taught us to believe that every effect must have a cause, has also taught us to look for a designing cause where there is an indication of contrivance in the effect. And hence we infer thus much with sufficient certainty, that if the universe is an effect at all, it must be referred to an intelligent cause. But, it seems, our experience does not reach far enough to justify the conclusion, that the universe, because it exhibits an adaptation of means to ends, must have had an intelligent Author. We want the only experience which the case demands—an experience in the origin of worlds. Were this principle carried to its full extent it would follow, that when I see a work of art, which is altogether new to me, I must not confidently conclude that it had a maker. I know, indeed, that men exist, and though *all reasoning from the relation of causes and effects may be fallacious*, I think I know that the human intellect is adequate to the production of those effects which we call the works of art. But as my experience cannot reach to a novel case, unless I may venture to call in the axiom, that similar effects must be referred to similar causes, I must draw my conclusion with diffidence and hesitation. But, as Mr. Hume observes, I have *no* experience of the origin of worlds. And if I had, what would be its precise value? “All reasoning from the relation of causes and effects may be fallacious and deceitful.” But the argument from experience, which Mr. Hume says is wanting, would rest upon the presumption, that similar effects proceed from similar causes, in which presumption Mr. Hume ought to have maintained that *in all cases* there may be no force. Indeed, if all reasoning from the relation of causes and effects may be fallacious and deceitful, were a world constructed before my eyes, the possibility of doubt, as to its origin, would not be precluded! In opposition, however, to these extravagancies of scepticism, I maintain that experience affords a *sufficiently* certain ground of reasoning, and I further maintain, that the experience which we have had of the

connection between contrivance and a contriver, abundantly justifies the conclusion, that the universe must have had a designing cause. To reject this conclusion is to set aside, without necessity,* one of the strongest associations of the human mind, and to reason upon a principle, if a principle it can be called, which would subvert the foundation of all reasoning. If similar effects are not to be referred to similar causes, all ratiocination is at an end. It is in vain to urge that there is a difference between the works of nature and the works of art. As far as respects the adaptation of means to ends, and on this alone the argument rests, there is no difference, except that this adaptation, in the former, is far more curious and exquisite than in the latter. Were any one still to say that the expe-

* I said *without necessity*, because no difficulty attending the hypothesis of Theism can possibly be greater than the difficulty of conceiving that such an adaptation of means to ends, as is *equivalent to contrivance*, should exist without the operation of intelligence. Indeed, ideas are more closely associated in the human mind than those of *contrivance* and a *contriver*. In contemplating the works of art, as connected with intelligence, we not only recognise the general relation of cause and effect, but are, moreover, led to acknowledge that the work effected corresponds to an archetype in the mind of the artist. And hence we seem satisfactorily to infer, that everything which indicates contrivance answers to a certain model which previously existed in the mind of some intelligent agent. And shall the works of nature, with all their various and exquisite adaptation of means to ends, be regarded as answering to no model, as corresponding to no archetype? There is one point of difference, it is true, between the works of nature and the works of art, which is, that the latter are put together by the application of mechanical powers, whereas the former are many of them evidently produced by the action of certain laws, which are called the laws of nature. But this circumstance of difference by no means counterbalances the circumstances of resemblance, and, therefore, does not avail to set aside the analogy. And what are the laws of nature but a certain mode of operation? Does the law in any case design and anticipate the effect? It may not be altogether foreign to the argument to observe further, that the laws of nature, together with all real existences, must be, in themselves considered, the objects of knowledge. And yet from the hypothesis of the Atheist, it will follow that no being exists by whom these laws are understood.

rience of which I have been speaking is no certain guide in a case to which it does not itself extend, I should think it sufficient to reply, that it is the only guide which we have, and that it is absurd to relinquish this guide in order to wander in a field of vain conjecture, without a ray of probability to direct us. One thing we know, which is, that intellect can adjust means to ends, and produce effects which indicate contrivance; but that anything else can produce these effects, we not only do *not* know, but have not even the slightest reason to believe. But men sometimes argue as if it were the perfection of human wisdom to follow the weaker probability instead of the stronger, or to set probability altogether at defiance, because it falls short of strict and mathematical demonstration.*

From the view which has been now taken of Mr. Hume's objection to the being of a God, it appears that the reasoning which ascribes the universe to an intelligent Author, rests upon precisely the same foundation as that which attributes what is denominated an effect to that which is denominated a cause. Contrivance is the thing to be accounted for, and that reasoning, founded on experience, which has led us to conceive that every effect must have a cause, has led us to demand an intelligent cause for every effect which indicates such an adaptation of means to ends, as could not, in our apprehension, be the result of chance or accident. And against this reasoning I do not see what can be urged, except that it does not amount to such a demonstration as would exclude all possibility of doubt. If the argument does not amount to the highest probability, I do not know what probability is. And Mr. Hume's reason-

* If any one should say that probability is not a reasonable ground of confidence, I should only desire him to carry this principle as far as it will go, and to *act* upon it. I need not point out what consequences would follow. But shall that evidence, upon which mankind do not scruple to act in ordinary concerns, be considered as unsatisfactory only in concerns of the highest importance? The practice of demanding absolute demonstration where it is not to be had, and where it is not needed, has done much mischief. It has given rise to an unreasonable scepticism on the one hand, and to an absurd appeal to *common sense* on the other.

ings only show that this probability is not absolute and incontrovertible proof. That this may appear more clearly, I will deduce from Mr. Hume's observations the only conclusions which would be formidable to the hypothesis of Theism, and leave the reader to judge whether these conclusions are legitimate. Between cause and effect we perceive only *conjunction*; therefore the probability is, that cause and effect are not *connected*! All our reasonings from the relation of causes and effects may be fallacious; therefore the probability is, that they *are* fallacious! We have no experience in the origin of worlds; therefore it is *probable* that the universe, which shows throughout an adaptation of means to ends, is *not* the work of an intelligent Author! If these are just conclusions, Mr. Hume's reasonings carry with them more weight than has been hitherto attributed to them. But, in spite of Mr. Hume's subtleties, mankind will continue to reason with confidence from the relation of cause and effect. They will also assume to themselves the privilege of generalising their ideas, and from similarity in different effects will infer similarity in their causes. And unless it shall be shown by some solid argument, that an organised universe is *not* an effect, they will think that they cannot err in ascribing it to an intelligent though invisible Cause.

But it may, perhaps, be said, that we may as well rest in a self-existent universe as ascend beyond it to a self-existent God. Were the universe a mass of matter, without any indication of design, it might, for anything that I am able to allege, be self-existent. But the marks of design, which it everywhere exhibits, stamp upon it the character of an effect which could be produced only by a designing cause. Between a harmonized universe and the idea of self-existence there is a repugnance, a repugnance founded on the experience which we have had of the connection between contrivance and a contriver, between effects which indicate an adaptation of means to ends, and an intelligent agent by whom this adaptation was devised. But between the notion of intelligence and self-existence there is no repugnance, and for anything that either experience or reason sug-

gests to the contrary, intellect may exist uncreated. Something uncreated there must be; but as analogy forbids us to suppose that this something is an organized system, which seems to testify the operation of an intelligent contriver; it consequently leads us to conclude that this something is that incomprehensible Being whom we call God. I will conclude with the sentiment of the poet, in which even an Atheist will not refuse to join,

“And if a God there is, that God how great!”

E. C.

Feb., 1822. M. R. vol. xvii.

SIR,—In my last (p. 65) I committed a trifling error in quoting the words of Mr. Hume. Instead of writing, “all reasoning from the relation of causes and effects,” &c., I should have written, “all reasoning from the relation of cause and effect,” &c.

I will avail myself of this opportunity to say another word on the nature of this relation. The question is, whether the constant conjunction of cause and effect implies that there exists between them a necessary connection. I contend that it does. The conjunction under consideration must either be fortuitous or necessary.* If fortuitous, then every event which takes place in the universe must be truly and properly *contingent*. How then comes it to pass that causes should not often act without being followed by their effects, and that effects should not spring up without being preceded by their causes? Moreover, as that which is contingent, or altogether independent of previous circumstances, (could it happen at all,) *may*

* I am aware that a third hypothesis may be formed, namely, that the conjunction between cause and effect is arbitrary, depending on the pleasure of the Deity, by whose energy the effect is produced. But as this hypothesis would only shift the notion of a cause from one thing to another, and would imply a necessary connection between the *real* cause and the effect, it does not require a distinct consideration.

happen at one time as well as at another, how comes it to pass that those events which we term effects uniformly follow those which we denominate causes? Whence is it, for instance, that the motion of the cricket-ball always instantly succeeds to the impulse of the bat? Are not the chances against such a succession *infinite*, unless the phenomena which are thus conjoined are necessarily connected? And will not this reasoning hold with respect to the innumerable combinations of cause and effect which take place throughout the whole of nature? Is it not then *infinitely* improbable that cause and effect should be uniformly conjoined, if they were not necessarily connected? Here, I think, we have the necessary connection of cause and effect made out by something like *a process of the understanding*. But perhaps some sceptical philosopher may say, that the contrary hypothesis, namely, that there is no necessary connection between cause and effect, does not involve a contradiction, and, therefore, that it may possibly be true. This inference is not quite correct. It does not follow because a proposition does not involve a contradiction, that therefore it may be true. It does indeed follow, that it may be true for any thing that we can *prove* to the contrary; but our ignorance is not an infallible criterion of possibility. Mr. Hume, I think says, that this proposition, The sun will not rise to-morrow, does not involve a contradiction; from which the intended inference doubtless is, that perhaps the sun may *not* rise to-morrow. Nor does it involve a contradiction to say, that the sun did not rise yesterday; so that had I slept through the day, I might have had some doubt whether the world was not during that period involved in total darkness. But the information of my friends would, in this case, have set me right. But who could have vouched for the truth of their information? The falsehood of the strongest testimony does not amount to a contradiction; consequently (it might be said) the strongest testimony may be false. But methinks, Sir, I hear you say, Enough of these extravagancies! I say so too, and will take my leave of them with observing, that scepticism, when in her most incredulous, or what she doubtless considers as her most *philo-*

sophic mood, borders on the opposite extreme of puerile credulity.

E. C.

P.S.—Your correspondent O.P.Q. (p. 76) is desirous of information respecting John xxi. 15. The little which I have to communicate he is welcome to, and that little will concern the Greek of the passage alone. If the sense were, “Lovest thou *me* more than these?” the Greek ought to have been, *αγαπᾷς ἐμέ πλεον τουτων*; I recollect but one passage in which *με* seems to be used as a contradistinctive, and that is Eur. Phœniss. 447: *παυσαι πονων με, και σε, και πασαν πολιν*, but here it is easy to read *παυσαι πονων σε κα̃με και πασαν πολιν*. See Æschylus Sept. contra Theb. v. 240. But to return to the passage under consideration; suppose the sense to be, “Lovest thou me more than *these* love me?” the Greek is correct, and may be compared with the following passage of Aristophanes: *του Πλουτου παρεχω βελτιονας ανρθας*, the construction of which is precisely similar, and the pronoun is not inserted as the nominative to *παρεχω*.

April, 1822. M. R. vol. xvii.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—The communication of your correspondent T.F.B., in your last Number (p. 211), brought forcibly to my mind an observation which I had made to a friend not a week ago, which was, that the Unitarians, while they have endeavoured to show the absurdity of the popular doctrine of the atonement, have not sufficiently urged upon the public the true interpretation of the phraseology on which it is founded. This interpretation will, I conceive, be found in the Sermons of the late Mr. Kenrick. This able and excellent man has satisfactorily shown, “that the death or blood of Christ has no efficacy in removing moral guilt, but that, whenever it is spoken of as procuring the forgiveness of sin, it relates entirely to re-

storation to a sanctified or privileged state, which, in the language of both the Old and New Testament on many occasions, is expressed by the forgiveness of sins."—*Sermon XIV.* vol. i.

Thirty years ago I was led to doubt whether the death of Christ and the forgiveness of sin (in the usual sense of this expression) were ever associated in the minds of the apostles, and Mr. K.'s Sermons have convinced me that my doubts were not groundless. To many, I am aware, this declaration will appear strange, and will seem to indicate a wish to dispose of a plain Scripture doctrine by any expedient. Against strong prejudices it is not easy to reason with effect; I would, however, just suggest to such persons the advantages which attend the above-stated hypothesis. In the first place, it is founded upon a *truly scriptural interpretation* of Scripture phraseology. In the second place, it gives a view of the consequences of the death of Christ which is conformable *to fact*. In the third place, it is free from the difficulties which encumber every scheme of the atonement which the advocates of this doctrine have hitherto been able to devise.

While I have my pen in my hand, I will make a remark or two upon an observation which I met with the other day in the *Quarterly Review*, and which the Reviewer considers as very admirable and important; namely, that God is revealed to us not as he is *absolutely* and in himself, but as he is *relatively* to us who are his creatures. I am not deep in these mysteries; but I presume that the observation is intended to intimate, that we must not reason from the Divine attributes as made known to us in Scripture, to the measures of the Divine administration. If such be its object, it might as well have been spared. For, in the first place, it is altogether gratuitous. In the next place, God cannot be imagined to possess absolutely any attributes which stand opposed to those which he possesses in relation to his creatures. And, consequently, if we know what God is in relation to mankind, we can reason with the same certainty and confidence respecting the measures of his government, as if we thoroughly understood what he is absolutely and

in himself. If, for instance, we are assured that God is infinitely or (as the Reviewer would say) *perfectly* good in relation to man, we know just as well what to expect at his hands, as if goodness were proved to constitute his moral nature and essence. In a word, unless revelation be intended to mislead and deceive, God can be nothing absolutely which will not allow him to be, in his dealings towards his creatures, what he has declared himself to be. E. C.

May, 1822. M. R. vol. xvii.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—I wrote my short remark upon John xxi. 15 (pp. 287, 288), not as a biblical scholar, which I am not, but from a simple consideration of the Greek in itself considered; and I do not know that I have anything further to say which would deserve the attention of your correspondent, except it be to remark, that if the Evangelist intended the emphasis to fall upon the pronoun, he ought to have written *εμε*, *in order to prevent ambiguity*. If the writers of the New Testament were not very nice as to the distinction between the enclitic and the emphatic form of the pronoun, yet they did not, I apprehend, neglect this distinction so as to render their meaning obscure and uncertain. In our Evangelist we read, *ει ο κοσμος υμας μισει, γινωσκετε οτι εμε πρωτον υμων μεμισηκε*. This is as it ought to be; though here the sense could not have been mistaken, even had the enclitic been employed. The Greek, however, would have been at variance with the writer's meaning, as the proper interpretation of his words would have been, "know that it hated me before you hated me." And I cannot help concluding, that when he wrote *αγαπαξ με πλειον τουτων*; his meaning was, "Lovest thou me more than these love me?"

E. C.

June, 1822. M. R. vol. xvii.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—The communication of your correspondent T. F. B., in your last number (p. 211), brought forcibly to my mind an observation which I had made to a friend not a week ago, which was, that the Unitarians, while they have endeavoured to show the absurdity of the popular doctrine of the atonement, have not sufficiently urged upon the public the true interpretation of the phraseology on which it is founded. This interpretation will, I conceive, be found in the Sermons of the late Mr. Kenrick. This able and excellent man has satisfactorily shown “that the death or blood of Christ has no efficacy in removing moral guilt, but that, whenever it is spoken of as procuring the forgiveness of sin, it relates entirely to restoration to a sanctified or privileged state, which in the language of both the Old and New Testament on many occasions is expressed by the forgiveness of sins.”—*Sermon XIV.* vol. i.

Thirty years ago I was led to doubt whether the death of Christ and the forgiveness of sin (in the usual sense of this expression) were ever associated in the minds of the apostles, and Mr. K.’s Sermons have convinced me that my doubts were not groundless. To many, I am aware, this declaration will appear strange, and will seem to indicate a wish to dispose of a plain Scripture doctrine by any expedient. Against strong prejudices it is not easy to reason with effect; I would, however, just suggest to such persons the advantages which attend the above-stated hypothesis. In the first place, it is founded upon a *truly scriptural interpretation* of Scripture phraseology. In the second place, it gives a view of the consequences of the death of Christ which is conformable *to fact*. In the third place, it is free from the difficulties which encumber every scheme of the atonement which the advocates of this doctrine have hitherto been able to devise.

While I have my pen in my hand, I will make a remark or

two upon an observation which I met with the other day in the *Quarterly Review*, and which the Reviewer considers as very admirable and important; namely, that God is revealed to us not as he is *absolutely* and in himself, but as he is *relatively* to us who are his creatures. I am not deep in these mysteries; but I presume that the observation is intended to intimate, that we must not reason from the Divine attributes as made known to us in Scripture, to the measures of the Divine administration. If such be its object, it might as well have been spared. For, in the first place, it is altogether gratuitous. In the next place, God cannot be imagined to possess absolutely any attributes which stand opposed to those which he possesses in relation to his creatures. And, consequently, if we know what God is in relation to mankind, we can reason with the same certainty and confidence respecting the measures of his government, as if we thoroughly understood what he is absolutely and in himself. If, for instance, we are assured that God is infinitely or (as the Reviewer would say) *perfectly* good in relation to man, we know just as well what to expect at his hands, as if goodness were proved to constitute his moral nature and essence. In a word, unless revelation be intended to mislead and deceive, God can be nothing absolutely which will not allow him to be, in his dealings towards his creatures, what he has declared himself to be.

E. C.

April, 1822. M. R. vol. xvii.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—In the paper with which the “Christian Reformer” for the present year is introduced, it is observed, that in the present day “high points of doctrine are only here and there asserted,” and that “the majority of congregations calling themselves *orthodox* are contented with the name without the reality of ancient *orthodoxy*.” In this representation, which I

have no doubt is just, I find, as in many other things, an evil blended with a good. That the improved state of theological knowledge should have led the nominal followers of Calvin to moderate their doctrine, so that the human heart should not shrink from it with horror (in which case, however, it is Calvinism no longer), must afford satisfaction to every sincere Christian, the *true* Calvinist alone excepted. This state of things may safely be regarded as an omen of still better days, and portends an important change of opinion which will be experienced at no very distant period. Nor will any one who is acquainted with human nature be surprised that the progress of religious inquiry should, in a certain stage of it, exhibit the phenomenon above described. Though here and there an individual has possessed mental energy enough to pass at once from Calvinism to the simple doctrine of the Unitarian, this is too much to expect from the public mind, which always moves slowly, and is obstinately tenacious of ancient prejudices. But, as I intimated above, the good of which I have been speaking is not unmixed with evil. That an unscriptural system, which, if presented in its real colours, could not now maintain its ground, should be so softened and palliated as to be admitted under a certain modification, when otherwise it would repel belief, is a circumstance which is calculated to prolong the dominion of error, and consequently to retard the progress of truth. And the mischief is the greater because the system (if a system it can be called) which is sometimes substituted for the genuine doctrine of Calvin, assumes no fixed and definite character. A creed which is distinctly laid down, and so far clearly understood, submits itself to examination, so that its truth or falsehood may, by impartial inquiry, be easily ascertained. But a doctrine (or rather a *phraseology*) which wears an ambiguous and indeterminate form, and, availing itself of popular prejudices, addresses itself to the ear rather than to the understanding, eludes instead of inviting inquiry, and retains possession of the feelings, while it makes no distinct impression on the mind. When the preacher tells his hearers, in so many words, that the blood of Christ has

saved the elect from the vindictive justice of the Father, the thoughtful mind may start at the declaration, and may be disposed to ask in what part of the sacred volume this doctrine is to be found. But when, instead of being thus explicit, the orator contents himself with merely haranguing on the great scheme of redemption without explaining what it is, every man is left at liberty to accommodate the description to his preconceived opinions; and as few hearers are so captious as to quarrel with their instructors for treating them with words instead of ideas, all may agree to admire that which none can justly be said to comprehend. Here I cannot help noticing, as a thing much to be lamented, that preachers who entertain what are called moderate views in religion, should sometimes continue to use a language which they know will be misapprehended by those who hear them. They may say in their defence that the language which they employ is chiefly the language of Scripture. But this in my judgment makes the case still worse. He who uses scriptural phraseology to which he is aware that ideas which he deems unscriptural will be attached, wilfully converts the oracles of truth into the means of confirming prejudice and error. If he must encourage the belief of opinions which he does not himself admit, let him adopt language of his own, that the mistaken views of men may rest on the basis of human authority. This authority many might dare to dispute, but what is considered as the authority of the Word of God, is to the serious-minded Christian overwhelming and irresistible. And thus when erroneous opinions which have originated in the misinterpretation of Scripture phraseology are cherished by the perpetual application of this phraseology, the evil scarcely admits a remedy. Some Christian teachers endeavour to reconcile their consciences to this abuse of scriptural language by pleading, that were they to speak their whole mind they should injure their usefulness. It is not mine to pronounce a harsh judgment upon their conduct, but I must be allowed to say, that mistaken indeed must be those views of usefulness which shall lead a teacher of Christianity intentionally to refrain from

declaring the whole counsel of God. If there is a class of men upon earth in whom simplicity and plain-dealing are more eminently important, and more peculiarly becoming than in all other men, they are the ministers of the gospel of Christ.

I will conclude this desultory letter by replying to an objection which has sometimes been brought against Unitarian preachers. It has been said, that when treating of certain topics, they are sparing in the use of scriptural language, as though they were secretly conscious that their doctrine is but feebly supported by the authority of revelation. The fact may be admitted, but the inference is false; they have not the slightest suspicion that their doctrine is unscriptural, but they know that in a mixed congregation there as yet may remain many in whose minds unscriptural notions have been associated with scriptural phraseology; and rather than use a language which, if they did not perpetually explain it when used, would be liable to misconception, they may reasonably prefer to express what they believe to be the truths of the gospel in terms which cannot be misunderstood. Moreover, there is a kind of language in the New Testament, which, in the age of the writers, was perfectly natural, and therefore perfectly proper; but which, if the general views of the Unitarian are just, it is now rather the business of the Christian teacher to explain than to adopt. Of this kind are the sacrificial allusions which the apostles make use of in relation to the death of Christ—allusions which it was scarcely possible for them not to employ; but which, if employed in the present day, unless illustrated by a just interpretation, must infallibly lead to error. I will only add, that if in the study of the New Testament a due attention had always been paid to the times and circumstances of the writers, the tenets of Calvinism would never have been heard of—tenets which ought not to have found an advocate in the world after sufficient time was allowed for the circulation of Dr. Taylor's "Key to the Apostolic Writings," a work in which these tenets are refuted as fully and unanswerably as

any error ever was refuted in any branch of science or of knowledge. E. C.

April, 1823. M. R. vol. xviii.

P.S. When I wrote the paper of which your correspondent G. B. W. does me the honour to speak so favourably (p. 160 of your last number), I was aware of the passage 1 John, ii. 12—a passage which I think that your correspondent has explained satisfactorily enough. Had the expression *for Christ's sake* been a scriptural expression, the phrase *δια το ονομα αυτου* might reasonably have been interpreted so as to bear the same meaning. But as the case now stands, the language of John is to us somewhat ambiguous. Had I been asked what I conceived to be the meaning of the passage in which it is found, I should, perhaps, have replied, that the general import of it might be expressed as follows:—"I write unto you, little children, because by your profession of the Christian faith you are redeemed from heathenism and idolatry, and introduced into a state of moral and religious privilege." That this change of moral condition is what is meant by the forgiveness of sins, as spoken of in connection with the death of Christ, I feel more and more convinced. I should, however, like to see the subject fully discussed by men (and many such men there are) who are better qualified for such a discussion than myself. From the habit of my mind, and the nature of my occupation and pursuits, I can only throw out hints, leaving to others everything like minute examination and inquiry.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—After the declaration which I have made of my inability to enter into long discussions, your worthy correspondent, Mr. Jevans, will not be surprised that I decline giving

a formal reply to his communication in your last number (pp. 294-297). That I may not, however, be wholly silent, I will, with your permission, acquaint him and your readers how I came to adopt the opinion in confirmation of which I referred to Mr. Kenrick's Sermons. When a young man, I read with great interest Dr. Taylor's "Key to the Apostolic Writings." I there found it proved incontestably, that the Gentiles were called *sinners* because they did not enjoy the privileges of the Jewish covenant. While strongly impressed with this idea, I was accidentally led to reflect on the well-known passage, "Behold the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world;" and my mind was forcibly struck with the thought, that the true interpretation of this passage must be, that by the death of Christ a way would be opened by which the Gentile world might be translated from what was deemed an *unholy* to a *holy* state, by which they, who before were *sinners*, might become *saints*. In the justice of this interpretation I was afterwards confirmed by reading, with some attention, the first and second chapters of the Epistle to the Ephesians, in which the apostle describes more fully than elsewhere the benefits which have resulted from the death of Christ, who is there represented as having broken down the middle wall of partition between the Jews and Gentiles, and "having reconciled both unto God in one body by the cross." Nor did I find anything in these chapters which was unfavourable to the sense which I had annexed to the passage above quoted. I hence inferred that when the pardon of sin was spoken of in connection with the death of Christ, the thing intended was an introduction to a new state of moral and religious privilege. And here I take my leave of the subject by again referring your readers to Mr. Kenrick's Sermons, and, I add with pleasure, to Mr. Belsham's Exposition of the Epistles of Paul.

E. C.

June, 1823. M. R. vol. xviii.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—Your learned correspondent, Dr. Jones, has stated in your last number (pp. 531–533), that he considers *αμπαλλεθ'* as the true reading in *Orestes*, 316, and has moreover remarked, that “Porson’s note shows that he mistook the meaning and construction of the passage.” The Doctor, I know, will excuse me if I say that were I to adopt Mr. Porson’s reading, I should also adopt his interpretation; and that for more reasons than one. But the reading itself is false. If ever our illustrious countryman altered the text of his author unnecessarily (which he certainly did very seldom), he has done it in this verse and its fellow in the antistrophe, having admitted into them *three* conjectures, which answer no other end than to break the uniformity of the chorus, by intermixing trochaic penthimemers with a series of dochmiacs. This observation is extorted from me by the truth of the case; and if any one shall imagine that it is intended to cast any slight on the skill of Mr. Porson, he does not know the veneration in which I hold this prince of critics.

E. C.

October, 1823. M. R. vol. xviii.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—A note in pp. 36, 37, of Mr. Kentish’s excellent Sermon delivered at Bristol, has drawn forth from their concealment a few remarks on a passage in Dr. Paley’s “*Natural Theology*” which I wrote some time ago, and had almost forgotten. Towards the conclusion of the chapter on the Unity of the Deity we read as follows: “Certain, however, it is, that the whole argument for the Divine unity goes no further than to an unity of counsel.” This observation was evidently in-

tended to guard against a conclusion which might otherwise have been drawn from the chapter in which it is found. What that conclusion is, admits of but little doubt. But could the Archdeacon's work fall into the hands of a man who had never heard of three persons in one God, the above remark would perplex him to some purpose. In reading the work up to this very observation, he would find that the author's object was to prove the existence of a mind by which the universe was contrived and executed; and nothing would be further from his thoughts than the suspicion that more minds than one were concerned in the design. When, moreover, he should recollect the chapter on the personality of the Deity, and the remarkable words with which it concludes, "Design must have had a designer; that designer must have been a *person*; that person is God;" and should also advert a second time to the title of the chapter in which the above remark is found, namely, on the Unity of the Deity, what would be his surprise on being told that nothing more was meant by this unity than a unity of counsel! A unity of counsel! he would say; between whom and what? Between God and himself? Or between one God, and certain other gods possessing the same essence and the same attributes? The first interpretation he would reject as meaning nothing, and the second he would consider as set aside by the combined force of the two chapters on the personality and the unity of the Deity, in which it seemed to be proved that God is one intelligent agent or person.

"The whole argument for the Divine unity goes no further than to an unity of counsel." If by unity of counsel we are to understand, according to the natural meaning of the words, an agreement of purpose between more minds than one, it may be justly observed, that nature gives evidence of *no such thing*. Nor, indeed, is it possible that mere uniformity of design should suggest the notion of more than one designing mind. To say then that the argument for the Divine unity goes no further than to an unity of counsel, is to say, that it goes no further than that to which it neither does nor can go. In one sense, indeed, of the word *counsel*, Dr. Paley's observation is

true enough ; since uniformity of design, *in itself considered*, proves only unity of will or purpose. But when it is allowed that nature points to one Creator alone,* and Dr. Paley's reasonings have proved that Creator to be a person, nothing seems more clear than that, according to the evidence of nature, God is one great and undivided Mind. But this is a conclusion which Dr. Paley seems to have been unwilling to admit. And, if I understand him rightly, to guard against this conclusion he has emphatically said, "*Certain, however, it is*, that the whole argument for the Divine unity goes no further than to an unity of counsel." In other words, *the whole argument* for the Divine unity by no means proves that God is one ; or, as Dr. Paley would probably have interpreted his own remark, by no means disproves a plurality of persons in the Godhead. But would it not have been more just to say, that though uniformity of design does not in itself demonstrate that not more than one mind was concerned in the work of creation, yet when we come to consider the attributes which we must ascribe to a self-existent Being, we see sufficient reason to conclude that God is one undivided and indivisible intelligence ? But without this species of reasoning, Dr. Paley's remarks in his incomparable chapter on the personality of the Deity, are quite sufficient to establish this conclusion. He observes that, "in whatever mind resides, there is a person." And what he meant by the term *person*, is manifest from the definition which he afterwards gives of the Deity as a "perceiving, intelligent, designing Being." But as wherever mind resides there is a person, if there is more than one mind, and consequently more than one person in the Deity, then, according to Dr. Paley, God consists of more than one intelligent and designing Being, which few will choose to acknowledge.

Should any one say that I have taken advantage of the use which Dr. Paley has made of the term *person*, I answer, that when he defined God to be a person, and also an intelligent Being, he spoke the language of reason and common sense ;

* "Natural Theology," p. 483.

and if there is a theological hypothesis with which this language is at variance, let those look to it whom it may concern.

I cannot dismiss the subject without expressing my conviction that no Trinitarian, when reading the *Natural Theology* of Paley, ever conceived of God as consisting of more than one person; nor do I believe that the mind of the writer was ever fixed on more than one person, except it was when he penned the sentence which I have been considering. Indeed, I question not but that Trinitarians universally, except when their minds are engaged on their particular doctrine, or when they are contemplating what they call the scheme of redemption, annex the same idea to the term God which the Unitarian annexes to it, that of one great Intelligence which first created, and now governs and pervades the universe. On the other hand, when they reflect on the divinity of Christ as distinct from that of the Father, I have no doubt but that, if they were to analyse their ideas, they would find that they conceive of two Gods as distinct in their attributes as in the offices which their system allots to them. Of the Holy Spirit as a separate person, I am persuaded that the idea seldom presents itself at all.

E. C.

December, 1823. M. R. vol. xviii.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—My attention having lately been directed more than usual to the superstitions of Pagan Idolatry, I have been led into a train of reflection which, if it may at all contribute to illustrate the evidences of Christianity, will not be regarded as unprofitable. The question which arose in my mind was this, whether there be reason to think that without a divine interposition these superstitions could have been banished from the world, and a purer religion substituted in their place. In considering this question, the natural inquiry is, by what means, exclusive of Divine interference, such a revolution must have

been effected, if effected at all. And the only means on which the imagination can fix are these, that men of superior talents, who should have seen the folly of the popular worship, would have endeavoured to enlighten the more intelligent of their countrymen, and that as knowledge descends from the wise to the ignorant, the illumination would at length have reached the lower orders of society, till none should have been left to believe what men of sense had universally rejected. And when the absurd theology which had been received by inheritance had been shown to be as groundless as it was irrational, it may be supposed that juster views of religion would easily have found their way into minds no longer occupied by prejudices which might prevent their reception. But he who knows anything of human nature, he who is aware of the force of religious prejudice, and who also considers how little of the knowledge which enlightens the more intelligent members of a community ever makes its way to the vulgar, will see reason to *doubt* whether superstitions so deeply rooted as those of ancient Paganism could have been eradicated by the means supposed. To have effected such a work must have required a *long succession of intelligent and reflecting men*, who should have employed their labour upon the undertaking, and who should not have suffered themselves to be discouraged by the opposition which they would have encountered, or by the slow progress of the reformation which they were endeavouring to effect: for that its progress must have been slow, we may safely infer from the pertinacity with which the most gross corruptions of Christianity have been retained for ages, and are still retained, by the great majority of its professors. And one thing appears certain, that unless a theology, which should have taken strong hold of the feelings, had been substituted for that which had been displaced, the supposed subversion of idolatry would have been followed by a *period of general scepticism and irreligion*. But where was this theology to be found, or whence was it to be sought? The boasted philosophy of the ancients supplies no system which could have been brought home to the minds of men with sufficient autho-

rity to supply the place of opinions rendered venerable by their antiquity, and confirmed by everything that can strengthen the impression of that which men deem sacred. Indeed, the philosophers scarcely differed more from the vulgar in their opinions than from each other, and had they all agreed, their arguments were too subtle, and their conclusions too uncertain, for general acceptance and utility. Nor could they have possessed any influence which might have insured the admission of their doctrines, while their arguments were not understood. Some, perhaps, will say that idolatry having been once dismissed, the religion of nature must of necessity have prevailed, or rather that the religion of nature must ultimately, by its own evidence, have banished idolatry from the world. Of the religion of nature much has been said both by Christians and Unbelievers, and if we are to believe what we are sometimes told concerning it, its truths are emblazoned in the heavens in characters which all can read, and which none can misunderstand. This religion is said to teach with the utmost clearness the unity and perfections of God, the doctrine of a universal providence, and the future existence and immortality of man. I believe that the world is wiser than in days of yore, and that juster modes of thinking have been adopted in modern than what prevailed in ancient times. But I do not believe that it is owing to this advancement in wisdom that men of talents, not greatly above the common level, can now with a single glance of the intellect clearly see the evidence of truths which great men of old either altogether rejected, or could only dimly discern through a cloud of obscurity and doubt. The articles above-stated, as the discoveries of natural religion, are the great truths of Christianity; and they who contend for them, as inculcated by nature, have derived their conviction of them from Christianity, and from Christianity alone. They contemplate the phenomena of the universe by the light of revelation, and then rashly imagine that these phenomena would present the same aspect were this light withdrawn. They mistake opinions, impressed by education, for the clear and certain deductions of reason, and think that they believe,

upon independent evidence, truths which experience seems to have shown that revelation alone is competent to teach. Hence the grand problem, whether man be destined for immortality is solved in a moment, and that on which philosophers of old employed so much thought to so little purpose, is proved by arguments which, whatever force they have, adapt themselves to the feeblest understanding. That some of the ancients endeavoured to establish this doctrine is true; but if they really believed it, there is sufficient reason to think that their faith did not grow out of their reasonings, but that their reasonings were laboriously sought for to uphold a preconceived opinion. And were Christianity proved to be a delusion, though a future life might be regarded as *a consummation devoutly to be wished*, I feel fully persuaded that the hope of it would in general rather be encouraged as a pleasing dream than as the presage of a glorious reality.

But having now inquired how far it appears probable that a revolution similar to that which was caused by the promulgation of Christianity could have been brought about by the researches of philosophy, and the gradual diffusion of knowledge, I proceed to say a word on the means by which this revolution was in fact effected. But I shall first consider the hypothesis of the unbeliever, I mean the hypothesis which the unbeliever must admit. According to this hypothesis, then, a few unlettered Jews, believing, or pretending to believe, in the resurrection of a crucified Master, while no such event had taken place, and in a series of miracles which were never wrought, conceived the extraordinary design of converting the heathen world to a religion which stood diametrically opposed to the prevailing superstitions, and which could flourish only by their total abolition. And these impostors or fanatics (call them which you please) had the temerity to rest their whole cause upon an appeal to facts which they maintained to be notorious, which facts they either themselves invented or believed without the shadow of a proof. Had we lived at the time when this extravagant project was devised, and had we, like modern Unbelievers, rejected all notion of miraculous

interposition, and consequently not admitted the truth of the facts which were brought forward in behalf of the new religion, what should we have thought of these men, and what expectations should we have formed as to the success of their undertaking? Should we not have confidently predicted, had we taken the trouble to predict anything, that a few short years would bury the mad scheme, together with its mad projectors, in everlasting oblivion? Would a momentary suspicion have darted into our minds, that it might so happen that these spiritual Quixotes would change the religion of the world, and that the final event of their wild enterprise would be the overthrow of a worship which had stood for ages, supported by the civil power, and dignified by all the pomp and splendour which could captivate the imaginations and blind the understandings of its votaries? But in the exact proportion in which such a result appears improbable, does the credibility of a divine interposition rise in the judgment of impartial reason. But mankind, it will be said, have always been credulous, and have in all ages shown themselves the willing dupes of knaves and enthusiasts. Be it so. But did ever any portion of a community submit, for the gratification of credulity, to part with early prejudices, and to undergo a total revolution of religious opinion? The followers of Joanna Southcott seem to have been ambitious of showing how far credulity can go. But if Joanna had commenced with endeavouring to overthrow the Christian faith, I have not credulity enough to believe that she would have robbed the Man of Nazareth of a single disciple.

But let us now suppose the truth of the New-Testament history, and we immediately have a clear and satisfactory solution of a phenomenon which otherwise must for ever remain inexplicable. The world before the Christian æra was overspread with the dreary shade of idolatry and superstition; the glimmering light of reason was far too feeble to dissipate the gloom; when it pleased the great Disposer of all events to interfere for the merciful purpose of redeeming his benighted offspring from a darkness which hid the Creator from their view, and left them to wander without God and without hope

in the labyrinths of ignorance and vice. Here was a *dignus vindice nodus*, and the hand of God may be traced in the grand result. A worship which its votaries believed would stand for ever has fallen, to rise no more, and only exists in the page of history to show to what a state of mental degradation the creatures of reason have been reduced. The belief of one God, and the confident* expectation of a life to come, accompanied with the admission of a morality from which nothing ought to be taken, and to which nothing can be added, have prevailed for centuries in regions where, but for Christianity, Idolatry might still have maintained her temples, and called for her immoral rites and senseless oblations. And whatever may have been the corruptions with which Christianity has been disgraced, and its practical influence impeded, the impartial study of its records must ultimately restore it to its primitive purity, and present it to the world, as it proceeded from the hands of its Founder, "worthy of all acceptance."

E. C.

Jan. 1824. M. R. vol. xix.

* If man is not designed to live again, to expect a divine revelation would be absurd. The light of Nature may serve well enough to conduct a mortal being to the grave. But if man is destined for immortality, it might safely be presumed, that one great object of revelation would be to acquaint him with this destination, and that wherever revelation should be received, an assurance of human immortality would be felt. *And such has been the fact.* An Unbeliever might perhaps object, that the great majority of mankind, being altogether incompetent to judge of the evidences of revelation, must admit a future life upon authority alone. I allow it, and let the most be made of the concession. It is not the evidence of a doctrine, but the belief of it, which is practically useful. And if the objector would be kind enough to consider how many opinions he is himself obliged to take upon trust, he would find the force of his objection not a little diminished. It is the appointment of nature, and an appointment which revelation could not be expected to set aside, that every man should in many cases trust to the knowledge of other men, and use it as his own. And it would be lamentable, indeed, if the majority of the species, to whom the means of mental cultivation are in a great measure denied, might not be permitted to enjoy the benefit of truths, the evidence of which they are unable to appreciate.

P.S. I think myself bound to thank Dr. Jones for the civility with which he has replied to my little observation respecting Musgrave's conjecture on the Orestes of Euripides (xviii. 696). But, perhaps, I ought in justice to myself to state, that the Doctor has altogether overlooked the ground of my observation. Whether the conjecture be true or false must be determined by *metrical* considerations; and by these considerations it is decisively refuted. This, I conceive, will be questioned by no one who has studied what has been written in Germany on the Greek Metres since the time of Mr. Porson. With respect to the expression αἰθερ' ἀμπαλλεσθε, it may be compared with the πηδῶντα πεδία of Sophocles, the *quorum equora curro* of Virgil, and many other passages, in none of which do I consider a preposition as understood, having long since become a convert to the doctrine of Hermann, laid down in his ingenious treatise on Ellipsis and Pleonasm. That παλλειν is used for παλλεσθαι, in the Electra of Euripides, I should have felt confident, even without the authority of Porson, Seidler, and others, and I agree with Brunck, that both παλλειν and ἀμπαλλειν are employed in a neuter sense in the Lysistrata of Aristophanes; but that the Attics, or indeed the other Greeks, were acquainted with such verbs as ἐπαλλω and ἀνεπαλλω, I must be allowed to doubt until some positive evidence of the fact shall have been produced.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—The propensity of many modern divines to depreciate the religion of nature is so frequently manifested, and in a way so obvious and glaring, that it can hardly escape the notice of any person at all accustomed to theological inquiries. I am far from supposing that these gentlemen pursue this course from any dishonest motive; on the contrary, I am persuaded they fancy that they thereby do honour to Christianity;

while, on the other hand, I have no hesitation in professing my firm conviction, that the RELIGION OF NATURE is the rock on which Christianity is founded; and that he who aims at supporting the latter by undermining the former, does, in fact, though unconsciously, all that one man can do, to destroy both. Happily for us all, they are both indestructible.

This conviction, which has been growing and strengthening in my mind for the last forty years, is not in the least degree weakened by the letter of your highly respectable correspondent, the Rev. Mr. Cogan, inserted in your publication of this day (pp. 11-14), the leading object of which, according to his own statement, is to illustrate the evidences of Christianity; but in which he more than insinuates, that what is called the religion of nature is of little or no value; that "they who contend for the unity and perfections of God, the doctrine of a universal providence, and the future existence and immortality of man, as inculcated by nature, have derived their conviction of them from Christianity, and from Christianity *alone*;" and that "the ancients, who endeavoured to establish the doctrine of a future life, *did not themselves believe it*; and if they did, their faith did not grow out of their reasonings, but their reasons were laboriously sought for, to uphold a preconceived opinion." What it was, however, other than reason which produced this preconceived opinion in their minds, Mr. Cogan has omitted to inform us; and without his assistance, I confess myself unable to account for it, otherwise than by supposing that it was the effect of the reasonings of superior minds on the perfections of God the Creator, and on the nature and circumstances of man his creature. That the ancients, at least, whatever may be fancied of those of later times, did not derive their conviction of the unity and universality of the Divine Government, and of a future state of existence, from Christianity *alone*, or from Christianity *at all*, is quite clear, from the fact of their having recorded their opinions before Christianity existed; and it is undeniable that some of them expressed their conviction of these truths in nearly as plain terms as any Christian can do at this day. What, for

instance, can be a stronger expression of belief in the being and government of One Supreme God, than the following passage of Cicero? “Quid potest esse tam apertum, tamque perspicuum, cum cœlum suspeximus, cœlestiaque contemplati sumus, quam esse aliquod numen præstantissimæ mentis, quo hæc regantur?”—*De Nat. Deor.* lib. ii. cap. ii. *When we lift our eyes to the heavens, and contemplate the celestial bodies, what can be more clearly evident, than the existence of some superior being of consummate wisdom, by whom they are governed?* Or in what words could this illustrious man have expressed more plainly his expectation of existence after death, than in the following? “Quid multa? Sic mihi persuasi, sic sentio, cum tanta celeritas animorum sit, tanta memoria præteritorum, futurorumque prudentia, tot artes, tantæ scientiæ, tot inventa, non posse eam naturam, quæ res eas contineat esse mortalem.”—*De Senect.* 21. *This, in short, is my settled conviction, this is my judgment, on reviewing the faculties of the mind, its wonderful activity, its memory of the past, and foresight of the future, and its discoveries and attainments in arts and science, that it is impossible that a being to whom such powers belong, can be perishable.*

In the course of his attempt to run down and bring into contempt the religion of nature, Mr. Cogan, the last man in the world to be suspected of any disingenuous intention, seems to me to have been betrayed, by the warmth of his zeal, into an error not uncommon with disputants, especially those who have the misfortune to be engaged in supporting a bad cause; I mean that of misstating and caricaturing the opinions of those from whom he differs. He says, “If we are to believe what we are sometimes *told* concerning it [the religion of nature], its truths are emblazoned in the heavens in *characters which all can read, and which none can misunderstand.*” Will Mr. C. be so good as to inform us by whom we are *told* anything so strange and absurd. For myself, I can say, that though I have read with great attention, and in many instances with great pleasure, the writings of Christian philosophers,

who were believers in the religion of nature, and have also occasionally looked into the writings of a few Deists, and conversed with others, it has never happened to me to meet with this extravagant position. I have always understood, that whatever valuable truths the book of nature may contain, though it may be written in characters which are indelible and unchangeable, though it may be unincumbered with various readings and interpolated texts; yet that it is so far like the New Testament that it cannot be read to advantage, except by those who have taken some pains to learn the language in which it is written. Indeed, if it were otherwise, it would have greatly the advantage of the Bible, which is universally admitted to contain numerous passages which set at nought all human power of interpretation. Mr. Cogan will, therefore, I am sure, oblige many of your readers by informing them who they are that have given this extraordinary character of the religion of nature. I am sorry to be obliged to call upon him to do this, because I am inclined to think he will find it a task of some difficulty.

In the commencement of his letter, the worthy writer states the question which arose in his mind to be "whether there is reason to think that *without* a divine interposition, these superstitions [of Pagan idolatry] could have been banished from the world, and a purer religion substituted in their place." Now, from this language, would it not be perfectly natural to conclude, that *with* a divine interposition, this happy state of things has been effected, that superstition has actually been banished from the world, and a pure religion established in its stead? Yet strange to tell, he soon after assures us, that "*little* of the knowledge that enlightens the more intelligent members of a community *ever* makes its way to the vulgar," and speaks of "the pertinacity with which the most gross corruptions of Christianity have been retained for ages, and are still retained, by the great majority of its professors!" He might have added, with great truth, though, to be sure, it would not have quite suited the object of his letter, that many of these gross corruptions have been *so* gross, as never to have

been exceeded in absurdity and folly by the popular fictions of ancient Greece or Rome. It may be replied that these abominable corruptions are not to be charged on the Christian religion, of which they are in reality no part, but the dreams of ignorant, or the inventions of designing, men. This I most readily grant, because it is most certainly true. But, on the other hand, I expect it to be granted to me, because it is equally true, that the popular superstitions of ancient Greece and Rome were no part of the religion of nature, because they were contrary to reason, and were accordingly disapproved of, by the wisest and best men of the times in which they prevailed.

In a note, Mr. Cogan admits without hesitation as true, what he imagines may be offered in the shape of an objection by an unbeliever, namely, that "the great majority of mankind, being altogether incompetent to judge of the evidences of revelation, must admit a future life upon authority alone;" and he adds, "It is not the *evidence* of a doctrine, but the *belief* of it that is practically useful." This language from the pen of a liberal Dissenting minister is surely very singular and extraordinary. For any man to receive a doctrine as infallibly certain and supremely important, a doctrine which is to be the foundation of his hope, and the guide of his life, not because there is sufficient *evidence* of its *truth*, but because some person who calls himself his spiritual director, tells him it must be *believed*, does, I confess, appear to me to savour more of the credulity of a child, than the wisdom of a man. If, however, this complete "prostration of the understanding" be, as Mr. Cogan represents it, a matter of necessity, or, according to the doctrine of a Right Rev. Bishop, a duty, in either case, as it appears to me, Protestantism and everything connected with it is at an end; since if so great a sacrifice must be made, it is quite obvious that the Church of Rome has a much fairer claim to it than any other power whatever.

To that part of Mr. Cogan's letter which is intended to show the unreasonableness of rejecting Christianity, I have nothing

to object. I am an advocate for natural religion, not an opposer of Christianity. And I think it important to remark, that in my judgment, the most complete conviction of the eternal truth and universal authority of natural religion is in perfect harmony with an entire belief in the supernatural origin and great importance of the Christian revelation. From the gracious hand of the Giver of every good and perfect gift, and not through the medium of the unhallowed decrees of usurping priests, or earthly magistrates, I gratefully and joyfully receive both. The latter, I verily *believe* to be true; the former, I certainly *know* to be so. W. STURCH.

Euston Square, Feb. 1, 1824. M. R. vol. xix.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—The value of Natural Religion is a subject of great interest and importance; and had I sufficient leisure for the discussion, and were conscious that I possessed abilities equal to it, I should gladly bear my part in a friendly controversy on the subject, not with any wish “to run down and bring into contempt the religion of nature,” but in order to ascertain, if possible, how far the discoveries of this religion reach. But as I am not the man for such a task, I shall content myself in my intended reply to Mr. Sturch’s paper (pp. 110–112), with making a few detached remarks on his observations: and this I shall do with freedom, but, I trust, without violating the respect which is due to his talents and character.

I have said, that “they who contend for the unity and perfections of God, the doctrine of a universal providence, and the future existence and immortality of man as inculcated by nature, have derived their conviction of them from Christianity, and from Christianity alone.” And if Mr. Sturch is disposed to believe that they would have had the *conviction* of their truth which they now have, had not their lot been cast in a Christian land, I can only say that he has my hearty consent.

We know how they originally came by this conviction, and that they could have attained it by any other means we never can know. And for myself, I should not think favourably either of the understanding or the modesty of the man who should venture to say that had he been nursed in the lap of idolatry, and encompassed from his cradle with the superstitions of a Pagan worship, he should have felt any assurance of the truths above stated. And but for Christianity this might have been the case with all the modern advocates of natural religion.

Again, I said, that "If the ancient philosophers really believed in a future life, there is sufficient reason to think that their faith did not grow out of their reasonings, but that their reasonings were laboriously sought for to uphold a preconceived opinion." Mr. Sturch complains that I have omitted to state on what, except reason, this preconceived opinion was founded, and he has kindly endeavoured to supply the deficiency, and supposes that it might be the effect of the reasonings of superior minds on the perfections of God the Creator, and the circumstances of man his creature. It is a pity that these reasonings have not been handed down to posterity. I have this moment looked once more into Plato's seven arguments for the immortality of the soul, contained in his famous dialogue on that subject, and I do not find Mr. Sturch's reasonings among them. And that there had existed men in some earlier ages who reasoned as Mr. Sturch would now reason, is a supposition much less probable than that the opinion in question was the traditionary result of some original revelation which had been communicated by God to the human race. But whatever may be the justice of this remark, I cannot but feel persuaded that the expectation of a future life was not generated by such reasonings as those of the ancient philosophers.

Cicero has certainly stated the argument for the being of a God in an able manner, in his second book, *De Natura Deorum*. But if he felt the force of his own reasoning, as Mr. Sturch and I have felt it, it is wonderful that he should

have written many things which he did write in the remaining part of the treatise. And much more must be known concerning God than his simple existence, to make up the sublime views which are given of him in the volume of revelation. Thus much I readily concede to the advocates of Natural Religion, that the argument for the existence of a God is as conclusive as need be, and that from the predominance of good, which appears in his works, it is difficult not to conceive of him as benevolent. But when I wish to investigate the Divine character further, I do not seem to proceed with certainty, but rather to lean upon reasonings which may prove fallacious. But Cicero, moreover, has expressed a lively expectation of a life to come. Mr. Sturch knows what has been said on the other side of the question ; to which I shall only add, that this expectation does not appear to have been of any service to him when its influence was most needed. And this seems to hold true of the ancients in general.

But my zeal in a bad cause has, it seems, betrayed me into an error, which, for my consolation, is a common one, that of mistaking and caricaturing the opinions which I do not myself admit. I had said, that "If we are to believe what we are sometimes told concerning the religion of nature, its truths are emblazoned in the heavens in characters which all can read, and which none can misunderstand ;" and I am called upon to inform your readers who they are who have advanced so strange and absurd a position. As Mr. Sturch was not personally attacked, I might, perhaps, without impropriety, decline answering to the call. Or, I might say in my defence, that I merely meant to convey the general impression which had been made upon my mind by what I had occasionally read and heard on the subject of Natural Religion. But I will rather present to your readers a passage which accidentally met my eye the other day, and which will serve my purpose tolerably well. And I leave others to judge whether my observation can be considered as a violent caricature of the sentiments which it expresses. "God," says my author, "has spread before *all the world* such legible characters of his works and

providence, and given *all mankind such a sufficient light of reason*, that they to whom his written word never came, could not (whenever they set themselves to search) either doubt of the being of a God, *or of the obedience due to him.*" * All, then, if they pleased, could *read* and *understand* the legible characters of which the author speaks. And, for my part, I know of no truths which are intelligible *to all mankind*, but those which are *too plain to be misunderstood.* But the author shall proceed. "Since the precepts of Natural Religion are plain and *very intelligible to all mankind*, and seldom come to be controverted, and other revealed truths which are conveyed to us by books and languages are liable to the natural obscurities and difficulties incident to words, methinks it would become us to be more careful and diligent in observing the former, and less magisterial, positive, and imperious in imposing our own sense and interpretations of the latter." If Mr. Locke has here given Natural Religion "an advantage over the Bible," the fault is not mine. Did I consider myself as having a right to call upon Mr. Sturch for an explanation of anything in his letter, I should request him to tell me a little concerning "the language" in which the truths of Natural Religion are written; whether, for example, it may be learned without a teacher, or whether it will be necessary to call in the aid of some person of superior mind to explain

* Mr. Locke, in this passage, makes no mention of a future life; but as he has said elsewhere, that if there be no hope of a life to come, the inference is, let us eat and drink for to-morrow we die, he could not, when speaking of obedience to the will of God, have altogether excluded the doctrine of a future existence from the discoveries of Natural Religion. Mr. Locke speaks of *searching* for the truths of Natural Religion, and I never supposed any man to say that they could be understood by those who would not take the trouble to learn them. But that which is intelligible to *all mankind*, must be *very easy to understand.* And I fear that had Mr. Locke been closely pressed with the question, *how the most rude and uncivilised of mankind* were to set about the *search* spoken of, he would have been obliged to confess that the precepts of Natural Religion, to which he alluded, did not *differ much* from those innate principles which he has so ably exploded.

what otherwise might be obscure and difficult, and to assist us in the interpretation of the volume which it is proposed to read; in which case this instructor might show something of the spirit of those *usurping priests* who are so justly the object of Mr. Sturch's abhorrence.

But to proceed with my defence; I had made it a question, whether *without* a divine interposition the superstitions of Paganism could have been banished from the earth, and a purer religion substituted in their place. Upon this Mr. Sturch asks, "From this language, would it not be perfectly natural to conclude, that with a divine interposition, this happy state of things has been effected, that superstition has actually been banished from the world, and a pure religion established in its stead?" The superstitions *of which I was speaking* have been banished from the earth, and Mr. Sturch will not choose to say that Christianity is not in itself a pure religion. That it would be corrupted in the hands of man, every reflecting mind would have anticipated. The corruptions, indeed, by which its beauty has been defaced are *gross enough*, but as they are not to be "charged on the religion itself," I do not see what reason I had to do more than to advert to them as I did. To dwell upon them more at large would not indeed have "suited the purpose of my letter" so well as it might have suited that of Mr. Sturch's reply.

I now proceed to an observation at which I am not a little surprised. I acknowledged that the great majority of mankind are unable to judge of the evidences of revelation, and added, that it is not the *evidence* of a doctrine, but the *belief* of it, which is practically useful. "This language," says Mr. Sturch, "from the pen of a liberal Dissenting minister, is surely very singular and extraordinary." For aught I know, it may be very singular and very extraordinary; but of this I am very sure, that what it expresses is true. And it is to me very extraordinary that any sensible man should call its truth in question. And had not Mr. Sturch's mind been haunted by the unsightly forms of those spiritual directors of whom he speaks, he could not surely have confounded two things which

have no affinity to each other, or have attributed to me a sentiment which he might have known could not be mine. To submit to spiritual tyranny is *one thing*, and to rest in the judgment of those whom we consider as wiser than ourselves, in cases where we are conscious that our own judgment will not avail us, is *another thing*; and, much as it may "savour of the credulity of a child," is conformable to the constitution of nature, and the universal experience of mankind. With respect to the insolent demands of men who call upon you to prostrate your understanding before the dogmas which they choose to erect into articles of faith, I should certainly urge it upon the most illiterate Christian strenuously to resist them, believing it to be infinitely better that he should think for himself as well as he can, than that any man should assume the right of thinking for him. But I still maintain, that there are multitudes in every Christian country who are *altogether* incapable of deciding upon the truth or falsehood of the Christian religion. But if Mr. Sturch, who is himself a believer, would point out any principles which would enable them to determine the question, he would effectually refute me, and confer a benefit upon them. But it seems, if my remark is just, "Protestantism and everything connected with it is at an end." This, did I believe it, I should be sorry for. But truth is truth, whatever becomes of consequences. There is, however, no ground of apprehension. As it has been judiciously observed, "The right of private judgment is unquestionable, but the ability to exercise that right is quite another thing." Nor is it at all necessary in order to refute the arrogant claims of the Church of Rome, to maintain that every Christian, whatever have been his means of improvement, is competent to judge of the evidences of revelation.

Mr. Sturch has the good fortune to possess two indestructible and divine religions, one of which he *believes* to be true, the other (Natural Religion) he *certainly knows* to be so. In this, Mr. Sturch, who does not seem to have distinguished very accurately between faith and knowledge, differs somewhat from that zealous champion of Natural Religion, the author of

"Apeleutherus," who, if I rightly recollect, when speaking of an important article of this religion, says, that *certainty* is entirely out of the question. Were I called upon to decide between Mr. Sturch and this anonymous author, I should pronounce judgment in favour of the latter, and should give it as my opinion that Mr. Sturch, in a moment of inadvertency, has mistaken a *strong persuasion* for *certain knowledge*.

E. C.

March, 1824. M. R. vol. xix.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—In my last (p. 137) I quoted a passage from Mr. Locke; and as it is always useful to point out the errors and inconsistencies of great men, that others may not be misled by them, I wish, with your leave, to say another word or two on the sentiment which is there expressed. Mr. Locke maintains that *all mankind* without the aid of revelation could have attained an *undoubting* conviction of the being of a God, and a knowledge of the obedience which is due to him. When Mr. Locke expressed this opinion, he either could not have carefully considered what he meant by *all mankind*, or could not have had in his mind what he afterwards wrote on the existence of a God, which he regards as the most certain of all truths. Of this truth he gives a demonstration, which no doubt he thought to be the most clear and simple. This demonstration, however, he acknowledges to be complex, when he says that "he believes nobody can avoid the cogency of it, who will but as carefully attend to it as to any other demonstration of *so many parts*." Of these parts, the first indeed is a proposition of which no man can doubt, but the rest consist of abstract and metaphysical reasoning. If your readers will turn to it (vol. ii. p. 239 et seq.), and then ask themselves whether the discovery of this demonstration is within the reach of a Hottentot or Indian savage, they will, I

conceive, agree with me that even that truth which lies at the foundation of all religion, whether natural or revealed, is not so intelligible to *all mankind* as Mr. Locke has represented it; unless, indeed, they should fortunately hit upon some shorter and easier method of proof. But if the first principle of religion is involved in obscurity, as to multitudes of the human race, what shall we say of the whole system which is to be deduced from it? But Mr. Locke, as appears from what he says elsewhere, was misled by the opinion that it is inconsistent with the wisdom and goodness of God, not to furnish all mankind with the means of knowing the great principles of religion. But surely we may leave in the hands of a merciful Creator those to whom these opportunities have been denied. If I have pointed out an error in Mr. Locke, I have done nothing but what this great and good man would have wished to be done; and, perhaps, nothing but what the light which he himself shed over the world of intellect has enabled me to do.

One word more, and I have done. If the advocates of Natural Religion would content themselves with saying, that its principles may be discovered by men of thought and reflection, and by their means be diffused among mankind in general, they would not run into palpable absurdity; but when they maintain that the truths of this religion, that is, the truths of which this religion is usually said to consist, are intelligible to every human being who will give himself the trouble to inquire into them (which implies that every human being is capable of conducting such an inquiry), they lay down a position which is not to be surpassed in extravagance by the wildest vagaries of the human mind—a position, which it would be the extreme of folly wilfully to *misstate*, and which it would be no easy task to *caricature*.

E. C.

April, 1824. M. R. vol. xix.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—To my remarks (p. 110), perhaps rather too uncere-
moniously expressed, on the Rev. Mr. Cogan's paper on the
Evidences of Christianity, that gentleman has replied, in your
publication of this day, in a spirit of mildness and candour,
which does him the highest honour, and which would greatly
tend to increase, if that were possible, the respect with which
his character is regarded by all who know him. I shall endea-
vour to follow his example in the few observations I have to
make on his reply.

Mr. Cogan appears to treat with great scorn the supposition,
that men unacquainted with the Christian revelation may
believe in the unity and perfections of God, the doctrine of a
universal Providence, and the future existence and immortality
of man. He declares that he should not think favourably
either of the understanding or the modesty of the man who
should venture to say so; and he says, "If Mr. Sturch is dis-
posed to believe that they would have had the conviction of
their truth which they now have, had not their lot been cast in
a Christian land, I can only say, that he has my hearty con-
sent." Now, sir, Mr. Cogan, who is much better acquainted
with antiquity than I can be supposed to be, well knows, that
all these doctrines have been believed before the Christian
revelation had any existence. He knows, too, that the belief
of a Deity and a future life, though always more or less dis-
figured and debased by superstition and absurdity, has been
very general, I might say universal, in all ages. He knows
that these doctrines were believed by the heathen inhabitants
of this island, in their rude and savage state; and it is for Mr.
Cogan to show, which I think he will find it difficult to do,
that they would *not* have been generally believed to this day,
whether Christianity had been introduced or not. For my own
part, I see no reason whatever to doubt that they *would*; and,
probably, in a much improved state, bearing some proportion

to the civilisation of the country. But if by the words, "*conviction of their truth which they now have*," Mr. Cogan means the same *clear, full, rational and consistent* information on these subjects, that we derive from the Christian revelation, I beg leave to assure him that no such supposition ever entered into my mind. For although I have no doubt whatever that the light of nature opens to mankind in general the prospect of futurity, yet I believe that even to the strongest eyes it must appear somewhat indistinct and imperfect; and I therefore rejoice in that splendid and glorious light which the Christian revelation throws over the scene, and for which I can never be sufficiently thankful.

Mr. Cogan seems desirous of declining the task of pointing out to us in whose writings it is that the truths of Natural Religion are spoken of as "*emblazoned in the heavens in characters which all can read, and none can misunderstand*." The only passage he quotes is from Locke, and he thinks it will answer his purpose *tolerably* well; but, I confess, I think quite otherwise, inasmuch as I can discover in it nothing more than the plain, simple position, that the light of nature is sufficient to convince *those who "set themselves to search,"* that there is a God to whom obedience is due; a position which, I presume, Mr. Cogan will not venture to deny, after having, in this very letter, on which I am remarking, told us that he "*readily concedes to the advocates for Natural Religion, that the argument for the being of a God is as conclusive as need be*," and that from the predominance of good which appears in his works, *it is difficult not to conceive of him as benevolent*." By the word God, I presume, he means a Creator and Governor of the world; and if this Creator and Governor is also a kind and benevolent Benefactor, Mr. Cogan will, doubtless, admit the conclusion to be very *natural*, that obedience is due to him. In a note on this quotation, Mr. Cogan goes on to say, "Mr. Locke speaks of *searching* for the truths of Natural Religion; and I never supposed any man to say, that they could be understood by those who would not *take the trouble* to learn them. *But that which is intelli-*

gible to all mankind, must be very easy to understand." Now, from this position, I must beg leave to withhold my assent. By *all mankind*, I suppose, we do not mean *every individual without exception*. We do not intend, for instance, to include *idiots* ; but we mean mankind *in general*. Now, I think, I know many things which mankind in general are very capable of learning and understanding, if they will *take the trouble* to do so, which yet cannot be said to be *very easy*. It can hardly be doubted, I suppose, that at least nine out of ten of mankind, if taken at a proper age, may be taught the chief rules of arithmetic ; though these are so far from being *very easy*, that they certainly are far *more difficult* to understand than the leading principles of morals. Indeed, the very phrases, "*take the trouble*," and "*set themselves to search*," plainly show that all is not perfectly *easy*, but that there are some *difficulties* to be overcome by persevering labour ; and, I will add, *by all the assistance that the learner can obtain*. For I will not hesitate a moment to satisfy Mr. Cogan's curiosity, by answering in the affirmative the question which he suggests, but modestly doubts whether he has any right to put to me, concerning the propriety of calling in, as often as it may be needful, the aid of some person of superior mind, to explain whatever may be obscure or difficult. I would, however, advise Mr. Cogan not to distress himself with fears, lest the instructor should show something of the spirit of the usurping priest, of which I think there is little danger ; for to repeat what I have elsewhere said, there is "this unspeakable advantage in favour of Natural Religion ; that whoever undertakes to inculcate its pure and salutary maxims is on a footing of perfect equality with his fellow-men." He can assume no dictatorial authority, nor exact from them any implicit obedience. As he cannot have the shadow of pretence for "dominion over their faith," he must content himself with being the "helper of their joy." In short, it appears to me that the quotations from Locke are extremely unfortunate, and not in any degree relevant to Mr. Cogan's purpose ; and as he has not produced any other authority to justify the use of the language to which I

objected, I must consider his omitting to do so, as a tacit admission, that if it was not the language of misstatement and caricature, it was, to say the least, *a little too strong*.

I proceed now to remark on the surprise which Mr. Cogan expresses to my objection to his notion of the value of *belief without evidence*. He tells us he is *very sure* that it is true; and he maintains "that there are multitudes in every Christian country who are *altogether* incapable of deciding on the truth or falsehood of the Christian religion." Now, if he means that there are multitudes who are incapable of deciding with certainty on the *external evidence* of Christianity, that is, of the truth of every miracle related in the New Testament, or in any writer of the earliest Christian age, I not only admit the truth of the position, but I go a great deal further,—I believe that there is not one man upon the face of the earth who is competent to the decision. But if his meaning be, that men in general have no adequate means of judging whether the important truths inculcated in the New Testament are worthy to be received and acted upon, I must be allowed to differ from him *in toto*. For being fully persuaded that Cicero was right in vindicating the authority of Right Reason in his book "*De Republicâ*;"—that St. Paul was right in asserting the universal obligation of the Law of Nature, in his Epistle to the Romans;—that Bishop Sherlock was right in maintaining that "the religion of the Gospel is the true original religion of Reason and Nature;"—that Locke was right when he said that "God had discovered to men the Unity and Majesty of his Eternal Godhead, and the truths of Natural Religion, by the light of Reason;"—that the learned and excellent Lardner was right in affirming "that St. Paul was not wont to *deny* and *contest*, but to improve the natural notions which men had of Religion;"—that the Reverend Robert Robinson was right in saying, "a conformity between the dictates of Nature and the precepts of Revelation, is the best proof of the divinity of the latter;"—and that Archdeacon Paley, and a thousand others, have been right in asserting the authority of both natural and supernatural revelation; and having myself read the New Testa-

ment with care, and found it to consist principally of confirmation and illustration of Natural Religion, which, I am persuaded, men in general, being properly educated, are capable of understanding and justly appreciating,—I deem it a libel on human nature to assert that mankind are incapable of judging for themselves, and that they must and ought to depend for their religious ideas on any dictatorial governor, whether ecclesiastical or civil.

Mr. Cogan, adverting to my profession of attachment both to Natural Religion and to Christianity, the latter of which I have said “*I verily believe* to be true; the former I *certainly know* to be so”—imagines that he has discovered some difference of opinion on this subject between me and the author of a book, entitled “Apeleutherus;” who, in speaking of a *particular article* of religious belief, says that *certainly* is entirely out of the question. And, as it is well known to Mr. Cogan, and to my friends in general, that the author of that book and myself are in reality one and the same person, I must, of course, be sorry and ashamed, if there should be found to be any material difference between us. But I hope that a few words of explanation will show that the supposed difference is rather in appearance than in reality; and will satisfy both Mr. Cogan, and another of your correspondents, whose signature is B., that they have both misunderstood my meaning. When I spoke of Natural Religion as *certainly* true, I should have thought it quite obvious that I was considering its general or abstract character, and not inquiring into the particulars of which it might be *supposed* to consist. And, undoubtedly, *as a general position*, it may be safely affirmed, that whatever can be proved to be a principle of Natural Religion *must be true*; because the witnesses of this religion—the heavens, which declare the glory of God—the firmament, which showeth his handiwork—day unto day uttereth speech—night unto night showeth knowledge—cannot for a moment be imagined to bear *false* testimony. But with respect to the supposed particulars of this religion the case is different. In considering *them* the question *arises*,—What is the testimony

that these witnesses give, and to what extent does it go? And *in some cases*, the answer to this question may not be so clear and satisfactory as we could wish; probability may be the utmost that we can obtain—*certainty, in such cases, may be entirely out of the question.* With regard to Supernatural Religion, I have no hesitation in affirming that it is always, in some degree, dependent upon things which are, in their own nature, fallacious; and, therefore, whether it be considered in the abstract or in the detail of any particular revelation, *certainty must be entirely out of the question.* It may still, however, possess a high degree of probability, and be entitled to be “*verily believed.*” If, therefore, Mr. Locke, in the passages quoted by Mr. Cogan, has really given Natural Religion “an advantage over the Bible,” it was no great “fault,” and Mr. Cogan need not be very anxious to clear himself from the suspicion of being the accomplice of that illustrious man.

Notwithstanding my declaration of attachment both to natural and supernatural revelation, with, however, an undisguised preference of the *authority* of the former, I cannot admit the congratulatory statement of Mr. Cogan, that I have “the good fortune to possess two religions.” On the contrary, I am decidedly of opinion that there never was or can be more than one true and acceptable religion; which, as it has been well observed by my late learned and valuable friend, the Rev. Charles Bulkeley, “being originally founded in the perfections of God, and the nature of man, must of necessity, in every period of time, and under every particular dispensation of it, be fundamentally and essentially the same.”

I now take leave of this controversy, regretting that it has been my painful duty to appear in opposition to the *opinions* of a gentleman whose personal character I so highly esteem; and, thanking you, sir, for permitting me to occupy so much space in the pages of your valuable Miscellany.

WILLIAM STURCH.

April 1st, 1824. M. R. vol. xix.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—My acknowledgments are due to Mr. Sturch for the handsome manner in which he has spoken of the temper with which I replied to his animadversions (p. 220). His last paper will furnish matter for an observation or two which I wish to make, not from the love of controversy nor the desire of victory, but for the sake of truth, in a matter of some moment.

Mr. Sturch acknowledges that Christianity has cast a glorious light on the future hopes of man. But *if I rightly understand Mr. Sturch's views*, he considers Christianity as borrowing its *principal* evidence from its conformity to the Religion of Nature. Now, *as far as this is the case*, Christianity cannot render any truth more clear than the Religion of Nature had previously rendered it. Christianity, then, must possess a *clear and satisfactory evidence* altogether *distinct* from that which it derives from its conformity to Natural Religion; and if this evidence does not amount to *certainty*, it must amount to something that to practical purposes will serve as well.

By *all mankind*, Mr. Sturch means mankind *in general*. Mr. Locke meant something more. He did not, it is true, include *idiots* in this expression; but he, doubtless, meant all who possess the common faculties of human nature. And I must repeat, that those truths, which are intelligible to *all mankind*, must be *too plain to be misunderstood*. So that the quotation from Mr. Locke, though not the most appropriate that might have been selected, was not altogether irrelevant to my purpose.

I suspected that it might be necessary to call in the aid of some spiritual guide to interpret the Religion of Nature, and that its truths are not *quite so clear* as they are sometimes represented. And I am confirmed in the opinion that some obscurity hangs over this religion, when I recollect that different commentators annex different interpretations to the language in which it is written. To instance in the doctrine of a future

life: Dr. Clarke professes to *demonstrate* this doctrine chiefly from the inequality of the Divine dispensations in relation to the virtuous and the vicious. This *demonstration* Mr. Sturch altogether rejects; and, if my memory does not deceive me, maintains what Dr. Clarke considers as altogether untenable, that virtue is in every case its own reward. Another may be as little satisfied with Mr. Sturch's reasonings, as Mr. Sturch is with the reasonings of Dr. Clarke. And a third may reject as inefficient and inconclusive the reasonings of both Dr. Clarke and Mr. Sturch. So that it does, indeed, appear that though the Religion of Nature is *certainly true*, "in its general and abstract character," yet "with regard to the supposed particulars of this religion the case is different," and that "*certainly may be entirely out of the question.*" Here I am led to observe, that he who *certainly knows* that what nature teaches must be true, but does *not certainly know* what it is that nature does teach, *knows* no more than what is known to every other man. Every man is aware that "the heavens which declare the glory of God cannot be imagined to bear *false* testimony." But as Mr. Sturch observes, "the question arises, what is the testimony that they give, and to what extent does it go?" And to this question different answers will be returned, which may perplex the inquirer quite as much as "interpolated texts and various readings." But, it seems, while *certainly may* be out of the question with respect to the truths of Natural Religion, it must *always* be out of the question with regard to the truths of revelation. But why so? If Christianity is allowed to be true, then, as it confirms the Religion of Nature, and "is fundamentally the same with this religion," it must partake of the same certainty, which is indeed no certainty at all, if Natural Religion is only certain as to its *authority*, and this certainty cannot be transferred to the principles which it inculcates.* But Christianity, moreover, has its separate and inde-

* Mr. Sturch observes, that "whatever can be proved to be a principle of Natural Religion *must be true.*" But as some difficulty attends this proof, and Mr. Sturch has not enabled us to distinguish between those truths which Nature teaches with *certainly*, and those in which

pendent evidence. And the value of this evidence appears from the fact, that it is this by which Christianity has thrown that “splendid and glorious light over the prospect of futurity,” for which Mr. Sturch very properly says that he can never be sufficiently thankful. But supernatural religion is “always in some degree dependent upon things which are in their own nature fallacious.” Here Mr. Sturch probably alludes, in part, to historical testimony, of which his views are somewhat singular, and which he is disposed to distrust in exact proportion to the importance of the conclusions which are to be drawn from it. And hence, perhaps, he not only allows with me that *multitudes* are incapable of deciding on the *external evidence* of Christianity, but maintains, that not one man upon the face of the earth is competent to the decision—a decision which, it seems, involves the necessity of determining on the truth of every miracle related in the New Testament. However, that these miracles, collectively and singly, are *worthy of belief*, I am happy to pronounce, upon the authority of Mr. Sturch himself, who in Apeleutherus expresses himself in words *to this effect*—that the doctrine of Jesus and his Apostles is so far beyond their natural means of knowledge as to constitute a miracle, and a miracle which renders *all the rest credible*. If this be so, I need give myself little uneasiness about those passages of Scripture which “defy all human power of interpretation.” But though the external evidence of Christianity is so difficult to decide upon, yet “men in general, being properly educated,” are capable of judging how far its truths are worthy to be received, by their conformity to the principles of Natural Religion. This is so far well. But what are *they* to do who have not been “properly educated,” or who have not been educated at all? I am afraid that they must be contented to believe upon authority, that is, to take upon trust the opinions which prevail in the communities to which they belong. However, I have the satisfaction to feel assured, that their incapacity of judging for themselves does not confer upon

probability is the utmost that we can obtain, I am at liberty to suppose that some *little* uncertainty is attached to most of them, if not to all.

any man, or body of men, a right to judge for them; so that the interests of Protestantism are still secure.

Upon the whole, from the descriptions which are given of the Religion of Nature, I find it utterly impossible to ascertain what is its true character and value. It is sometimes said to be "intelligible to every human being who is willing to open his eyes and fix them attentively on its luminous and instructive lessons;" sometimes its principles require that men should be "properly educated" in order to understand them. Its *authority* is higher than that of revelation, but the information which it gives is not so *clear, full, rational, and consistent*. It is *certainly true* in the abstract, but falls short of certainty in its supposed particulars, which is *something like* being certain and uncertain at the same time. It is the main support of Christianity, and in return (which indeed is equitable enough) it receives from Christianity a splendid and glorious light which it does not itself possess, and consequently cannot diffuse. All that here appears clear and intelligible is, that of the *two* religions, if I may still be allowed to call them *two*, Christianity is, as I always suspected, by far the more valuable and important. But I am impatient to take my leave of the controversy, which I do without any diminution of the respect which I have been long accustomed to feel for the character and talents of my opponent. And *if* he shall appear here and there to have reasoned inconsistently, of which I do not make myself the judge, the reader will, I doubt not, attribute it, with me, to the difficulty of maintaining the divine origin of Christianity, together with the superior authority of Natural Religion.

E. C.

May 24, 1824. M. R. vol. xix.

[The above article concludes the controversy between Mr. Cogan and Mr. Sturch upon the subject of Natural Religion. The reader will see that it was carried on with spirit on both sides; and I think it right to state, that it did not in the least degree interrupt the friendship which existed between them for many years.]

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—Lately, when I was on a visit in the country, I laid my hands on the Evangelical Magazine, and noticed the passage on which your correspondent R. B. has animadverted with just severity, p. 409. When I read the passage I said, This is in course, and gives me no concern. But I am sorry to find that a learned and estimable man, the Bishop of St. David's, should have chosen to pronounce in the House of Lords that Unitarians are not Christians. Whether the Bishop means that they are unbelievers in disguise, or that, though they fancy themselves Christians, they are not really such, I neither know nor wish to be informed. But as I would willingly suppose that the Bishop does not profess to search the secrets of the heart, I shall consider his declaration as meaning, that though Unitarians believe what they profess to believe, still they are not entitled to the appellation of Christians. What then is the definition of the term Christian? I should propose the following: a Christian is one who admits the divine mission of Christ, and consequently acknowledges his religion as the rule of faith and practice. And I should add, that he who successfully endeavours to act up to the moral precepts of this religion, in the expectation of a life to come, is a real and a good Christian. This definition would not satisfy the Bishop of St. David's; nor, I presume, would the Bishop's definition satisfy the Catholic. But the Bishop, no doubt, would say that the Unitarian rejects the *essential doctrines* of Christianity. But who is authorised to determine what are and what are not its essential doctrines? Until this question is settled, it may seem reasonable to conclude that those doctrines constitute the essence of Christianity which are inculcated in the New Testament with such perspicuity and force, that they have been admitted, in every age, though with various combinations of error, by all who have borne the Christian name. The doctrines for which the Bishop is so zealous are doubtless essential to the system which he con-

siders as Christianity, but I should marvel if his Lordship, with the aid of all who think with him, could prove them to be essential to the great practical object of the Christian faith, that is, to living soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world, in the expectation of "that blessed hope, and the glorious appearing of the great God, and of our Saviour Jesus Christ." Not awed by the Bishop's skill in Greek, I repeat the words, "and of our Saviour Jesus Christ;" which version is not inconsistent with the terms of the original, as the Greeks not unfrequently pass from one subject to another without repeating the article before the second. Of this some curious examples may be found in Thucydides. I know the canon by which it has been attempted to prove the divinity of Christ from the passage now cited. But in the application of the canon it is assumed, that the expression, "the great God," can be an attributive of the subject, Jesus Christ. But if this can be, how comes it to pass that we never meet with the simple expression *our God Jesus Christ* in the New Testament? an expression which was used when the divinity of our Lord was at length believed. Jesus Christ is sometimes called our Saviour, but his usual designation is that of "our Lord;" a designation which occurs about 100 times in the epistolary part of the New Testament. But in no one instance is he simply called *our God*. But, perhaps, some one may say, is not the passage in question rendered ambiguous by the omission of the article? Ambiguous to whom? I will venture to say that it was ambiguous to no one who read the epistle in the age in which it was penned. But granting it to be ambiguous, which version has a just right to be preferred, that which makes Jesus Christ the same with the great Supreme, or that which distinguishes him from his Father and our Father, his God and our God; that which makes the passage speak a language consistent with the *tenor* of the sacred volume from beginning to end, or that which imports into it an inexplicable mystery which has no support whatever except from two or three passages of dubious construction? Yet for explaining these passages in such a manner as to render them conformable to *innumerable clear and express declara-*

tions of Scripture, Unitarians are reproached as unlearned, and pronounced not to be Christians!

I believe the Bishop of St. David's to be a Christian, and though in my judgment a mistaken, yet a conscientious Christian. But allow me to define the *essentials* of the Christian faith, and let me imbibe a little of his Lordship's spirit, and borrow his Lordship's mode of reasoning, and I shall be able to show that he has no just claim to this appellation. Christianity, I should say, teaches that God is *one undivided essence or person*; but this *fundamental* doctrine the Bishop does not believe; therefore the Bishop is no Christian.

“Quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam!”

E. C.

Sept. 24, 1824. M. R. vol. xix.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—Having in my last (pp. 531 — 533) alluded to a grammatical canon which has been applied to prove the divinity of Christ, I will now, with your leave, state the canon, as given in the “Classical Journal,” No. XVI., and make an observation or two upon it. “When two or more attributives joined by a copulative or copulatives are *assumed* of the same person or thing, before the first attributive the article is *inserted*, before the remaining ones it is *omitted*.” That this canon holds true *in general* I have no doubt. But it is manifest that it is applicable only when the noun which has the article *can be* an attributive of the subject which is to follow. And it is worthy of observation, that the epistolary writers of the New Testament do not commonly use the article with an attributive standing *before* the name of Jesus Christ, when such attributive is introduced by a conjunction, the word Θεός having preceded. Before Θεός, in such case, I contend, that they

employ the article or not, as the occasion may require. Such passages as the following are numerous, *απο Θεου πατρος ἡμων, και Κυριου Ιησου Χριστου*, and in all these passages *Κυριος* is the same to us as *ὁ Κυριος*; and before *Θεος* the article is not wanted. Should it be said that the article is omitted before *Κυριος* because it is omitted before *Θεος*, I answer that this reason, simply considered, is not sufficient, as might easily be shown.* In the Epistle of James i. 1, we read, *Ιακωβος Θεου και Κυριου Ιησου Χριστου δουλος*. Here the article before *Θεος* is omitted as unnecessary; hence Paul also writes, *Παυλος δουλος Θεου*. 2 Thess. i. 12, we read *κατα την χαριν του Θεου ἡμων, και Κυριου Ιησου Χριστου*. Here the article is inserted, because *ὁ Θεος ἡμων* is more correct than *Θεος ἡμων*. In the first Epistle to Timothy v. 21, we find *διαμαρτυρομαι ενωπιον του Θεου και Κυριου Ιησου Χριστου*. Here again the article is inserted, because *ενωπιον του Θεου* is the usual expression. But the apostle, it seems, in these instances ought to have inserted the article before *Κυριου*, if he did not intend that Jesus Christ should be considered as both God and Lord. But what if in the view of the apostle he *could not* be thus considered? And certainly his habitual practice of speaking of God and *our Lord Jesus Christ* in the same sentence, as distinct from each other, constitutes a *point of difference* between these passages and those cases to which the canon is justly applied. In illustration of the canon, the following words of Æschines have been quoted: *ὁ συκοφαντης και περιεργος Δημοσθενης*. But who sees not, from the observations which have now been made, that this passage is not analogous to the controverted passages in the New Testament, except in *form*, and that their coincidence in this respect may justly be considered as accidental? We read *ὁ Κυριος ἡμων και σωτηρ Ιησους Χριστος*; and here the canon holds good. But *Κυριος ἡμων* not only is an attributive, but a perpetual attributive of Jesus Christ; whereas *Θεος* and *Κυριος Ιησους Χριστος* are perpetually distinguished from each other. It is easy to lay hold of a rule, and to apply it to cases which

* The following passage is worthy of notice: *ἐξ οὗ και σωτηρα απεκδεχομεθα Κυριον Ιησουν Κριστον*. Philipp. iii. 20.

appear similar, without considering in what they differ, but this has never yet been deemed the part of sound criticism; nor will any vigilant critic suffer himself to accept an imperfect for a perfect analogy.

In a word, the canon in question will prove nothing until the divinity of Christ shall have been established by other evidence, and when this shall have been done, I shall say of the canon, *valeat quantum valere potest*. But were I a Trinitarian, I should wonder that Jesus Christ should never be called *our God*, except with another appellation. I do not question the sincerity of those who endeavour to support the divinity of Christ by this canon, but I am persuaded that they would gladly exchange all the passages to which it has been applied for one such expression as the following, ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστός.

E. C.

Nov. 1, 1824. M. R. vol. xix.

P.S. When I said that the epistolary writers of the New Testament do not *commonly* use the article with an attributive standing before the name of Jesus Christ, &c., I had in mind the following passage, 2 Tim. iv. 1, Διαμαρτυρομαι ουν εγω ενωπιον του Θεου και του Κυριου Ιησου Χριστου, and I did not know whether there might not be one or two passages similar to this. But I believe that there are not; and I find that του Κυριου is excluded from the text of Griesbach.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—I have read Dr. Channing's last sermon with great pleasure and interest. A glowing fervour of feeling, controlled by a vigorous understanding, breathes in every page. But I am sorry that he should have thought it necessary to cast certain reflections upon the English Unitarians, and upon that eminently great and good man Dr. Priestley. To these reflec-

tions I should probably have replied, had not this been already done by abler hands. But there is one observation relative to Dr. P. on which I cannot forbear to make a remark. Dr. Priestley is represented as “distinguished more for rapidity than for profoundness of thought.” To this I reply, without hesitation, that if to think justly is to think *profoundly*; that if in every matter of controversy to see where the question hinges, and to separate that which is extraneous from that which is essential; that if to penetrate into the abstruser mysteries of metaphysical science, and to make that clear to many which before perplexed the few; that if to dive into the recesses of the human mind, and thence to draw forth negative reasonings to array against what had passed for positive proofs; that if all this indicates *profoundness* of thought, Dr. Priestley was the profoundest thinker of his age. But what is it, after all, that not unfrequently passes for profoundness of thought? Laborious research, which promises much, and accomplishes nothing. Instances might be produced of writers who have been thought profound, who have seldom arrived at a just conclusion, who have only lost themselves in the *depth* of their own conceptions, and bewildered those who have admired their profundity. It is said, indeed, that truth lies hid in a well; and, as though misled by this adage, we sometimes overlook it when before our eyes, and then take vast pains to draw it from its deep retirement. And when we have fatigued ourselves with a tedious and fruitless search, we either reward our labour by embracing a shadow for the substance, or charge our own blindness on the supposed obscurity of the thing pursued. In fact, it is not so much profundity of thought which is necessary for the discovery of truth, as a quickness of perception to see what kind and degree of evidence are required, and a *comprehension of mind* which can balance arguments against objections, and ascertain on which side the scale preponderates. But to return to Dr. Priestley. Dr. Priestley, then, was a man in whom acuteness and comprehension of intellect were combined in a pre-eminent degree. In the grasp of his understanding and the extent of his views, he far indeed surpassed

every contemporary writer of whom I have any knowledge. And in accordance at once with the greatness of his conceptions and the singleness of his soul, he writes with a simplicity which has seldom been paralleled, and never surpassed. Bent on some great object, he never stops to set off a single idea to the best advantage, but as though secure as to the general validity of his reasonings, he leaves the naked truth to make its own impression. From a magnanimity of thought peculiarly his own, he overlooks inferior objections which might be brought against the views which he defends, or those which he attacks, and never descends to those subtleties which have secured a more general admiration to writers whose talents have borne no comparison to his. In one respect, I confess, Dr. Priestley was not a profound thinker;—he thought without *effort*, and enables his reader, for the time being, to think without effort also. He often seizes his point at once, and gains by a glance resembling intuition what others would have endeavoured to establish by the formalities of a long and elaborate proof. He is never obscure, and therefore never leaves us to wonder at the depth of that knowledge which we find ourselves unable to comprehend. But Dr. Priestley sometimes errs in his judgment. And who does not? But it is matter of *just astonishment* that a man who thought *so rapidly* should have erred so little. And I feel the fullest conviction, that he has not erred *at all* on some of those topics on which many English Unitarians, together with Dr. Channing, differ from him. Upon the whole, I do not think that Dr. Priestley's talents are held in the estimation which they deserve by those who are so much indebted to his labours. His moral excellence will indeed be acknowledged by all except weak men and bigots, "whose praise is censure, and whose censure praise." But few seem to me to form a just estimate of his intellectual endowments, or to understand how great a man he was.

If I may be allowed to occupy a little more space in your pages, I should willingly make an observation or two on certain positions of Dr. Channing's, which are found in the same

note with his remarks on Dr. Priestley. Dr. Channing gives it as his opinion, that "reason teaches that the supernatural must occupy either a large space or none at all, in the Divine administration." From what premises this conclusion follows, I am at a loss to discover. Reason seems rather to teach, that under the administration of an infinitely wise Being, who has *confessedly* instituted a system of *general laws*, supernatural interposition need not be frequent, and *fact* in this case seems to confirm what reason dictates. But Dr. Channing further remarks, that "it may be said of men, in whom the intellect acts alone, or in whom it is disjoined in a great degree from imagination, taste, and refined moral sentiment, and from the perception and feeling of the great, the good, and the lovely, that although they claim for themselves peculiarly the character of rational, they are among the last to discover the *rational in religion*." I hope that I am not too old to learn, since I feel that I am willing to be taught; but this is a lesson which I fear that I shall find it difficult to apprehend, having always thought that the great impediment to the discovery of religious truth has been, that in the pursuit of it intellect *does not act alone*. And hence I have explained what otherwise would have appeared inexplicable, how it comes to pass that men of sense and reflection can resist the evidence of truths which appear to me to admit of as clear and easy demonstration as any proposition in Euclid. I have heard, indeed, that *carnal* reason cannot judge of spiritual things. This, however, I have always considered as the refuge of absurdity, as the evasion of men who have felt a galling conviction that they were engaged in the defence of an *irrational* system. But I did not expect to hear that reason without some foreign aid cannot discover the *rational* in religion. But according to Dr. Channing, imagination, taste, and refined moral sentiment, must be called in to assist the decisions of the intellect, and to guard it against the errors into which, when *acting alone*, it will be prone to fall. How it may be on the other side of the Atlantic, I cannot tell, but on our side of the water there are men not deficient in understanding, who profess to see in

Calvinism the perfection of moral harmony and beauty. Now as Calvinism certainly does not make its appeal to the *intellect alone*, I presume that these gentlemen must find it to accord with their imagination, taste, and moral sentiment, and perhaps (strange as it might appear to me) they may derive an argument in its favour from their "perception and feeling of the great, the good, and the lovely." It will be in vain to reply, that their taste, imagination, and moral sentiment must be miserably perverted; they doubtless think otherwise, and unless the appeal be made to reason, and to reason alone, it will be impossible to prove that they do not think justly. But Dr. Channing has moreover observed, that "that system of faith alone is rational which accords with man's whole nature, and especially with his moral nature, and with those high spiritual faculties and sensibilities which adapt and direct the mind to God, and to a nobler existence than the present." But the question is, whether the views which, *in Dr. Channing's opinion*, accord best with man's moral nature, are or are not the views of Scripture. I am ready enough to allow that a system of *divine* truth must in reality be adapted to the moral nature of man; but there is a better judge of that adaptation than either Dr. Channing or myself—I mean the great Author of Revelation, who, though He has doubtless done all that it was right to do for the moral improvement of mankind, may not have done all that our imaginations might have anticipated, or all that our "sensibilities" may crave. But, to return to the remark which I chiefly proposed to consider, I would observe, that imagination, taste, and moral sentiment, unless they are under the guidance of reason, will rather impede than promote the discovery of truth, as in this case taste will be false, imagination delusive, and moral sentiment incorrect. Taste, imagination, and moral sentiment, are terms which are grateful to the ear from the pleasing ideas with which they are connected, but the things intended by these terms differ in different individuals according to the countless variety of influences and associations to which they have been exposed; and unless Dr. Channing can point out a method by

which they may be rectified to the standard of pure reason and abstract truth, they must, if listened to, in innumerable instances lead to error. Dr. Channing's reasoning seems to proceed upon the supposition that, while the naked intellect will pronounce one judgment, taste, imagination, and moral sentiment will pronounce another. Which ought to yield in the conflict, I cannot for a moment doubt. But if Dr. Channing means (which perhaps he does mean), that where true taste, a correct imagination, and just moral sentiment, are combined, they will *imperceptibly* guide the judgment, and save it from the *chilling* errors into which it might otherwise fall,—in this case, it is true, no conflict will be experienced, and our inquiries may proceed with a smooth and uninterrupted current; but the misfortune is, that it is difficult to say when taste is true, when imagination is correct, and when moral sentiment is just; and this must be decided by reason, if decided at all. In few words, unless we mean to *open a door for enthusiasm*, we must admit that in the study of revealed truth, as of all other truth, reason is the sovereign authority to which everything else must bow. Nor need we wish to call in any principle whatever to assist the “naked intellect” in the study of religious truth, since the views which the sacred volume will unfold to the *understanding* alone are of the most sublime and elevating character, and, if cordially received, are abundantly sufficient to work upon the best affections of our moral nature, and to “make us wise unto salvation.” That imagination, taste, and moral sentiment may be of great use in illustrating and enforcing these views, I am very ready to grant. Of this, indeed, Dr. Channing is himself an eminent proof. And I wish from my heart that there were many Unitarian preachers like him, save and except in the prejudices which he has taken up against the English Unitarians, and against a man who, by a rare combination of intellectual and moral excellence, may justly be regarded as one of the brightest ornaments of human kind.

E. C.

Jan. 1825. M. R. vol. xx.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—When I have said the little which I have to say upon a subject, I cannot easily, amidst the pressure of my occupations, turn my attention to it a second time; but as silence in some cases is liable to be misinterpreted, I think it proper to say a word or two in reply to the observations of your correspondent Ω, p. 75.

In the Second Epistle of Peter i. 1, some manuscripts, instead of Θεου, read Κυριου; so that this passage, allowing the genuineness of the Epistle, cannot be confidently appealed to on the question. Your correspondent is right in considering the Common Version as incorrect. I should, without hesitation, render the passage as it is rendered in the Improved Version, and should extend to the word Σωτηρ the remark which I made in relation to the word Κυριος, nor do I see any sufficient reason why it should not be thus extended. Indeed, when I made the remark, I conceived that if there were good reason to believe that the canon did not hold good with respect to ὁ Θεος ἡμων και Κυριος Ιησους Χριστος, it could not hold good with respect to ὁ Θεος ἡμων και σωτηρ Ιησους Χριστος. But your correspondent asks, “If ὁ Κυριος ἡμων και σωτηρ Ιησους Χριστος is correctly rendered ‘our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ,’ why should not ὁ Θεος ἡμων και σωτηρ Ιησους Χριστος be rendered ‘our God and Saviour Jesus Christ?’” To this question my former communication will give what, I think, may be considered as an answer; and if your correspondent will do me the favour to read it again, if I mistake not, he will perceive that, though the grammatical construction of the two passages is the same, yet when the general language of the apostolic writers is considered, there is a *circumstance of difference* between them which justifies an adherence to the canon in the former instance, and the neglect of it in the latter. It may moreover be observed, that when a writer can suspect no danger of being misunderstood, he may unconsciously fall into a construction which he would

otherwise have avoided. I have reasoned, as your correspondent will perceive, upon the supposition that Peter was the author of the Epistle, and that he wrote Θεου, not Κυριου.

Since I wrote my former paper, I have read Appendix, No. III., to Dr. Carpenter's third edition of Unitarianism the Doctrine of the Gospel; to which I would refer those of your readers who wish to see a full and judicious discussion of the subject.

E. C.

Feb. 1825. M. R. vol. xx.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—As I do not wish to see the cause of Unitarianism aided by a single erroneous interpretation of Scripture (any more than by the “disingenuous artifices”* of any Unitarian preachers), I was not sorry to find that the Reviewer of Dr. Spry's Two Sermons in your last Number, in treating of Hebrews i. 2, has rejected the interpretation of Grotius, which, however, as the interpretation of so great a man, Valckenaer justly thinks ought to be *modestly* refuted. It is an interpretation to which I never could subscribe, as I do not remember in the course of my reading to have met with a passage in which *δια* with the genitive must necessarily be rendered *propter*, though I think I have seen one or two in which it might be rendered indifferently by *propter* or *per*. In the passage pro

* The Bishop of Chester has lately affirmed that several Presbyterian congregations have been “deluded into Unitarianism by the most disingenuous artifices on the part of some of their preachers.” I wish that his lordship, of whom I have been accustomed to think too favourably to suppose that he has thrown out a random charge without imagining that he has facts to support it, had thought it worth his while to inform us what these artifices have been, and by whom they have been employed. At present the imputation is too vague to be refuted, and, as it falls on no one *individually*, may be supposed to be applicable to many.

duced by the Reviewer from Thucydides, lib. v. § 53, *δια* does not govern *του θυματος*, but *την εσπραξιν*, which follows. In lib. vi. § 57, I have always thought that *δι' ὄνπερ*, which is the reading of several manuscripts, ought to be restored. It is at length adopted in the useful edition of Haack, and will, I doubt not, be retained in the edition publishing by Poppo. Of Josephus I can say nothing positively. I think that he uses *αφικνεισθαι δια λογων*, which I suspect to be one of the expressions referred to by the Reviewer. This expression, meaning to hold a conversation, is analogous to *δι' εχθρας αφικνεισθαι* and many others in the best Greek authors. It is used by Euripides in the *Medea*. *Vide* desideratissimi Elmsleii notam ad v. 842. But whatever may be the justice of these remarks, one thing I well know, that my venerable friend Mr. Belsham, with whose ardour in the pursuit of religious knowledge, and *scrupulous care* to derive his faith from the Scriptures alone, I have been acquainted for more than forty years, values truth infinitely more than any interpretation of Grotius, or of any other man.

E. C.

July, 1825. M. R. vol. xx.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—Allow me to suggest to your respectable correspondent T. F. B. (p. 536), that *γιγνεσθαι*, or the Ionic *γινεσθαι*, is used by Herodotus in the sense of *ειναι*. *Vide* Wesseling, ad lib. vii. ch. xi. In ch. lii. of this book we read *τῶν συ μαρτυς γινεαι*. Aristophanes, Pl. v. 431, uses *γιγνεσθαι* in the same sense; *ουκουν ὑπολοιπον σοι το βαραθρον γιγνεται*. I subjoin an observation of Valckenaer. This incomparable scholar, in commenting on Heb. i. 4, writes as follows:—*γινεσθαι frequenter ponitur pro ειναι, frequenter et abundat. Nostro tamen loco virtute non caret, significans factus*. Thus much in defence of Socinus. With the interpretation of the Proem of John's

Gospel I do not meddle, being contented with the conviction which I feel, that the orthodox interpretation is inadmissible.

In reading the excellent communication of *Clericus Cantabrigiensis* (pp. 552-557), I was somewhat amused to find that Dr. Coplestone attributes the admission of the Necessarian system in part to the pride of the human mind in refusing to believe that the *foreknowledge* of God may coexist with the *contingency* of events. What obstinate perverseness, not to believe that an event can be *certain* and *uncertain* at the same time! But this pride of the human intellect is, in many cases, a provoking quality. It has an unlucky propensity to call things by their right names, and will not swallow a *contradiction*, though recommended under the guise of an "apparent incongruity." Theologians, in particular, find it a troublesome thing to deal with. Even though they call it hard names, and vilify it with the appellation of *carnal reason*, or imperiously demand of it to humble itself before their *mysterious* dogmas, it remains inflexible. It will pry into secrets which it is assured are above its comprehension, and pertinaciously refuses to admit that two propositions which are diametrically opposed to each other can both be true. When will men of sense and learning cease to deceive themselves and mislead others by the sophistry of words? When will they remember, or reason as though they remembered, that things will remain the same by whatever names they may be called? When will theologians, especially, be sensible that, unless they can refute the charge of maintaining absurd and contradictory propositions, to call their doctrines *mysteries*, is only to add evasion to the disgrace of defeat? It would be more magnanimous boldly to affirm, that what appears a contradiction to the limited understanding of man, may, nevertheless, be true.

E. C.

Oct. 1825. M. R. vol. xx.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—In the haste with which I made my remark on the verb *γινεσθαι*, in my last (p. 605), I omitted to observe that, in the passage quoted from Herodotus, *γινεαι* can neither be rendered by *fis* nor by *factus es*, the sense excluding the former, and the tense of the verb the latter, of these renderings. I also neglected to submit to the consideration of your ingenious correspondent an example or two of *γενεσθαι* used as the aorist of *ειναι*. The following instances will show that a transition or change of state is *not always* implied by this word. Thucydides, lib. iv. ch. xciv. Ψιλοι—ουτε τοτε παρησαν, ουτε εγενοντο εν τη πολει. Lib. ii. ch. xcvi. Εγενετο ἡ αρχη ἡ Οδρυων, μειγεθος, επι την θαλασσαν καθηκουσα, κ. τ. λ. Herodotus, lib. ii. ch. cxxxiv. Ουτω και Αισωπος Ιαδμονος εγενετο. *Thus it appears that Æsop also was the slave of Jadmon.* Pausanias, lib. i. ch. xvi. Σελευκον δε βασιλεων εν τρις μαλιστα πειθομαι και αλλως γενεσθαι δικαιον και προς το θειον ευσεβη. The Scholiast on the Vespæ of Aristophanes, v. 581. Αισωπος τραγωδίας εγενετο ὑποκριτης γελοιωδης. On this instance I need make no remark. I may now, I think, compare και ὁ λογος σαρξ εγενετο (as interpreted by Socinus), with the following passage of the Septuagint. Proverbs iv. 3, υἱος γαρ εγενομην καγω πατρι ὑπηκοος, και αγαπωμενος εν προσωπω μητρος.

The fact seems to be this: The verb *γινεσθαι* is used of a state commencing, and *ειναι* of a state which exists. But this distinction was sometimes overlooked even in the present tense, as particularly by Herodotus; and as things *are* what they *have become*, the primary meaning of *γινεσθαι* was often dropped in the aorist, and the want of a proper form of an aorist to the verb *ειναι* was supplied by *γενεσθαι*, as in Latin, *fui* (from the Greek, *φυνω gigno*) was used as the aorist of *sum*. If any one contends that the primitive signification of the verb ought to be taken into account in these instances, he seems to me to overlook the analogy of language, and to embrace in his con-

ception what never suggests itself to the mind of the reader. I will only add, that I now distrust the example produced in my last from Aristophanes. E. C.

Oct. 1825. M. R. vol. xx.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—Having, since I wrote my last (p. 646), received two friendly letters from a respectable contributor to the Repository on the verb *γιγνεσθαι*, I have been led to think upon the subject more than I had ever done before. The result of my thoughts I will now communicate in as few words as I can.

I had said that *γενεσθαι* was used as the aorist to *ειναι*, and, upon looking into Buttman's Greek Grammar, I find that this able grammarian has stated that *γεγονα* and *εγενομην* are used as the preterites of this verb. That this is true with respect to the *infinitive mood* is certain, there being no possible way of expressing the sense of *fuisse* in Greek but by *γενεσθαι* and *γεγονεναι*. But I will confine myself chiefly to *γενεσθαι*. If *γενεσθαι*, then, is often equivalent to *fuisse*, would it not be strange if *εγενομην* could never signify *fui*? But of this use there are many and unquestionable examples. I will only add two to those which have been already produced. Philostrati Heroica, p. 32, in the edition of Boissonade:—Εἰ μὲν τετρατῶδεις ἐγένοντο ἐκεῖνοι καὶ ξυμβεβλημένοι θηριοῖς οὐκ οἶδα. *An immensi illi (Gigantes) fuerint, et serpentibus cincti, non novi.* Theocriti Scholiastes ad Id. vii. ver. 8: ΒΡΑΣΙΛΑ· οἱ γραφοντες δια τοῦ δ', ἀμάρτανουσι. Ἐγένετο γὰρ Βρασιδάς Λακων τοῦ γενος, ὃ δὲ Βρασιλας Κῶρος. But, it may be said, how came it to pass that the primary meaning of *γιγνεσθαι* should be obscured or lost in the aorist? I ask, in reply, how came it to pass that the Greek *φύω* should lose its primary signification in the Latin *fui*? But is it not common for words by a certain inflection of meaning to be applied to cases to which in their

primitive sense they were inapplicable? And do not the preterites of certain verbs differ materially in signification from the present tenses of these verbs? Every scholar knows that *κτᾶσθαι* is *to acquire*, and that *κεκτησθαι* is *to possess*. This is not extraordinary. But *κεκτησθαι* is sometimes so used as to exclude the sense of *acquisition*. *Vide Euripidis Orest.*, v. 1202. Analogy, then, would lead us to conclude that if *εγενομην* was once used for *fui*, its original meaning would, in some instances, be *lost sight of altogether*. I will now endeavour to point out the *ratio* of the fact for which I have been contending. When we speak of that which *was* or *has been*, we evidently do not speak of a permanent and necessary existence, but of something which must *have begun* to be, of something, which, in some way or other, must *have become* what it *has been* or *was*. The verb *εἶναι*, therefore, may not improperly borrow its preterites from a word which comprehends the significations of *nasci*, *oriri*, *feri*. Certain it is that neither *εἶναι* nor *esse* have preterites of their own. And the reason of this, *perhaps*, may be, that they denote existence *simply*; and hence they are applicable to that which exists necessarily and permanently. But even though my metaphysics should be false, the fact will remain the same.

While writing this last sentence, I was struck with the use of the term *existence* in our language. *To exist*, if we consult the derivation of the word, is to *come into being*, and yet who hesitates to speak of the *existence* of God? This may teach us not to reason too confidently from the primary meaning of a word as to what may be its ultimate use. But here a wide field of inquiry opens itself, into which I will not enter. I will only add, that some critics have said, that *existo* in Latin is sometimes equivalent to *sum*. E. C.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—In looking over my last communication (xx. 729), I find that I have committed an error in transcribing the Latin version of the passage quoted from Philostratus. Instead of writing *serpentibus concreti*, I have written *serpentibus cincti*. I can account for this mistake only by supposing that Virgil's *cinctam serpentibus Hydram* was indistinctly present to my mind. Had I thought of the Greek at the time, or recollected that the Giants (to speak with Apollodorus) εἶχον τὰς βασιεῖς φοιιδας δρακοντων, association would not have got the better of my eyesight. A curious instance of the power of association is produced by a late eminent critic in the Classical Journal, No. XVII. p. 49. "A letter," says he, "is inserted in the Gentleman's Magazine for 1798 (p. 839), with the following title: *An Original Letter from Dr. Thomas Moore, of Norwich*. This letter is signed *Tho. Browne*, and appears to have been written by the celebrated Sir Thomas Browne. There is no resemblance between Browne and Moore, but the transition from *Sir Thomas Browne* to *Sir Thomas More* is extremely easy."

On the Homeric γεγτο spoken of by Dr. Jones, p. 727, see Heyne's Homer, vol. v. p. 421. E. C.

Jan. 1826. M. R. vol. xxi.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—I have read with pleasure the ingenious remarks of T. F. B. in your last Number (p. 20). I think that I have in *in effect* already replied to them in my communication for December last (xx. 729), particularly by the quotations from Philostratus and the Scholiast on Theocritus. I will only add

one or two brief remarks. *The word has been flesh* would in Greek be expressed by γεγνε. It is true that the aorist in Greek is often used for the preterpluperfect; but this use is confined to cases where the meaning of the tense cannot be uncertain. The same observation may be made respecting the perfect, or rather the aorist, in the Latin language. Your correspondent's rendering of Λισωπος Ιαδμονος εγενετο, would seem to imply that Æsop was born free, but afterwards came into a state of servitude. But of this Herodotus evidently knew nothing. To sum up the whole in a few words—my doctrine is, that in certain cases the primary meaning of γιγνεσθαι had as little force in the aorist γενεσθαι, as the meaning of the Greek φυω had in the Latin *fuisse*. But whether the primary meaning of γιγνεσθαι was lost in the aorist or not, if γενεσθαι was used as an aorist of ειναι, which your correspondent grants that it frequently was, all that I have contended for is, in fact, conceded. As to the distinction which my ingenious opponent makes between the imperfect and the aorist, it is not founded on any principle with which I happen to be acquainted.

With respect to the import of the term *mystery* (see p. 3), I should have no objection to apply this term to certain truths which surpass the comprehension of the human intellect, had it not been so egregiously abused. Your correspondent is well aware that *words* operate as a charm, and the word *mystery* has been perpetually employed as a charm to silence reasoning and to disguise absurdity. A proposition is submitted to my consideration, couched in terms which either mean nothing or destroy each other; and when this has been demonstrated, the advocate of the proposition tells me that his doctrine is a *mystery* which I must not expect to understand. But I ask, what is it which I must not expect to understand? I understand *most clearly* that his proposition, if it means anything, is self-destructive and contradictory, and the only *mystery* to me is that he should not understand the same. But he urges that the *subject* to which his doctrine relates is too sublime for the limited faculties of the human mind. Be it so; but my concern at present is with an individual proposition upon the false-

hood of which I feel myself competent to pronounce. But my adversary still tells me that I am not competent to pronounce upon the falsehood of that which relates to a *mysterious* subject; and by the magic of a word he would willingly close *my* eyes as effectually as he has closed *his own*. *Mystery* has been made the last refuge of baffled argument, and the term has been employed to awe the human mind into a blind submission to dogmas at which reason stands aghast, and to which Scripture gives no countenance. Your intelligent correspondent will now see on what my dislike of the term *mystery* is founded, and I feel persuaded that we cannot materially disagree. E. C.

Feb. 1826. M. R. vol. xxi.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY.

SIR,—I perceive that in my last (p. 85) I have inconsiderately drawn an erroneous inference from T. F. B.'s rendering of a passage quoted from Herodotus, which I wish to acknowledge, in justice both to your ingenious correspondent and to myself.

Your American critic has now a second time turned my attention to the *canon* respecting the Greek article. My view of the subject may be *briefly* expressed as follows: The canon relates to two or more nouns denoting attributes of one and the same subject. But God and our Lord Jesus Christ are perpetually distinguished from each other. Κυριος Ιησους Χριστος is used again and again for *the* Lord Jesus Christ when the word Θεος precedes; and when ο Θεος precedes, it will be found that the article was required by the usage of the Greek language. These circumstances form a clear line of distinction between those cases in which the canon holds good, and those to which certain Trinitarian divines have wished to apply it. E. C.

March, 1826. M. R. vol. xxi.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE CHRISTIAN REFORMER.

SIR,—It has sometimes occurred to me that something might be written with advantage on the use and abuse of analogical reasoning. But as I have neither inclination nor ability for long discussions, I can only throw out a hint or two, upon which men of greater talent may enlarge, if they think proper.

Analogical reasoning is a species of argumentation by which the understanding may be easily misled, as it carries with it the show of ingenuity and research, and by captivating the imagination may pervert the judgment. At the same time, when properly employed, it is of admirable utility, as in cases where the production of a similar instance affords the very evidence which is required. There are some propositions which it would be scarcely possible to defend except by analogy. A parallel case is the only thing which can fully satisfy the mind, and when this is found, a difficulty which before might appear insurmountable, ceases to be felt. But in the use of analogical reasoning, great care should be taken that the things compared should, as far as relates to the point in question, be truly similar. And where a general resemblance is made to stand for strict similitude, there analogy is misemployed, and the person to whom this reasoning is addressed, unless he can call in the aid of a discriminating judgment, will infallibly be deceived. In matters of criticism, it is demanded by accurate scholars that the analogies which are brought forward should be perfect in every circumstance which is essential to a just comparison; and if the same severity be not employed in moral reasoning, the cause of truth cannot fail to suffer. But the least caution is often employed where the greatest is required; and many, no doubt, would laugh to scorn the man who should reason on the most trifling subjects in the way in which they themselves reason on matters of the highest importance.

But the justice of the above observations will best appear by

an instance or two of the proper and improper use of analogical reasoning.

Suppose it to be urged, and urged it has been, against Christianity, that this religion cannot proceed from God, because it is not communicated to the whole human race. This objection, if expressed in its proper form, amounts to the following proposition—that God will not bestow an important blessing on some of his offspring which He withholds from others. And this proposition, which seems specious enough in itself, can only be refuted by the evidence of fact. Here, then, analogy not only *may* but *must* be employed, or the objection remains unanswered and unanswerable. But, happily for the cause of revelation, it is a characteristic of the Divine government that privileges are allotted in different measures to different individuals, and that which is granted to some is denied to others. This holds true, even of blessings which are most important to the true enjoyment of life, as health, knowledge, and the means of intellectual and moral cultivation. Analogy, then, furnishes a reply to the objection, which is satisfactory and complete.

Again, it has been objected to Christianity that it produces but little effect on the conduct of its professors, and that it has even been the cause of evils of no ordinary magnitude. This objection, when reduced to its principle, affirms, that what God bestows cannot be abused. But this proposition analogy most fully and clearly refutes. Reason is allowed to be the gift of God, and man, as such, is complimented with the appellation of a rational creature. But in how few does reason discharge its proper office! How few really live that life which reason dictates! And how often is this faculty employed to gain the most unworthy ends, and to effect the basest purposes! Indeed, everything which God gives may be and is more or less misapplied. And were Christianity incapable of being abused or neglected, this peculiarity might induce a suspicion that nature and revelation had not the same author.

But it is time to pass on to one or two examples of the misapplication of analogical reasoning.

Were it urged in behalf of that decree which is supposed to have destined, or to have *left*, the greater part of the human race to suffer eternally for the sin of Adam, that children do, in fact, suffer in this world for the folly or the vices of their parents, it could not be denied that there is an analogy between the two cases. But the analogy is imperfect and defective. Between these two appointments there are *important circumstances of difference which are more than sufficient to counterbalance their general resemblance*. By the former, interminable misery is entailed as a punishment upon those who had no share in the guilt contracted. By the latter, temporal inconveniences are sustained by the child in consequence of his parent's misconduct. By the extravagance of a father his son may be reduced to poverty. But thousands live in poverty whose fathers were never extravagant. In consequence of the excesses of a father a child may be born with a feeble frame and delicate constitution. But there are many whose frame is feeble and constitution delicate, whose fathers were chargeable with no excesses. And whoever shall be able to vindicate the appointment of Providence in the latter case, will not be at a loss how to vindicate it in the former. Indeed, from that arrangement, which has provided that the consequences of a man's conduct should extend to those with whom he is closely connected, mankind may learn, and do learn, lessons of prudence and virtue. But what useful lesson is to be learned from the *decretum horrendum* of Calvin, it would puzzle the ablest theologian to explain.

Again, analogy has been called in to illustrate the doctrine of the Atonement and the mediation of Jesus Christ. A schoolmaster, it is said, may grant his scholars some indulgence, or remit the punishment due to an offender, if one of his pupils will consent to write an extraordinary exercise. But to make the case parallel, this said exercise should furnish the ground upon which favours should be granted, or punishment remitted, in every case in which indulgence is shown or an offence forgiven. The remission of punishment, for instance, *whenever it is remitted*, must be referred, as to its procuring cause, to the

exercise of A B, which was composed for this kind and generous purpose.

Bishop Butler, in his "Analogy," furnishes another instance of false reasoning applied to this subject. In defence of what he terms the satisfaction of Christ, he says, that "when in the daily course of Providence it is appointed that innocent people should suffer for the faults of the guilty, this is liable to the very same objection as the instance we are now considering." He also remarks, that "vicarious punishment is a providential appointment of every day's experience." If the expression *vicarious punishment* is to be understood according to its proper and obvious meaning, vicarious punishment is a thing altogether unknown in the plan of Providence and the economy of the human life. And if nothing more be meant by the expression than that the innocent are liable to suffer in consequence of the faults of others, it may be replied, that this appointment, of which a very satisfactory explanation may be given, bears no resemblance to a judicial decree by which an innocent person should suffer that the guilty might escape.

But analogy has nowhere been more egregiously misapplied than in defence of what have been termed *mysteries* in religion. We are compelled to believe certain truths in relation to things, of which we know not the nature or mode of operation. And this fact has been urged in behalf of propositions which are either absolutely unintelligible or demonstrably false. It has been said, that as we are obliged to believe what we cannot comprehend, we shall be guilty of temerity if we reject those sacred mysteries which from their very sublimity must ever be incomprehensible to man. In this reasoning, *incomprehensibility* is made a generic term, which includes two distinct cases, that of conclusions which reason *is compelled* to admit on subjects which, considered in their full extent, lie beyond its grasp; and that of propositions, the terms of which are either obscure or contradict each other. To confound these cases may suit the purpose of the theological disputant, but the judicious inquirer after truth will take good care to separate them. He will believe that there is a God, though he knows not how

this great Being exists; but he will not on this account be a whit more disposed to believe that the Father is God, and that the Son is God, and that the Holy Ghost is God, and yet that there are not three Gods but one God.* E. C.

Jan. 1827. C. R., N. S. vol. i.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE CHRISTIAN REFORMER.

SIR,—As it is much the fashion to speak of the doctrine of the Atonement as a *vital, fundamental, cardinal* doctrine of Christianity, I wish to inquire a little into the doctrine to which such an importance is attached. As maintained by those who hold the above language, the doctrine, I apprehend, is this, that God the Son, dwelling in the man Christ Jesus, *made an infinite satisfaction for sin to the justice of God the Father*. I ask, then, is this doctrine expressly taught in the Christian Scriptures? Can it be conveyed to the mind in *Scripture language*? Is it not *manifestly* a human interpretation of a phraseology which is found in the Christian records? Is there a single passage in the New Testament which expresses any thing *tantamount* to this *vital* doctrine? And yet, as the reader will observe, *it is capable of being distinctly laid down in the compass of one short sentence*. If this is a *fundamental* principle of the Christian religion, it were to be wished that the apostles had understood it as well, and defined it as clearly, as the orthodox of modern times. How much controversy might have been spared if they had not left this *vital* doctrine to be *collected by inference* from expressions to which

* When it is said that there are three *persons* in one *God*, the charge of verbal contradiction is avoided. But when the terms of the proposition come to be explained, if it do not resolve itself into mere Unitarianism, it presents us with three Gods in one God. That this should not have been perceived by men of understanding and reflection, affords a striking proof of a truth which has not yet received the consideration that it deserves—I mean, the power of words to blind the understanding.

various other interpretations may be given! When will the practice cease of establishing gratuitous, not to say absurd, theories on the language of Scripture, and then dignifying them with the appellations of *vital* and *fundamental* doctrines of the Gospel? But the orthodox Christian, no doubt, will ask, what is the meaning of those passages of Scripture in which the death of Christ is spoken of in connection with the forgiveness of sin? Were I to give him my interpretation of them, he would not accept it. It is, however, sufficient to reply, that whatever be their true interpretation, his interpretation cannot but be false, as it involves assumption upon assumption. To say nothing of the doctrine of three persons in one God, it assumes what is manifestly not true, that the sin of a finite being deserves an infinite punishment; it assumes what can never be proved, that infinite justice is something altogether distinct from infinite benevolence; it assumes, in contradiction to the whole analogy of judicial inflictions, that justice can be as well satisfied by the sufferings of the innocent as by the punishment of the guilty; and unless, for the sake of consistency, it be maintained that the divinity suffered, it assumes that an infinite value may be attributed to the sufferings of a man.

It will be no wonder if the advocates of such a doctrine should also be advocates for the prostration of the understanding to the mysteries of the Gospel. But when it is demanded of me to prostrate my understanding to the mysteries of the Gospel, I am at a loss to understand what the demand implies. Am I to believe, that I do not see that to be an absurdity or contradiction which I do see to be such? Or am I to believe, that what I do see to be a contradiction or an absurdity may not be such in reality, and ought, therefore, to be received? One thing, however, is certain, namely, that this demand involves an acknowledgment that the doctrines contended for are *irreconcilable to reason*. Let them be shown not to be *irrational*, and the prostration of the understanding will have no place. I will not dwell upon the consequences which have followed from this prostration of the

understanding in religion, but will simply state, that as the evidences of Christianity amount only to the highest moral probability, it will be impossible, while Christianity is encumbered with doctrines which are irreconcilable to reason, to argue successfully with the unbeliever. Prove to him that on the ground of its external evidence the Christian faith cannot rationally be rejected, his answer is at hand. He will reply, that, perplexing as the case may be, it cannot be more irrational to reject than to admit a faith which appears to contradict the clear and certain conclusions of the human mind. The advocate of *mystery*, indeed, will say that the doctrines for which he contends are neither self-contradictory nor absurd. But of this the unbeliever will not allow him to be the judge.

But I ask, with what justice this doctrine can be called a *fundamental* doctrine of Christianity? Does it enforce a single moral obligation? Does the disbelief of it withdraw any motive to virtuous conduct? Is it by an appeal to this doctrine that we are urged to live soberly, righteously, and godly in the world? Or is not the grand consideration to us, what we shall suffer for sin if not repented of and forsaken, rather than by what medium it will be pardoned, when forgiven? I do not, however, say that the doctrine is not capable of any application. It is often applied to the injury, if not to the subversion, of practical religion. Men who have lived the most irreligious and immoral lives are exhorted in their dying moments to fly to the atoning blood of Christ for a passport to the joys of heaven. But this, it may be said, is an abuse of the doctrine. Be it so. I should be glad to be told what are its uses. It shows in an awful manner the evil of sin. And in a manner equally awful it distorts the character of God, and represents the Father of mercies as a being whom *it is impossible to love*. It is not, however, matter of admiration that they who verily believe this doctrine should consider it as a *fundamental* principle of their religion. If the understanding does not feel its absurdity, the imagination will be strongly impressed with its mysterious grandeur. The stern justice of the First person of the Trinity, contrasted

with the benignity of the Second, who condescends to do that without which myriads of helpless beings must have been doomed to everlasting torments, presents a subject of contemplation, which he who can unsuspectingly admit the doctrine, will not fail to regard with wonder and with awe. And to such a man, Christianity, when stripped of this stupendous machinery, will appear to have lost its essence and its interest. Thus, doubtless, the pious Catholic considers the Protestant as having robbed Christianity of its chief excellence and glory, while professing to reform the errors of the Church of Rome. But some zealot may now ask, if the atonement is not a *vital* doctrine of the Gospel, what *is*? I answer, the solemn assurance that “all who are in their graves shall hear the voice of the Son of Man and shall come forth, they who have done good, to the resurrection of life, and they who have done evil, to the resurrection of condemnation.”* This is indeed a doctrine of revelation, a doctrine in which every man is most deeply interested; a doctrine which applies to the grand springs of human action, hope, and fear, and which, when regarded as the sanction of the moral precepts of Christianity, leaves us nothing further to desire as a motive to a pious, benevolent, and holy life. A divine rule of life, supported by the doctrine of future retribution, established also on divine authority, contains everything that can beneficially influence human conduct, and train the heart of man to virtue. If

* “Had Jesus Christ delivered no other declaration than the following:—‘The hour is coming in which all that are in the grave shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil to the resurrection of damnation,’ he had pronounced a message of inestimable importance, and well worthy of that splendid apparatus of prophecy and miracles with which his mission was introduced and attested; a message in which the wisest of mankind would rejoice to find an answer to their doubts and rest to their inquiries. It is idle to say that a future state had been discovered already; it had been discovered as the Copernican system was; it was one guess among many. He alone discovers who *proves*, and no man can prove this point, but the teacher who testifies by miracles that his doctrine comes from God.”—PALEY.

I mistake not, however, there are Christian divines who, in their zeal for their peculiar doctrines, will not hesitate to say, that Jesus Christ came for no very important purpose if the object of his mission was merely to teach morality, and “to bring life and immortality to light.”

E. C.

March, 1828. C. R., N. S., vol. ii.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE CHRISTIAN REFORMER.

SIR,—If you think that your readers are not altogether weary of the Trinitarian controversy, the following remarks upon it, written some years ago, are at your service, in which I have confined myself to the simple proposition that there exists in the Godhead a trinity of *persons*. With those who maintain that the Deity exists in three distinctions, or sustains three characters, I considered myself as having no concern, as their hypotheses are *manifestly* in substance Unitarian.

In this proposition, then, that God consists of three persons, it is plain that the term Person and the term God are not intended to be synonymous, nor would any sober Trinitarian choose to assert that there are three Gods in one God. Even the author of the Athanasian Creed does not choose to affirm this. He says indeed, that the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God; but he immediately subjoins (would you have thought it, reader?) that there are not three Gods, but one God. It appears, then, that neither of the three persons of which the Godhead consists is strictly and properly God. And, indeed, could it be predicated of each individually that he is truly and properly God, then, as God consists of three persons, the Father, being God, must consist of three persons, the Son in like manner must consist of three persons, and the Holy Ghost of three persons; and each of these persons must consist of three other persons, and so

on *ad infinitum*. The Trinitarian may dispute the inference, and may say that his proposition expressly limits the Divine essence to three persons; but unless he uses the term God in a qualified sense, when he speaks of God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, the above reasoning stands against him in all its force. In what sense, then, does he use the term?

But let the meaning of the term God be for a moment considered. This term is universally used to signify an intelligent *Being*, possessed of what are called the attributes of Deity. Is, then, the Father such a being, and is the same to be affirmed of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost? We have, then, three Gods as distinctly defined as language can define them; and to say that these three are one, is only to say that one and three are identical. If, on the other hand, the Father is not an intelligent *Being*, and the Son and the Holy Ghost are in like manner neither of them intelligent *beings*, then, each of them being God, it follows, that something which is not an intelligent being may possess the attributes of Deity. What that something is, let him explain who can. Will the Trinitarian still say that he does not use the term person to signify an *agent* or *being*? I will not urge in reply, that this is the only intelligible sense of the term, nor will I ask the vain question, in what sense the term is intended to be used; but will rather remark, that whatever the term person denotes, if it does not denote an intelligent being, the doctrine of the Trinity is neither more nor less than Unitarianism wrapt up in a cloud of unmeaning phraseology. If God is acknowledged to be one Being (and the Trinitarian does not choose to say that He is three), the proposition of the Unitarian is virtually admitted. To say that this one Being subsists under three persons, is to advance a proposition which means just *nothing* until the sense of the term person shall be defined; and to call one of these persons the Father, and another the Son, and to allot to them offices which nothing but an intelligent agent can discharge, is only to show that unless the term person is used to denote such an agent, it is egregiously misapplied. Nothing

more surely need be said on the subject, until the meaning of the term person shall be distinctly specified. And there will be no temerity in predicting that whenever this shall be done, the proposition of the Trinitarian will either resolve itself into Unitarianism, or prove itself to be demonstrably false. One plain question, however, shall be asked in the meantime. Are the three persons of the Trinity to be considered as each possessing a separate and individual consciousness? If so, the three divine persons are, to all intents and purposes, three Gods. If they do not respectively possess a consciousness of their own, then either the consciousness of the Father is the consciousness of the Son, and the consciousness also of the Holy Ghost, and in this case the three persons are strictly *identical*, or the Divine consciousness must be possessed exclusively by one of the three persons of the Trinity; in which case the other two are neither persons, nor anything else which the human imagination can conceive.

Will the Trinitarian say, that though human language does not furnish terms which may express his doctrine with sufficient clearness and precision,* the doctrine itself may still be true? I ask, what doctrine? The proposition which he has usually maintained, when the terms of it come to be considered, either melts away into simple Unitarianism, or resolves itself into two propositions which contradict each other, and by which, therefore, nothing is conveyed. But the Trinitarian will still urge,

* Some have intimated that they are not bound distinctly to define or comprehend the terms in which they shall express so sublime and mysterious a doctrine. No doubt, if a man chooses, for his own amusement, to use words without ideas, he has an unquestionable right so to do. But if he comes forward to explain to his fellow-christians in what sense a fundamental doctrine of revelation is to be understood, and especially if he demands that an assent should be given to his explanation, he may assuredly be called upon to define his terms. And if he refuse to do this, he has no reason to complain if others will not admit that which he does not himself profess to understand. He may choose to satisfy himself with a persuasion that a proposition which is expressed in terms that convey no definite meaning may be true *in some sense or other*; but the intelligent inquirer will ask, *in what sense?*

that as his doctrine respects the mode of the Divine existence, the human mind cannot expect to fathom it. I might still ask, what doctrine? But waving this question, I observe that though the mode of the Divine existence is incomprehensible by man, it does not follow hence that every proposition which shall be advanced concerning it may be true, or that *no* proposition can be laid down respecting it which the human intellect can with certainty pronounce to be false. In fact, a proposition, the terms of which contradict each other cannot be true, whatever be the subject to which it relates. As I formerly remarked on the subject of Mystery, there is a great difference between not seeing how a thing *can* be, and seeing why it *cannot* be. And this is a difference which has been generally overlooked. I once heard a preacher of distinguished talents remark, that as there are mysteries in nature, as, for instance, we do not know by what energy a blade of grass is made to grow, we might antecedently have expected mysteries in the dispensation of grace, and may therefore safely admit what have been termed the mysteries of the Gospel. I considered this as a specimen of that loose mode of applying analogical reasoning by which men contrive to deceive themselves and to impose upon others. On this subject much might be said, but I will content myself with observing, that an analogical argument which brings forward a general resemblance between two cases, but omits a more important feature of difference between them, proves nothing, and less than nothing.

But perhaps the Trinitarian may now say that Christ is expressly called God in the New Testament, and that here the controversy, as it respects the divinity of our Lord, must end. Admitting the fact, I should rather say, that here the controversy must begin; and the question to be considered would be, in what sense this appellation might be given to Christ in consistency with the declaration of an apostle, a declaration confirmed by the tenor of the Christian Scriptures from beginning to end, that “to us there is one God, the Father, and one Lord, Jesus Christ.”

To these remarks, written, as I have stated above, some years

ago, I will add one *general* argument from Scripture against the doctrine which has been here considered: and the argument is this, that the language of the New Testament (to say nothing of the Old) is manifestly framed not on Trinitarian but on Unitarian principles. I do not here mean to take into account the passages in which the simple humanity of Christ seems to be positively affirmed, nor those in which our Lord asserts the limitation of his power and knowledge, which at once negative the notion of his divinity, but shall confine myself to the use of the term God in the Christian Scriptures.

According to the doctrine of the Trinity, at least according to that view of it which has been the subject of consideration, there are three *persons* in the Godhead; in other words, God subsists in three persons, called the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Neither of these persons then, singly considered, is truly and properly God, and the term God, in its genuine and full signification, ought to mean a Being in whom these three persons are united. But though the term God occurs (as has been said) thirteen hundred times in the New Testament, is there the slightest evidence that it is used in a single instance to denote a Trinity in Unity? Is there not, on the other hand, the most full and satisfactory proof that in the Christian Scriptures the term is employed to convey the notion of one person alone? When God is said to have given his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him might not perish but have everlasting life, what is intended by the term God? Surely not the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but the Father, *as distinguished from the Son*. When it is said, that there is one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, the meaning cannot be, that the man Christ Jesus is a mediator between man and the Father, *Son*, and Holy Ghost, but between man and the Father only. It being then certain, even from the evidence now produced, that the term God is applied to that one person whom we denominate the Father, it is reasonable to conclude that whenever the simple term God is used, the Father alone is intended. And in this sense, I doubt not, it is generally used even by Trinitarians themselves.

But let it now be allowed that the term God may be applied with equal propriety to each of the three persons of the Trinity; how, then, comes it to pass that we should nowhere read in the Scriptures of God the Son, and of God the Holy Ghost? That this is the true language of Trinitarianism, Trinitarians themselves have unwittingly afforded us abundant proof. But if one main object of the Christian revelation was to disclose the doctrine of the Trinity, is it not beyond expression strange, that while in the Christian records there is repeated mention of God the Father, not a word should be said of God the Son, and of God the Holy Ghost, and that we should nowhere read of three persons in one God? Is it not altogether inexplicable that the apostles, whose minds must have been full of so sublime a mystery, should not have taught the deity of the Son and of the Holy Ghost in language as clear and unequivocal as that in which they have taught the deity of that Being whom we call the Father? Trinitarians, however, are ready enough to contend that their doctrine is laid down in the New Testament in the clearest and most intelligible terms, and often reproach their opponents with wilful and incorrigible blindness because they cannot find it there. But I ask, how it comes to pass, if their doctrine is explicitly taught in Scripture, that they do not rest satisfied with expressing it in scriptural language? Why do they adopt a phraseology of their own in preference to the express words of inspiration? Why, I might further ask, have they not been contented with scriptural doxologies, but have chosen rather to employ ascriptions of praise of which Scripture furnishes no example, and to which it gives no countenance? Surely, by being thus wise above what is written, they convict themselves of error. The language of Trinitarians, indeed, when compared with the language of Scripture, is most manifestly the language of men who have fabricated a system for themselves; and it is language which is so far from bearing the impress of divine truth, that if submitted to a fair analysis, it will be found either to mean nothing or to contradict itself.

But I will add no more; nor should I have written thus

much, had I not wished, *for once*, to say a word or two on a doctrine, the rejection of which forms the distinguishing characteristic of that class of Christians to which for more than forty years I have professed myself to belong. E. C.

May, 1829. C. R., N. S. vol. iii.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE CHRISTIAN REFORMER.

Θεος δε ου τιμωρεται εστι γαρ η τιμωρια κακου ανταποδοσις κολαζει μεντοι προς το χρησιμον και κοινη και ιδια τους κολαζομενους.

SIR,—In p. 66 of Bishop Butler's "Analogy," I find the following words:—"Some men think the sole character of the Author of Nature to be that of simple, absolute benevolence. And supposing this to be the only character of God, veracity and justice in Him would be nothing but benevolence conducted by wisdom. Now, surely this ought not to be asserted unless it can be proved, for we should speak with cautious reverence upon such a subject." I quite agree with this able and excellent author that we ought to treat the question with cautious reverence. But upon the first view of the subject, it is manifest that not less temerity would be shown by affirming that justice and veracity in God are independent of benevolence, than by affirming that they are included in it. And that they *are* included in it, several considerations may be brought forward to show; while, for the contrary proposition, no probable argument can be advanced. I shall confine myself to the attribute of justice. If justice, then, in God be not a modification of benevolence, it is not analogous to that principle which we otherwise denominate justice, and it is in vain for us to reason concerning it. Justice in man, or that *to which alone we give the name of justice*, is evidently a branch of general benevolence, and even when it assumes its severest

form, and is employed in awarding the punishment of guilt, it has a view to nothing but utility; and however it may miss of its object from a defect of wisdom, the object itself is always what benevolence approves, or rather what benevolence suggests. If punishment were inflicted with any other view than that of doing good either to the offender or to others, we should no longer consider justice as the principle which ordained such infliction, but should refer it without hesitation to the wantonness of cruelty or the malignity of revenge. To say, then, that justice in God may be altogether distinct from benevolence, is only to say that justice in God may *not* be justice; and to affirm that it *is* distinct from benevolence, would be to affirm that there is no attribute in the Divine Nature to which the term justice can with propriety be applied.

But it will be said that there is something in moral evil which calls for suffering as its consequence, without any regard to utility, and that Divine justice is the principle by which this suffering is inflicted. On the concluding remark of this proposition, I need scarcely observe, that it is a mere abuse of language, to call that justice which is supposed to do what justice never does. But the proposition that there is a demerit in vice which calls for suffering, *even though the suffering should be in every sense useless*, presents a fair subject of inquiry. Do we then perceive anything in vice, *considered in itself*, which makes it necessary that pain should follow it, *even though this pain should be useless both to the sufferer and others?* It is in vain to reply, that, according to the constitution of nature, suffering is the consequence of vice, and therefore that to suppose the fact to be different from what it is, is to suppose an impossibility. That guilt and pain are connected by a law of nature, is admitted. But the present inquiry is, whether we see any reason, exclusive of utility, why they should be thus connected. And I conceive that we do not. For the sake of brevity I shall occasionally use the term *punishment* for suffering by which neither the sufferer himself nor others would be benefited. Will it, then, be said, that the *fitness of things* requires that *punishment* should follow guilt?

To speak of the fitness of things, without stating to what that fitness relates, is only to employ words instead of ideas, and to use a *relative* term as though it had an *absolute* sense. And granting all that has been said respecting the fitness of things, the question may still be asked, do we see that the fitness of things demands what it is now supposed to require? Perhaps it may be alleged that the human mind *intuitively* perceives that guilt ought to be followed by punishment. For other minds I cannot answer, but I have not this intuitive perception. I can, indeed, perceive clearly enough that punishment which shall be productive of good, may be inflicted from a principle of benevolence, but beyond this I perceive nothing. But vice or sin, considered as an offence against the perfect law of God, may justly be visited with what has been termed vindictive punishment. I answer, that the perfection of the Divine law, when considered, as it ought to be, in connection with the frailty of man, does not appear to supply a reason for the infliction of punishment which should *do no good*; and that the perfection of the Divine *character* forbids the supposition that such punishment will be inflicted.

But the honour of the Divine government, it may perhaps be said, requires that guilt should be followed by punishment. When it shall be shown that the honour of the Divine government consists in something distinct from the good of the creation, this proposition will deserve to be considered. In the meantime it is sufficient to ask, how the honour of any government can be sustained by punishments which should have no beneficial influence on the subjects of this government? But does not the ordinary language of mankind seem to be founded on the supposition that guilt deserves punishment for its own sake? Do we not say of an atrocious criminal, a brutal murderer for example, that he deserves to suffer something worse than death? In reply, I observe, that the indignation which we feel at certain crimes, though a useful principle in our constitution, may mislead our judgment; secondly, that the ideas of guilt and punishment are so closely associated in our minds that we are apt to overlook the link by

which the things themselves are connected ; thirdly, that were we to analyse our ideas when we use the above language, we should find our meaning to be, that while death is the legal punishment for lighter offences, the atrocious criminal, if punished according to the enormity of his crime, might justly experience a severer doom. But let us be convinced that *no good whatever* would follow this severer punishment, and we should immediately acknowledge that to inflict it would only be to add one evil to another. But, it will be asked, does not every man *feel* that sin deserves punishment for its own sake, and independently of any benefit by which the punishment may be followed ? To this question I would reply, that where reason is silent feeling is a dubious authority. And reason finds no connection between guilt and punishment, but what is founded upon individual or public advantage. As for the feeling in question, the case seems to be this. The ideas of guilt and punishment are associated in our minds by various means from our earliest years. Hence arises the notion of *demerit* which in consequence of this association is familiar to every man ; but perhaps not one man in a thousand has considered whence this notion is obtained, or what is implied in it. And all that a man, whether properly or improperly, can be said to *feel* is a persuasion that the appointment by which punishment follows guilt is just and proper. But in what the justice and propriety of this appointment consist, reason must inform him if he is informed at all. And he who says that guilt merits punishment for its own sake, says a great deal more than his feelings ever taught him. He has proceeded to argue upon what he feels, and has drawn a conclusion which I conceive to be erroneous. In a word, the only *intelligible* view of the connection between vice and suffering is, that vice is a disease, and that suffering is intended to effect its cure or to check its contagion. I think it sufficiently appears that punishment as far as we are able to judge, has for its object *utility alone* ; and I conceive that I cannot conclude better than by presenting to the English reader the meaning of my motto : “ God

does not inflict vindictive punishment, for this is the returning evil for evil; He chastises, however, for utility, both publicly and individually, those whom He chastises." E. C.

Jan. 1831. C. R., N. S. vol. v.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE CHRISTIAN REFORMER.

SIR,—As the judgment of the Vice-Chancellor in the case of Lady Hewley's Trustees lay before me the other day, as reported in the *Times* newspaper, my eye was struck with something that looked like Greek, and my attention was immediately arrested by it. On closer inspection, I found that the Vice-Chancellor was animadverting on certain supposed errors in the Improved Version of the New Testament. To some of his animadversions I shall take the liberty to reply, in behalf of the translators, though in one instance I shall differ from them. The Vice-Chancellor prefaces his animadversions with some observations on giving a *creed* instead of a *translation*. In my reply to his animadversions, I do not intend to have anything to do with *creeds*; but if a *creed* can be conveyed in a false translation, what scholar will affirm that no creed has been thus conveyed in the Common Version? God forbid, however, that I should impute to the translators the guilt of *wilfully* perverting the sense of Scripture. The portion of the translation which the Vice-Chancellor has selected for the subject of his remarks is the first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews. And the Vice-Chancellor finds fault with the translators for rendering πολυμερως, in the first verse of the chapter, "in several parts," instead of "at sundry times." "Πολυμερως," says the Vice-Chancellor, "might signify many parts of time or many parts of space." In criticism, the question is not what a word *might* signify, but what, in the

usage of a language, it does signify. Δι' οὗ και τους αιῶνας ἐποίησεν: "For whom also he constituted the ages." On this version the Vice-Chancellor remarks, that "the translators, finding themselves a little pushed hard when they translated δι' οὗ 'for whom,' have recourse to a note, by which it appeared that two or three persons had fancied that might be the proper translation." One of those who fancied this, and, for aught I know, the first, was the *incomparable* Grotius, whose fancy, it is true, is ably refuted by that *most profound scholar* Valcknaer,* who, at the same time, notwithstanding his orthodoxy, observes that the interpretation of Grotius is to be refuted modestly. The Vice-Chancellor cannot, indeed, be charged with any offence against modesty in his remarks on this version. His honour pronounces nothing upon it with confidence, except *that it certainly is not the received translation*. "He does not think, however, that any Greek scholar would dream that such was the *offhand* construction." His honour might have ventured to assume a more decisive tone, for *most certainly* no real Greek scholar, in the present day, would *offhand* translate δι' οὗ "for whom."

I consider this version as indefensible, and I am not the only *Unitarian* who passed that judgment upon it in the Old Series of the Monthly Repository. However, as an apology for the authors of the Improved Version, I must remark that the *authors of the Common Version* have in one instance supposed δια, with a genitive, to express the *final cause*. "Who being a ray of his brightness, and an image of his perfections." The Vice-Chancellor was "perfectly astonished" to find the word ὑποστασις rendered *perfections*. This version is borrowed from Mr. Wakefield, who no doubt considered the ὑποστασις here spoken of to be the *moral*, not the *physical* essence of the Deity. In a former work he had rendered the word *substance*. The translators might have borrowed from the orthodox Schleusner, and substituted *Divine Majesty* for *person*. Here

* This great man has been the object of admiration to all the scholars in Europe, and was such, not least of all, to the late Professor Porson.

the observation of Dr. Sykes deserves to be considered, namely, that the word ὑποστασις was not used in the days of Paul to signify *person*.

“And ruling all things by his powerful word.” “This,” namely, “powerful word,” for “the word of his power,” says the Vice-Chancellor, “does not express the literal meaning of the Greek, nor did the translators mean that it should.” Valckenaer gives the following version: *Nutu suo potentissimo*. He does not, indeed, agree with Grotius and the authors of the Improved Version in his view of the passage; but as far as the Vice-Chancellor’s objection goes, he is with them, and with them must share the censure. The Vice-Chancellor does not like the translation of πνευματα into *winds* in the 7th verse, and pronounces it to be *truly astonishing* that such a translation as “‘flames of lightning’ should be given to πυρος φλογα, which could not have that meaning.” “Πυρος φλογα. Sic in stylo sublimiori *fulmen* dicebant Hebræi, quod Schultensius monuit ad Jobum. Sensus itaque dicti est, *Qui ex ventis spirantibus facit angelos suos, quique fulminibus utitur ut ministris suis publicis*.”—Valckenaer. Higher authorities than Valckenaer and Schultens could not be produced. Valckenaer’s version is, indeed, a kind of paraphrase, intended to embody the substance of his critical observations, but it stands directly opposed to our Common Version, however *astonishing* this might seem to the Vice-Chancellor.

But the Vice-Chancellor charges it generally on the Unitarian translators, that they neither gave nor meant to give a *literal* translation, and *on this he lays great stress*. If this charge is just, Valckenaer will befriend them once more, who writes as follows: “*Sic solent interpretes servi verbum de verbo reddere, quo librorum sacrorum magnificentiam non parum dedecorarunt*.”—“Thus servile interpreters are accustomed to render word for word, by which they have not a little debased the magnificence of the sacred books.” Surely the Vice-Chancellor is singularly unfortunate in coming so often into a collision with this great critic.

I have written these brief remarks not as a theologian, which,

strictly speaking, I am *not*; nor as a Unitarian, which I *am*; but simply as a lover of Greek, and a lover of justice. I am aware that the Improved Version is not faultless; but let not blame fall upon the translators where no blame is due, and where *critics of the highest order* might find matter of commendation.

The Vice-Chancellor having finished his examination of particular passages, pronounces his judgment on the Improved Version in these words: "He never remembered to have seen any translation which could be considered more unsatisfactory, more arbitrary, more fanciful, more silly, and, he was sorry to add, more false than was that book."* How far this judgment is warranted by the *criticisms* which preceded it, I shall leave it to others to decide.

Before I lay down my pen, which, at my age, and with my growing aversion to writing, I shall not often resume, I will say a few words, probably my last words, on the general subject of Unitarianism. It is the fashion with bigots in the present day (for bigotry, like other things, has its fashion) to deny that Unitarians ought to be denominated Christians. It is in every man's power to give us, or to withhold from us, what name he pleases; but I shall quit the world with a conviction that the united efforts of all the bigots in Christendom cannot prevent the gradual extension of the Unitarian doctrine. The seed is sown, and the harvest must in due time follow. Unitarianism is not the opinion of an hour, it is not the dream of a fanatic, which must pass into oblivion, or be remembered only as a specimen of human folly; it is not a doctrine which requires for its reception that the eyes of the understanding should be hood-

* The reader may contrast with this judgment the liberality of the *learned* Dr. Bennet, Bishop of Cloyne, who, in a letter addressed to Mr. Belsham some little time after having received from him a copy of the Improved Version, expresses himself as follows. After observing that it is not to be expected that our opinions on many disputed and doubtful passages should perfectly coincide, he adds, "But it is always pleasing to see the sentiments of a respectable scholar, and the ingenuity with which he supports them. I repeat, therefore, with truth, that you have done me a great favour, and I shall always esteem your work a valuable addition to my library."

winked, or which invokes the aid of *terror* to protect its mysteries, but it is a doctrine which recommends itself by its divine simplicity, and which accords at once with the voice of nature, of reason, and of Scripture. It is a doctrine which is most honourable to God, and which looks with a benignant aspect upon man. It is a doctrine which (as opposed to Trinitarianism) has classed among its advocates several of the most illustrious names which have adorned the annals of the world. It is a doctrine which has been extricated from the cumbrous mass of absurdity under which for ages it had lain buried, by the *diligent and critical study of the Scriptures*. An attempt to extinguish this doctrine would be as unavailing as an attempt to extinguish the sun. The light of Divine truth has burst forth after a long and gloomy night, and though at present "the darkness comprehendeth it not," it cannot fail gradually to disperse the mists and clouds which may surround it, and to shine more and more unto the perfect day. E. C.

P.S. In the reply of "A Barrister" to the "Unitarian Independent" in the *Times* of Saturday, the 11th inst., I read the following paragraph: "But we will apprise the unlearned reader, that neither the Independent nor the Unitarian translators know anything of Greek, if they fancy that their translation of the 7th verse of this chapter is correct; for, to waive the objection to *lightning*, the translation ought to have been, 'Who maketh his messengers winds, and his ministers flames of fire.' Every critical Greek scholar is aware that, whenever two nouns or phrases are connected by a verb in this manner, making one an epithet to the other, the object *has* the article, and the epithet *has not*."

Will the Barrister affirm that Valckenaer *knew nothing of Greek*? If so, he must be a stranger to the name. Valckenaer has himself stated the principle which guided the Greeks as to the use of the article in the case in question, and he has observed that the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews has not used the article as it is used by them. Had he thought it necessary, he could probably have produced instances to con-

firm his interpretation. I will venture to produce one for him. In the 104th Psalm, verse 3, "who maketh the clouds his chariot," the Septuagint has no article before the word translated *clouds*,* which certainly appears to be the *subject* in the sentence, and not the *predicate*. E. C.

Jan. 1834. C. R., N. S. vol. i.

* Ὁ τιθεις νεφη την επιβασιν αυτου.

APPENDIX.

The following Letters would not have appeared in this volume, had it not been for a wish expressed by several friends who had perused them with interest.—R. C.

Dorset Gaol, September 25th, 1800.

MY DEAR SIR,

The formality of a letter on such an untoward subject, was not necessary from you. I recollected your severe affliction, and sympathised with you: it was sufficient to engross your thoughts, and I made myself sure at all times of every kind wish, and every correspondent feeling from so estimable a friend.

What commendations I may have ever bestowed upon you, were a compliment to my own perception of uncommon merit; and whatever my industry may have done for me, and persevering zeal, I contemplate the powers of your mind with astonishment, and an unaffected conviction of great inferiority in this respect.

I thank you for the passage in Lilius; my copy is not here, but he is an author whom I have read diligently, and think worthy of more respect than he has received.

Mrs. W. and what of my family are with me, are well, and unite in every good wish for Mrs. Cogan, yourself, and children. Believe me,

My dear sir,

Your most sincere and affectionate friend,

GILBERT WAKEFIELD.

September 6th, 1821.

DEAR AND EXCELLENT MR. COGAN,

Highly do I value, and carefully shall I preserve, your learned and friendly letter. I am quite exhausted by business and visiting in London, and I mean, as soon as possible, to make my escape into the country; there I shall carefully examine the passages which you have communicated to me from Herodotus. In the bustle of the town I really cannot attend, as I ought to do, to any literary subject. The other morning I read two of your sermons, and I was very much pleased with them indeed. I thank you, dear sir, again, and again, and again, for presenting me with the two precious volumes, and most assuredly I shall read some of the Discourses from my own pulpit, when I shall explicitly do the same justice to you which I have done to Dr. Rees.

Pray come and see me, for I shall give you a hearty welcome, and vexed I am that it is not in my power to wait upon you, as I did most sincerely wish. Mr. Cogan, your moral and your intellectual excellences have taken firm hold of my regard, and my respect; and I have this morning charged one of my executors to give you a ring when I am no more. Present my best compliments to Mrs. Cogan. Do not again preface, or again conclude, with that formal language of "Rev. Sir." I shall set you a very different example, by subscribing myself,

Dear Sir,

Your very faithful well-wisher and obedient servant,
S. PARR.

Extract of a Letter from DR. PARR to DR. ABRAHAM REES.

DEAR SIR,

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Now for a merry story. Nearly a month ago two ecclesiastical dignitaries came from Leamington to hear

me preach ; they were at the Regent Hotel, where the public table is often crowded. They heard me preface a sermon to this effect :—"The discourse I am going to deliver to you came from the pen of a writer who does not belong to the Established Church, but I have the honour to call him my friend, and I am sure that his intellectual powers, his literary attainments, his candour, his moderation, and his other exemplary virtues, would make him an ornament to any religious community."

Well, my two hearers, in a public company, expressed their astonishment and their indignation that such an eminent clergyman as Dr. Parr should bestow such praise upon Dr. Rees, who was a Socinian, and preach from a pulpit in the Established Church avowedly the sermon of such a heretic. Upon this a long and warm discussion arose.

Now, dear sir, in the first place Dr. Rees is not a Socinian ; in the second place, the sermon was not written by Dr. Rees but Mr. Cogan ; and in the third place, it did not contain one syllable which, under the torture of polemical interpretation, related directly or indirectly to any one peculiar tenet of Homousians, Sabellians, Patropassians, Macedonians, Arians, Apollonarians, Socinians, or modern Unitarians.

I was much amused with the tale, but I shall continue to preach good sense, whether it comes from the pen of Mr. Cogan, or Dr. Rees, or Dr. Duchal, or Dr. Jortin, or Bishop Sherlock, or Bishop Warburton, or Dr. Clark,—and these are the writers whose sermons I am accustomed to deliver ; and I now and then sprinkle some holy dew of panegyric upon these illustrious worthies.

I am, dear Sir,

With the greatest respect and regard,

Your friend, and obedient humble servant,

S. PARR.

Extracts from Letters received by a member of MR. COGAN'S family, shortly after his death, from the REV. THOS. JOHNSTONE, of Wakefield, one of Mr. Cogan's earliest and most esteemed friends.

The Memoir of your dear father, in the "Christian Reformer," for April, has greatly impressed me. It is calculated to interest every reader to whom his name is known, and, to the particular friends who have been happy enough to have had a personal acquaintance with him (more especially those who, in addition to the warmth of friendship, have been in eager pursuit of the same classical studies), it must afford singular and exquisite satisfaction. I cannot tell you in how lively a manner the account which is given of my residence with him has impressed me. It is peculiarly expressive of my past enjoyment, advantage, and improvement. Separated from your beloved father for so many years as I have been, I can still vividly recall the period of my companionship with him. Never, indeed, could it be effaced from my recollection; and the manner in which it has been communicated in the Memoir referred to, has brought it so strongly to my recollection, that, although now advanced to the age of eighty-seven, I could suppose it were only a short space since this enjoyment existed. Some scenes, indeed, will so return to my aged fancy, if I may so express it, that I could almost imagine that I was actually talking to him. One incident especially returns to my recollection. We had been separated some little time after his removal from the College, and he wrote to me (I think from Rothwell, his native place) to meet him, if possible, at Cambridge, and enjoy together the performance of "Acis and Galatea," which was to take place there, in the Senate House. Nothing could exceed our delight. We were both very familiar with the music, and I was persuaded by a gentleman, who was himself a performer, to take a part with him on the violin, while my friend was half persuaded to join in the singing, for which he was amply prepared, but declined. I shall never

forget the extreme enjoyment he manifested throughout the whole of the performance. Fond of Greek as he was, music had a fascination for him equally remarkable; and when the Memoir speaks of his bursting forth in the middle of the night in the concluding part of the trio in "Judas Macca-beus," so simply grand and beautiful as it is, my own voice, when I read it, involuntarily broke forth in fancied union with him in his favourite passage, "That thy power, oh, Jehovah! all nations may know;" and again, in the other sweet air of Handel referred to, and equally familiar to him, "Did I not own Jehovah's power, how vain were all I knew."

Though now with an eye dim with age, with a voice all shattered from the same cause, and with a pen which rigid fingers can scarcely guide, I could write in fancy for hours to record the numerous strains in which we were wont to indulge together, to revive our more serious labours, and to throw an animated cheerfulness over our existence. But not in music alone, or in affording me classical advantages, was he a valued friend, but also in aiding my first pulpit services. Many applications were made to the college at Daventry for supplies to the congregations in the district, some of which fell to his share, and on certain occasions he was wont to invite me to go with him, and by my taking some part in the devotional exercises, he wished me to bring my "mind gradually in," as he expressed it, for the more full ministerial duty. At that time it was not possible, I may observe, to read a written prayer in the dissenting chapels then visited; it was, therefore, necessary to acquire the habit of fluent extempore speaking, or to commit the prayer to memory. The former was considered, at that time, the most desirable, and considerable efforts were made (though not always with success) by some of the Daventry students for the attainment of this particular part of public duty. Extempore speaking was ever rather painful to my friend Mr. Cogan, and therefore he was soon glad to avail himself of the advantage which the change, in this respect, in certain places of our worship afforded. The opportunity which he thus granted me, of early acquiring the facility of

speaking, gave me an advantage in some religious services, particularly on funeral occasions, and in my frequent visits to the bed of sickness. In connection with the circumstance of my occasionally accompanying my friend in his first ministerial duties, I am here led to notice his first acquaintance with his cheerful and ever kind partner in life. Weedon was the happy spot. We went to supply the small dissenting society in that place, and we were domiciled at her father's house. No event more auspicious to his happiness than their subsequent union could have been accomplished. Of this I witnessed the most engaging proofs when, a few years afterwards, I visited your dear father and mother at Cheshunt, and also at their last loved habitation at Walthamstow. I will not enlarge, or I could dwell long upon the intellectual attainments and virtues of your venerated father, and also upon my own personal obligations. Thank God, I have had many friends, and I would undervalue no one, but assuredly amongst the foremost would be your dear departed parent, and, till my memory, which is, alas, gradually fading, has passed completely, his blessed self, in fond imagination, will remain with me. Let us, my dear friend, apply to the departed the blessed gospel assurance, the sweet hope of a renewal of affection in that world where no advance of time enfeebles the spiritual powers, and no mournful interruptions of existence can again take place. May it be, that though I was not permitted to renew my acquaintance with him here, I shall there be blessed with this privilege, and of witnessing at the same time his reunion with the children of his paternal love.

I remain, my dear friend,

Most truly yours,

THOS. JOHNSTONE.

Wakefield, April 27.


A LIST OF PUBLICATIONS,

BY THE

REV. E. COGAN.

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- A FRAGMENT ON NECESSITY. 8vo. *Printed*, but not published.
- MOSCHI IDYLLIA TRIA, GRÆCE, NOTIS ILLUSTRAVIT IN USUM STUDIOSÆ JUVENTUTIS E. COGAN. 8vo. *London*, 1795. *Printed*, but afterwards suppressed.
- REFLECTIONS ON THE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY. 12mo. *London*, 1796.
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- A SERMON ON THE PURITY AND PERFECTION OF CHRISTIAN MORALITY, delivered in the Meeting-House, Cross-Brook Street, Cheshunt, April 17th, 1800. 8vo. *London*, 1800.
- CHRISTIANITY AND ATHEISM COMPARED, in a Discourse delivered at the Meeting-House, Cross-Brook Street, Cheshunt, May 18th, 1800.
- AN EXAMINATION OF MR. ROBINSON'S REPLY TO MR. COGAN ON THE PRACTICAL INFLUENCE OF A BELIEF IN A FUTURE STATE. 8vo. *London*, 1800.
- A SERMON at the Old Meeting-House, Walthamstow, on occasion of the Death of ISAAC SOLLY, Esq., preached in 1802. 8vo. *London*.
- A SERMON delivered at the Old Meeting-House, Walthamstow, Oct. 29th, 1809, on occasion of the Death of EBENEZER RADCLIFFE, Esq. 8vo. *London*, 1809.
- A SERMON delivered at the Old Meeting-House, Walthamstow, December 10th, 1809, on occasion of the Death of MRS. HANNAH COOKE. To which is added, AN ADDRESS delivered at her interment in Bunhill Fields, Dec. 5th, 1809. 8vo. *London*, 1810.
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- A SERMON delivered at the Old Meeting-House, Walthamstow, Aug. 2nd, 1819, on occasion of the death of ELIZABETH, daughter of the late ISAAC SOLLY, Esq. 8vo. *London*, 1818.


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